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Abstract 
This thesis explores changes in medical professional work and regulation in the 
context of emerging 'patient safety' health policies. The study engages with three 
components of this policy. First, to what extent is the concept of error promoted in 
theory and policy being taken up within managerial practice and is this coterminous 
with the medical interpretation and construction of error? Second, how do medical 
professionals regard the intrnriuction of new reporting systems to collect information 
about errors in their work? Third, what new organisational systems are being 
developed to analyse and control errors and how do these diverge with those 
approaches advocated and practiced by medical professionals? It has been estimated 
that one in ten of all inpatient admissions experience some form of error in the 
delivery of care, totalling 850'000 events a year. Given such findings a new policy 
framework is being developed to improve 'patient safety' in the NHS. Following the 
Human Factors approach a new error management system is being introduced that 
consists of incident reporting procedures for the collection of information about 
errors, matched by techniques to identify the "root causes", and promote 
organisational change. Of importance for this thesis is the impact of policy on 
established forms of medical regulation. Through predominantly qualitative research 
techniques, this study has been carried out within a single NHS hospital case-study 
invol ving medical and managerial occupational groups. The empirical findings 
suggest, firstly, that the medical construction of error is indeed divergent from that 
advocated in policy and practiced in management and leads to distinct trajectories 
for the control of error. Secondly, medical professionals are generally disinclined to 
participate in managerial forms of incident reporting, and where such a system is in 
place there is a high degree of localised professional leadership. Thirdly, it was 
found that alongside new managerial systems for the control of errors, there were 
also a range of professional-led systems embedded within medical work and the 
local organisation of the hospital that had precedence of other centralised hospital 
systems. In consequence, the ability of managerial systems to penetrate the working 
environment of medicine was negligible. In conclusion, it is argued that while this 
policy could appear to challenge the basis of medical professional regulation the 
social, cultural and structural context of medical work is adapting to maintain a high 
degree of medical control and resist managerial encroachment. 
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1. Introduction 
The study 
"First, do no harm" 
(Hippocrates c400BC) 
"To err is human" 
(Pope 1711, line 525) 
This thesis is concerned with understanding the organisational and occupational 
control of health service quality, transitions in the relationship between medical and 
managerial groups in the National Health Service (NHS) and the extent to which 
medical professional regulation is changing. The focus of this study is the health 
policy agenda that aims to secure 'patient safety' through establishing new systems 
for the management of errors in health care. This research attempts to de-construct 
this new policy framework and explore the potential changes in medical work. This 
study is developed along three interrelated lines. 
The first is concerned with the conceptualisation of error promoted in prevailing 
theory and policy. This can be interpreted as reflecting a particular discourse for the 
management of errors that induces specific forms of social action. However, it is 
argued that policy fails to consider the alternate conceptual and interpretative basis 
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of error: especially the constructions of error by medical professionals that 
encourage divergent forms of social action. In this way, the thesis is concerned with 
exploring how different discourses of error provide the basis of social power for the 
control of health service quality. 
The second theme of the study is the promotion of incident reporting as a 
mechanism for gathering information about errors. This is a core feature of policy 
for enabling organisations to learn about mistakes and develop systems for their 
management. However, it is argued that such a managerial approach represents a 
form of organisational surveillance external to the medical profession. Furthermore, 
it is argued that policy fails to account for the theoretical debates surrounding 
organisational culture in its promotion of 'cultural change'. Specifically, it fails to 
consider the emergent and interactional aspects of work culture that can be resistant 
to cultural change strategies. 
Finally, the thesis anticipates that alongside forms of culture management, the new 
policy framework will also rely upon structured bureaucratic systems in the 
collection, analysis and utilisation of error data to promote safer organisational 
systems. However, questions have to be asked about the character of these new 
management structures, the extent to which they will engage with established 
occupational systems for the management of quality, and whether this new approach 
will penetrate and regulate medical work. 
The context 
From a statistical perspective it has been calculated that the rate of fatal error in 
health care exceeds travelling by aeroplane, train, automobile or motorcycle and 
going into hospital is more dangerous than rock climbing or bungee jumping (Patient 
Safety Training 2003). In fact it has been estimated that one in every ten hospital 
patients experiences some kind of error, and over one in every ten of these dies 
(Department of Health 2000). That means that over one in everyone hundred 
hospital patients will die not from their disease, but from mistakes in the care 
delivery process. Health service errors are potentially the fourth-biggest killer in 
England and Wales today (Moore 2000). Such statistical data should not be accepted 
on face value and questions should be asked of the methods and the merits of 
"retrospective case review" (the common method of establishing error rates), yet 
these figures do portray an alarming picture and since the early 1990s international 
studies of health service error have consistently revealed this pattern. In the NHS it 
is estimated that 850'000 people experience some form of health service error and 
the cost to the tax payer is estimated to be over £2billion in extra care, not to 
mention litigation expenses (Department of Health 2000). 
One of the major consequences of this 'problem' is the further pressure placed upon 
the 'negotiated relationship' between the State, the public and the medical profession 
(Salter 2000) as the 'trust' between the doctor, the patient and government is 
seemingly eroded by scandals, discrepancies and unfilled ex.pectations in health care 
10 
quality (Donaldson 1999). It is not surprising therefore that health policy has started 
to address the issue of "patient safety". In the influential report An Organisation with 
a Memory (Department of Health 2000) an 'expert group' described the problem of 
errors in health care and produced a series of recommendations. f'.luch of the 
theoretical context for this work was drawn from the experiences of the aviation and 
nuclear industries where error management and Human Factors have had a major 
impact on quality improvement. These recommendations were subsequently 
developed and policies have introduced the National System for Learning from 
Adverse Events and Near Misses (Since the initial submission of this thesis this 
system has now been re-branded as the National Reporting and Learning System 
(National Patient Safety Agency 2003). This change is not reflected in this work but 
the term National System is typically used to refer to the policy framework). This 
'National System' comprises procedures for reporting errors and analysing their 
causes 10 line with the influential psychological and managerial Human Factors 
theories 
The underlying feature of this policy framework is the commitment to Human 
Factors theory, where errors are seen as being the product of individual action but 
also poorly designed organisational systems that enable mistakes to occur. In this 
way, it is accepted that individuals will make mistakes, but it is suggested that 
organisational systems should be developed to limit the opportunities for error. Such 
an approach has been adopted for understanding the Herald of Free Enterprise 
disaster at Zeebrugge (Department of Transport 1987), the Ladbrooke Grove rail 
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disaster (Cullen 2001) and also the inappropriate administration of the drug 
vincristine at the Queen's Medical Centre, Nottingham (Toft 2001). In the NHS this 
new approach to error management is building on previous forms of risk 
management and can be interpreted as extending managerial responsibilities for 
quality improvement. Specifically, it requires all hospital staff to report errors 
experienced in their work to managers responsible for promoting and coordinating 
the analysis of their 'root causes' and through understanding these underlying causes 
organisational change can be initiated. 
Of theoretical and empirical interest in this thesis are the implications that this policy 
could have for medical professional and managerial relations in the NHS. It has been 
well documented that changes in the management of the health service have altered 
the character of medical work and some have argued that such changes have 
challenged the power of the medical profession or restricted medical autonomy 
(Alford 1975, Cox 1991, Elston 1991, Harrison 1999). Despite the developments in 
health service management there has been little concerted attempt to systematically 
manage clinical performance. Many of the policies developed in this regard, such as 
Medical Audit or even clinical governance, have been concerned with promoting 
greater medical transparency and formality for improving specific aspects of 
established professional practice. In consequence, it could be argued that the features 
of medical professionalism associated with regulation and clinical freedom have not 
been directly challenged by managerialism. However, the new system for the 
management of health service errors may provide new opportunities for the 
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management of clinical performance. Specifically, it represents a particular expertise 
about error that resides outside medical professional work and is associated with 
contemporary management theory. It also includes forms of cultural and structural 
control, in the form of mandatory reporting and management-led analysis and 
change, that offer to modify and crosscut existing patterns of medical work. In 
consequence, the policy can be interpreted as presenting new opportunities for 
managerial action that could alter the regulatory character of medical 
professionalism. Through empirical research this thesis de-constructs the patient 
safety policy agenda and explores three potential domains of managerialism that 
could transform medical professionalism. 
The theoretical framework 
The broad theoretical framework for this thesis is made up of the intersecting 
theories of medical professionalism, managerialism and organisational control 
within the context of health policy and service change. In addition to sociological 
theories, the thesis also engages with other theoretical perspectives that are central to 
'patient safety', in particular the Human Factors approach to safety management. As 
a particular model of quality improvement this also draws on a range of 
perspectives, including cognitive and social psychology, ergonomics. management 
and process theories. In this thesis it is argued that these represent a zeitgeist for the 
control of errors and offer to transform the medicaUmanagerial relations. 
Alternatively, these prevailing theories are themselves de-constructed in this thesis 
by drawing on a range of other socio-cultural theoretical perspectives. Given this 
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complex theoretical context it is not possible to identify one predominant theoretical 
framework for this study, rather it has been guided by an eclectic assortment of 
perspectives that have informed the analysis of policy and the development of 
empirical research. In consequence, the theoretical framework for this thesis can be 
described as 'pragmatic pluralism' or a 'mosaic' that avoids the constraints of 
abiding by a single theoretical perspective (Watson 1997). 
In the first instance the study has broad concern with medical professionalism and 
managerialism, and despite recognising the range of theoretical accounts of the 
professions, this work has been primarily informed by neo-Weberian accounts of 
professionalism, especially those that emphasise social closure and the occupational 
attributes associated with autonomy and self-regulation (e.g. Freidson 1970, 2000). 
Complementing these occupational theories, attention has also been gi yen 
organisational and managerial theorists with particular emphasis on forms of control 
and compliance through 'role and rule' structures and ideological cultures (e.g. 
Etzioni 1970, Parker 2000, Weber 1970). Of particular interest here are those 
theories that deal with the conflicting and localised character of organisational 
control and compliance. Furthermore, these have been enhanced with reference to 
models of social power, in particular the work of Foucault (1980). These theoretical 
frameworks are developed through the analysis and de-construction of policy and 
provide the theoretical context for this study. 
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Through bringing together these different theoretical perspectives the research has 
purposively attempted to avoid reductionist tendencies associated with adopting a 
narrow theoretical framework. Instead it has aimed to widen the scope of the study 
to more adequately engage with the occupational and organisational changes in the 
context of a particular policy development. Implicit within this work is the idea that 
the social world is given social reality through perception, interpretation and 
meaning and these constructions are important for informing social action and 
control (e.g. Berger and Luckman 1991, Weber 1992 Foucault 1980). Furthermore, 
it is conceived that such interpretation and action is shaped by cultural, discursive 
and structural influences that are themselves the product of shared meaning and 
practice (e.g. Archer 1995). However, it is important not to over-extend the logic of 
the constructionist approach and neglect the ontological aspects of the social world, 
in consequence, the theoretical framework for this thesis has also been developed 
with consideration of critical realist theories (e.g. Bhaskar 1998). In this way the 
ontology of the social world is accepted but of analytical importance are the 
epistemological facets that make the world 'real' for social actors and groups. 
This theoretical field is therefore pluralistic (Watson 1991) and has been developed 
with specific reference to policy and established works in the field of medical 
professionalism, organisational control, and social constructionism. This framework 
is developed over the proceeding four chapters where it is argued that, as an 
alternative to Human Factors, patient safety health policies can be empirically 
examined in relation to their impact of medicaVmanagerial relations along the 
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dimensions of social meaning, occupational cultures and organisational structures. 
Through engaging with these different aspects of medical professional work and 
management issues of power, control and compliance can be appreciated. 
Qualifications 
It is necessary to provide some qualifications or disclaimers about the research; to 
say what this thesis is not exploring. Initially, it is important to emphasise that while 
the patient safety health policy will have consequences for all health service staff, 
the focus of this study is on the medical profession and the work of hospital 
managers in relation to medical professionals. It is not directly concerned with other 
occupational groups, who may be dealing with similar changes in their work. The 
reasons behind this selection reside in the demands of conducting a manageable 
doctoral research project and also the theoretical interest in medicaUmanagerial 
relations. In terms of the medical profession, the research is not addressing any of 
the teaching aspects of medical work or the internal hierarchies of medicine. It is 
believed that by including multiple levels of the profession, i.e. consultants, 
registrars, house officers, and trainees that too many complicating factors would 
have to be considered, such as the interrelationships between grades. In order to 
minimise such complications the primarily focus of this work is on the relationships 
between managers and consultant level doctors. Furthermore, it is believed that these 
groups arc more estahlished in the hospital, i.e. not on rotation, and would therefore 
have more developed relationships within the organisation. 
\h 
It is also worth saying something about error. It is recognised that errors can be both 
positive or negative, and minor or catastrophic. One of the key issues in this research 
is to appreciate the social domains and interactions in which such classifications 
develop and errors are controlled. However, the study is not looking at major or 
scandalous errors, such as those that attract enormous media attention, as it is 
believed that the impact of such events on hospital staff, whilst being interesting, 
would potentially inhibit doctoral research, for example there could be legal 
complications. In consequence the research is concerned with the "routine" or 
"everyday" errors that occur in medical work, and the way in which these are given 
meaning and controlled. 
Outline of the thesis 
The plan of this thesis is as follows. Chapter two reviews the established theories 
and debates surrounding medical and managerial relations in the NHS. Here 
accounts of medical pr.ofessional work are outlined with specific focus on the 
concepts of medical autonomy and self-regulation that are commonly used to 
characterise professional status. These are then developed to explore the forms of 
regulation that relate to quality control in medicine. Following this a broad overview 
is given of the developments in Public Sector Management as applied to the health 
service. It has been argued that these developments have challenged medical 
"power" and have limited the scope of professional autonomy and self-regulation. 
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Although it is suggested that the impact of these managerial developments is 
debatable, it is proposed that recent developments in the management of health 
service quality have indeed established a pattern of increased bureaucratic control in 
medical work. This is the general theoretical context of the thesis. 
In chapter three, consideration is given to the specific "problem" of health service 
errors. International and national findings are used to indicate the perceived scale of 
mistakes and the impact on human life. Building on these findings it is shown how 
definitions of error vary, yet certain prevailing and underlying theoretical 
assumptions about error and error management predominate. The chapter then 
shows how these have been influential in the formulation of policy before describing 
the proposed National System for Learning from Adverse Events and Near Misses. 
Here specific attention is given to three interrelated features of this system. The first 
is the conceptualisation of error, the second is the promotion of incident reporting, 
and the third is the analysis of incident data and the management of change. It is 
argued that this policy could constitute a new development in the relationship 
between medical and managerial groups within the NHS. 
In chapter four this policy is de-constructed and theoretically scrutinized. This serves 
two broad purposes, the first is to critique the assumptions on which policy is based, 
but in so doing it is shown how other theories are of relevance to research on errors 
and medical/managerial relations. Here sociological works are discussed to reveal 
alternate accounts of medical error and drawing from theories of risk a constructivist 
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approach is put forward to guide this study. Policy is also questioned in terms of its 
organisational and occupational changes with various accounts of management, 
culture and control considered. Specific attention is given to different theoretical 
perspectives on organisational culture to suggest that the notion of cultural change 
advocated in policy is questionable whilst proposing that the study of medical 
culture can reveal important social factors relevant to occupational control. There 
theories of organisational structure and culture are used to inform the study's focus 
on medical regulation and hospital management. Building on the previous chapter 
and these theoretical contributions, this chapter concludes with empirical 'research 
questions' suggesting that the policy can be interpreted as representing new forms of 
discursive, cultural and structural control in the regulation of medical work. 
Chapter five provides an account of the research process. It is shown that within the 
broad context of qualitative research, observations and interviews have provided the 
main source of empirical data. The fieldwork was conducted within a single hospital 
case study and a range of managerial and medical occupational groups participated. 
This data was used to empirically address the debates and questions developed in the 
thesis and to identify unanticipated emergent findings. 
Chapter six provides an account of the social construction of medical errors. Here 
the data is used to show how health service managers have adopted the prevailing 
conceptualisation of error found in theory and policy, where it represents a new 
'logic' or expertise for the interpretation and control of errors. Conversely it was 
found that medical professionals interpret errors with reference to different 
assumptions and priorities. In particular, doctors seem to make sense of errors in 
terms of the technical medical knowledge that underpins their professional work, but 
also with reference to other social and cultural factors that arise from the perceived 
uncertainties and complexity of medical work. These findings are used to criticise 
realist accounts of error and suggest that the construction of error promotes specific 
forms of social action, and in this case medical action that does not accord with the 
expectations of policy. 
In chapter seven it is shown how the hospital is adapting its systems to promote 
more rigorous forms of incident reporting, in line with the National System. 
Attention is given to the character of these systems where it was found that the 
hospital had established a general reporting system across the organisation. 
However, it was also found that there were localised programmes for gathering 
information about errors that were often distinct from the activities of 'corporate' 
management. Underlying these differences it is shown how important medical 
beliefs, assumptions and norms represent barriers to participation in reporting and 
could be interpreted as resistant to the managerial evaluation of medical work. Not 
only does this demonstrate the obstacles of establishing a unified approach, but it 
also questions the notion of cultural change found in prevailing theory and policy. 
Chapter eight provides a description of the vanous forms of error and risk 
management within the hospital. Initially, attention is given to the hospital-wide 
20 
approach that builds upon systems of incident reporting. Here it is shown that the 
hospital is trying to develop its organisational and management arrangements ill 
accordance with policy. However, it was found that despite centralised " c o r p o r a t ~ " "
systems, professionals at the directorate level of the hospital are working with 
alternate forms of quality control and error management. This includes systems 
similar to the National System but also those based upon established professional 
regulatory mechanisms. These differences are then explored in terms of the culture 
of medicine, where it is shown there is an overriding preference for forms of 
professional control and at best the adaptation of new managerial system within 
medical practice. 
Finally, chapter mne reviews the potential impact of the policy on 
medical/managerial relations. Here the three main empirical components of the 
thesis are discussed individually, and brought together to question the assumptions 
of policy and assess the impact on medical professional regulation. In this chapter 
the debates and questions developed in chapters two, three and four are further 
explored, but it is argued that the impact on medical work is potentially less than 
expected in the light of the empirical findings. 
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2. Medicine, management and health service quality 
Introduction 
"Professional associations are not the only repositories of knowledge, but 
they are the repositories of a special kind of knowledge; and the 
establishment of proper relations between them and the democratic State is, 
today, one of the urgent problems affecting the future of social services. 
These groups represent, by the nature of t h ~ ~ lOterests that unite them, forces 
resistant to social change, and sometimes resistant, therefore, to needed 
changes in social services." (Titmuss 1963: 27-8). 
Richard Titmuss made these important observations in 1951, early in the life of the 
post war Welfare State. More recently, at the 1999 Labour Party Conference Tony 
B lair made reference to the "forces of conservatism" that held back public sector 
reform. It seems that the 'problematic' relationship between professional groups and 
the state is neither new nor resolved. For health care the relationship between the 
medical profession and the state has been historically littered with 'flashpoints', 
negotiations and trade-offs as politically driven changes have required re-
establishing the "proper relations" between the state and the profession. Klein (1991) 
and Foot (1997) highlight the antagonism and conflict between Bevan and the 
medical profession in the years leading up to the creation of the NHS, where one 
senior civil servant claimed that "dealing with the doctors is even worse than 
negotiating with the French" (cited in Hennessey 1990: --l21). Moving on, in the 
1960s Enoch Powell (1966) identified an institutional conflict between the medical 
profession and state with the inability of government to control and direct 
expenditure due to medical dominance in resource allocation. In the 1970s Crossman 
described the NHS as one of " ... the most autocratic, self-perpetuating, oligarchies 
since the Persian Empire." (cited in Battistella and Chester 1973). The political 
desire for change has frequently required re-negotiating relations with the medical 
profession. One of the most significant developments in this regard has been the rise 
of managerialism within the service over the last twenty years. This has shifted the 
broader concern with professional/state relations to the more localised relationship 
between medical and managerial groups within the service. 
This chapter provides the general theoretical context for this thesis. In particular it 
addresses the issues and debates pertinent to medical/managerial relations in the 
NHS. The chapter therefore draws on accounts of both professionalism and public 
sector management and demonstrates their divergence in the promotion of health 
service quality. Initially, attention is given to the sociological study of medical 
professionalism with specific consideration given to the notion of autonomy and the 
regulation of quality. The chapter then provides an account of managerialism in the 
NHS, with specific attention given to the wider context of New Public Management, 
the relationship between management and medicine, and the specific forms of 
quality improvement associated with managerial groups. These different 
occupational histories, expertise, organisational roles and relationships frame the 
empirical focus of this thesis. 
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Medical professionalism and the regulation of quality 
The sociology of the professions 
The sociology of the professions has evolved from identifying the "traits" of 
professionalism (Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933, Goode 1960, Wilensky 1964), to 
understanding the relationship between social status and social function (Parsons 
1951, Johnson 1972), to explaining how expert knowledge can provide occupational 
control over labour (Freidson 1970), to how professionalism represents a political 
strategy for acquiring status and market closure (Larson 1978) or how professionals 
are losing status and control (Haug 1973, Oppenheimer 1973). Some examples 
include Goode's (1960) view that professionalism is characterised by the two core 
traits of prolonged specialised training in an abstract body of knowledge and a 
collective service orientation. On these pillars it is suggested that other attributes of 
professionalism are located, such as the ability of a profession to determine the 
standards of education and knowledge, to control professional entry, and to establish 
the norms of practice. From a more theoretical perspective Parsons' (1951) 
functionalist account indicates that the special position of professionals within the 
social system reflects the vital services they provide for social stability. Conversely, 
other theorists have attempted to demonstrate the importance of professional work to 
'capitalist' society, for example, Johnson (1972) suggests that professionalism has 
emerged to manage the uncertainties of capitalism, and Navarro ~ ~ 1978) argues that 
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the medical profession provides a social control function through refonnulating 
social and collective health problems as individual health needs. For others 
professionalism and the process of professionalisation represent a form of 
occupational and market control (Larson 1978, Freidson 1970), where professional 
status enables particular occupational groups to acquire exclusivity in their work. 
This is often typically associated with the perceived social value of particular forms 
of expert knowledge and changes in the economic character of society (Larson 1978, 
Foucault 1973). Building on this perspective it is often suggested that professionals 
have considerable power and influence in the organisation of welfare services as 
their expert knowledge provides the basis of policy and service delivery (Wilding 
1982). More recently, Freidson (2000) has attempted to show that professionalism is 
a 'third logic' for the organisation and deli very of expert services; an alternati ve to 
market or bureaucratic forms of control. 
The sociology of the medical profession reflects many of these different positions 
from the historical formation of the profession and the significant role of expert 
knowledge, through to market closure, authority in health care delivery and the 
relationship between doctor and patient (Morgan et at. 1985). Within these different 
perspectives the concepts of 'autonomy' and 'self-regulation' can be identified as 
characteristic features of medical professionalism and important traits 01 
professional power and status. Equally they have been interpreted as sites on which 
managerial encroachment can be understood. 
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Medical professional autonomy and regulation 
Annandale (1998) suggests that the work of Eliot Freidson (1970, 1994, 2001) has 
become the "lens" through which discussion of the medical profession is refracted. 
Although his work has been appraised and re-applied widely, it remains an 
important reference point for understanding the medical profession within organised 
health care. As well as providing an account of the relationship between expert 
knowledge and occupational control, most recently as a 'third logic' between market 
forces and bureaucratic rule, his work makes important contributions to the concepts 
of professional "autonomy" and "regulation". For Freidson (1970) these professional 
characteristics, although legitimised by the state, are ultimately the product of expert 
knowledge. He makes the case that medical work is reliant upon extensive training, 
expert judgement and complex decision-making and only those occupational groups 
in possession of the appropriate expertise can work in the medical interests of thl' 
patient (note medical not health). It follows therefore that non-medical groups 
cannot legitimately provide medical services as they do not possess the required 
knowledge. Moreover these non-medical groups cannot legitimately evaluate or 
interfere in medical work because they do possess this necessary knowledge. 
Medical autonomy is the concept used to describe the ability of medical practitioners 
to exercise their expertise, judgement and decision-making with little external 
control, while the idea of self-regulation accounts for the inability of other 
occupational groups to legitimately assess and evaluate medical work. 
"The profession is the sole source of competence to recognise de\'iant 
performance and to regulate itself in general. Its autonomy is justified and 
tested by self-regulation" (Freidson 1970: 137). 
However, it is worth noting that these ideas remain questionable beyond the ideal 
typical and Freidson (1970) has made some important qualifications to these 
concepts. Firstly, he used autonomy to primarily describe the technical aspects of 
medical practice associated with the application of expertise. In consequence, while 
medical practice may be associated with other occupational features, such as 
authority in the division of labour, autonomy is explicitly developed to refer to thl' 
technical application of expertise. Secondly, Freidson was not absolute about the 
capacity of medicine to self-regulate and act autonomously. He shows that 
professional formation relied upon the social and political endorsement of medical 
knowledge. In Britain he suggests that it was through political "persuasion" and 
"negotiation", enshrined in the Medical Act of 1858 and licensure that professional 
leaders were able to secure and reproduce the legitimate basis of their work. It has 
been pointed out elsewhere that this process was also concerned with securing the 
internal and external boundaries of medical work and monopoly (Larkin 1995, 
Waddington 1991). 
"Clearly, professional autonomy 1S not absolute; the state has ultimate 
sovereignty over all and grants conditional autonomy to some" (FreiosoI1 
1970: 24). 
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Thirdly, Freidson reinforces the non-absolute basis of autonomy with specific 
reference to the organisational features of the NHS. Here he shows that the structure 
of health care limits and directs many of the non-technical aspects of medical work. 
while framing technical autonomy within clinics, wards, contracted rotas and shifts. 
For example, NHS consultants are salaried employees and function within a 
politically controlled and directed service, while the resources that fund their work 
are tightly managed and controlled. In consequence, while doctors may act 
'autonomously' or with 'clinical freedom' with the patient this is contingent upon 
the wider organisation of health services and the approval of the state. 
Nevertheless, recogmsmg these qualifications, Freidson maintained that medical 
professionals retained the technical ability to practice with little external control or 
interference. In consequence the application and appraisal of medical expertise 
remained largely free from external control. 
"So long as a profession is free of the technical evaluation and control of 
other occupations in the division of labour, its lack of ultimate freedom from 
the state, and even its lack of control over the socio-economic terms of work 
do not significantly change its essential character as a profession" (Freidson 
1970: 25). 
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Domains of medical autonomy 
Despite Freidson's qualifications, the concepts of medical autonomy and self-
regulation have been elaborated to describe the domains of influence, control and 
power associated with medicine in health care and society. Three such examples are 
discussed here to demonstrate the manner in which autonomy has been applied 
within the study of medicine. 
Ovretveit (1985) suggested that Freidson's (1970) definition of autonomy was too 
narrow because it focused primarily on the practitioner level of technical care; and 
as an alternative he developed a three dimensional model of autonomy. At the 
"national" level he believed that medical autonomy is demonstrated in the ability of 
professional associations to influence health policy. At the "local" level is the 
potential for medical practitioners to self-manage work, control resources and plan 
services autonomously. While "clinical" autonomy is used to refer to the technical 
freedom of doctors with their patients. Through this classification he shows how 
professions allied to medicine, such as physiotherapy, have gained greater autonomy 
and status at the expense of medical autonomy. 
Elston (1991) has also developed a three dimensional reclassification of medical 
autonomy in her analysis of health service changes in the late 1980s. Similarly she 
suggests that medical professionals have "political" autonomy through influence in 
policy, while doctors have "economic" autonomy in terms of shaping resource 
allocation, and again doctors have "clinical" autonomy when interacting with 
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patients. This conceptualisation of autonomy was used to account for the extent of 
medical de-professionalisation as a result of health service management and 
contracting. 
Similarly, Harrison (1999, 2000 with Ahmad) has used the concept of autonomy to 
account for the changes in medical professionalism brought about by increased 
managerialism in the NHS. Like Ovretviet (1985) and Elston (1991), he highlights 
three social dimensions, the macro, meso and micro, and highlights the relationships 
between these domains and medical autonomy. At the micro level medical control 
and autonomy is manifest in clinical freedom and the absence of external control 
over medical work. At the meso level medical autonomy is demonstrated by the 
corporatist relationship with the state and the organisation of health services, while 
at the macro level, medical autonomy is found in the specialised knowledge, or the 
bio-medical model, which informs policy. Therefore while clinical autonomy itself 
is found at the micro level, it is intractably linked to the macro and meso levels. For 
Harrison (1999) three features of the UK health sector demonstrate the importance 
of this autonomy. First is the commitment to clinical autonomy in policy documents 
throughout the life of the NHS. Second, the service is structured and organised to 
support and facilitate clinical autonomy. Third the practice of management has 
traditionally been concerned with supporting and facilitating autonomous clinical 
activity. 
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The dimensions of professional activity highlighted by the likes of Ovretveit (1985). 
Elston (1991) and Harrison (1999) show the influence of the medical profession at 
various social. political and organisational dimensions. These different aspects of 
medical professionalism have been explored in great depth. from accounts of 
medical knowledge and power (Armstrong 1997. Foucault 1971. 1973. Turner 
1995). to the study of medical influence in the policy process (Fox 1988. Klein 
1991), to the examination of medical work and the division of health care labour 
(Annandale 1998, Freidson 1970). Caution is needed, however, in the over-
application of autonomy as a meaningful sociological concept for understanding 
medical work (Evetts 2002, Waring 2002). It is important to consider the earlier 
remarks on Freidson' s (1970, 1994) observation that autonomy is primarily technical 
and bounded within systems that are influenced by other political and social forces 
(Rhodes 1997). 
"I deliberately take issue with the common assumption that professions were 
ever, anywhere, free and independent" (plenary address at the Conference on 
Regulating Expertise, Paris 1994). 
Autonomy refers to the technical application of medical expertise with minimal 
external interference or direction. Although the profession may have power and 
influence at other social levels of health care, and this may buttress clinical freedom, 
it is important not to over-extend the concept of autonomy to those areas that do not 
centre on the technical application of expert knowledge. Harrison's (Harrison and 
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Ahmad 2000, Davies and Harrison 2003) discussion of 'clinical autonomy' refers to 
four components of such technical control. The first refers to control over 'diagnosis 
and treatment' or the tests, examinations, procedures and treatments. The second is 
control over the 'evaluation of care' where judgements are made about 
appropriateness. The third is control over the 'nature and volume of the medical 
tasks' or the extent to which the doctor can establish their own work patterns and 
priorities. The fourth is the contractual 'independence' or the extent to which doctors 
can pursue other occupational activities. 
Of particular importance in this research are the technical aspects of 'diagnosis and 
treatment' and 'evaluation of care'. It will be shortly argued that despite the rhetoric 
of 'relative autonomy' and 'empowerment', contemporary management changes 
have been interpreted as challenging these aspects of medical autonomy. 
Furthermore, despite the 'state-sanctioned' and 'bounded' character of technical 
autonomy recent policies can also be interpreted as further engaging and inhibiting 
this medical autonomy. 
Regulating medicaL work 
Intractably connected to the control of expert knowledge and autonomy is the 
professional capacity for self-regulation. In general, regulation can be seen as the 
relationship where one group or organisation has legitimacy to evaluate, control or 
modify the behaviour of another (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). It typically refers to 
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accountability and the responsible discharge of duties or standards of work. It is 
often claimed, however, that professionals, unlike other occupational groups, ha\e 
the ability to self-regulate their work because other groups cannot sufficiently 
evaluate the technical discharge of their acquired expertise (Freidson 1970). 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider that regulation is more complex and 
interdependent than the notion of 'self-regulation' would imply. Moran and Wood 
(1993) suggest that regulation is a common social activity for the exchange of goods 
and services. It includes the regulation of market entry (who can provide goods and 
services), the regulation of competitive practices (on what basis can providers 
compete with each other), the regulation of market structure (how provision is 
organised), and the regulation of payment. Moran and Wood describe three ways in 
which regulation can be socially ordered. "Independent self-regulation" refers to a 
situation where providers control the conditions for market entry, competitive prices 
and can even shape the marketplace for services. "State-sanctioned regulation" 
refers to a situation whereby regulation may exist within the hands of a select 
occupational group but this is endorsed and sometimes monitored by the state. They 
suggest that this form of regulation is increasingly common, for example in the 
financial markets, and represents the increased legal and political basis of regulation. 
Finally, "direct regulation" refers to a situation of direct state control whereby 
authority resides within legislative parameters and regulation is carried out by 
particular public sector, or quasi-public sector bodies. 
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It is important to show that the notion of professional "self-regulation", like 
autonomy, is not an absolute concept (Evetts 2002). Salter (2000) describes the fonn 
of occupational governance typical of the medical profession since the mid-1900s as 
"state-sanctioned self-regulation". He suggests that the relationship, enshrined by the 
Medical Act of 1858 and the creation of the GMC, represented a necessary bargain 
between a "triangle of forces". The first corner of the triangle comprises the 
demands of civil society for acceptable standards of health care. The second corner 
represents the needs of the state to provide health care to society and control service 
resources. The final corner represents the profession, which has gained legitimacy, 
status and monopoly through engaging in this relationship. It is the mutual benefits 
acquired through this relationship that has provided an important feature of health 
policy and medical professionalism throughout this century (Salter 2000). 
The character of medical regulation is therefore shaped by the historical and political 
context of medical professionalisation and health policy development. It has been 
suggested that in the mid-nineteenth century there was a need to resolve the 
problems of medical over-crowding, over provision, competition, overlapping 
boundaries, increased demand for services and the increased social importance of the 
market for social exchange (Larson 1978, Waddington 1991). The manner of 
regulation enshrined by the Medical Act of 1858 provided a basis for controlling 
market entry, securing market closure and formalising professional boundaries 
(Larkin 1995). These changes established the state endorsement of medical 
knowledge, approved the provision of medical care and sanctioned internal 
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professional systems to control the quality of care and the conduct of practitioners. 
The regulation of the medical profession has remained under license from the state, 
in the form of the General Medical Council (GMC) and Royal Colleges. This has 
been termed the regulatory bargain between the state and the profession (Stacey 
2000). It is important to emphasise that while predominantly in the "hands" of the 
profession (the internal), this regulatory system remains sanctioned by the state (the 
external) (Irvine and Irvine 1997). It is therefore important to avoid simplistic 
references to self-regulation and instead it is useful to conceptualise the regulatory 
relationship as "acquired" (Evetts 2002) or "state sanctioned" (Moran and Wood 
1993). Moreover, in their study on medical regulation Allsop and Mulcahy (1996) 
elaborate upon these ideas by suggesting the regulatory mechanism can be both 
"formal" and "informal". For this thesis it is necessary to give more attention to the 
formal and informal features of medical regulation and highlight features of internal 
occupational control within the context of external legitimacy. 
Formal regulation 
The GMC represents the main state-sanctioned formal professional body responsible 
for the regulation of medical work; ensuring medical accountability to the state and 
the public. Irvine (1999) has identified four main regulatory functions of the GMC 
that reflect the common features of regulation (Allsop and Mulcahy 1996, Moran 
and Wood 1993). These include keeping a Medical Register of accredited, licensed 
and competent doctors; working with teaching institutions in the development of 
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training curriculum; setting standards of medical practice; and investigating and 
dealing with suspected dysfunctional doctors. In terms of regulating medical 
standards the main function of the GMC is therefore the licensure of qualified 
practitioners and the removal of the right to practice for those who breach 
established codes of conduct or standards (Irvine and Irvine 1997). This system is 
primarily concerned with market entry through training and licensure, and secondly 
with market exit when licensure is revoked or the doctor "struck off' in serious and 
proven cases of misconduct or malpractice (Irvine 1999). Accordingly Allsop and 
Mulcahy (1996) characterise the regulatory role of the GMC as concerned with 
assuring competence to practice and tackling "bad apples". 
Despite the political and sanctioned basis of this regulatory arrangement, Stacey 
(2000) suggests that the GMC exemplifies the ethos of professional self-regulation, 
because there has been little government interference in its history. Furthermore, 
what is possibly more interesting is the minimal role of the GMC in the day-to-day 
practice of medicine. 
"The GMC does not concern itself with the performance of doctors as a 
whole, but it focuses on the very small number of complaints that reach the 
disciplinary stage and are charged with unprofessional conduct" (Hughes et 
al 1997: 307). 
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As such the GMC reinforces the notion of self-regulation, as its formal procedures 
are primarily important at the beginning of a medical career and potentially at the 
end following poor practice. It has a minimal role in the routine regulation of 
medical work and as a meaningful regulatory mechanism (Stacey 1992). In 
consequence, the formal regulation of medical work relies on the informal aspects of 
daily practice and peer groups. 
Although not explicitly recognised as a regulatory body, it is also worth mentioning 
the role of the Royal Colleges and other professional Societies as devices for 
promoting standards in medical work (Allsop and Mulcahy 1996). These bodies 
assist in the development of training criteria and the assessment of medical standards 
within specialised areas of medicine. They have an important role in career 
development and ensuring standards. To gain entry to these groups or Fellowship it 
is necessary to demonstrate the acquisition of specialised knowledge, experience and 
ability. Although actually external to the formal regulatory systems of medicine 
(Irvine 1997), these bodies work closely with the GMC in the development of 
specialised educational curricula and in recognising professional standards at senior 
occupational levels. They can be interpreted as a further system for market entry and 
maintaining standards of medical practice primarily through encouraging good 
practice and providing support in areas where performance may be sub-standard. 
A significant feature of these professional bodies is development and support of 
Confidential Enquiries for exploring issues of quality and promoting professional 
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improvements. These enquiries represent important devices for improving standards 
and raising performance through assessing the quality of medical care on an 
aggregated and anonymous basis. Originally centred on maternal deaths, but now 
including areas of medicine such as peri-operative care, these programmes represent 
the mandatory collection of information concerning deaths following care in order to 
promote professional learning and the development of guidance (Department of 
Health 2000, Donaldson 1999). Interestingly they demonstrate the capacity of the 
medical profession to seek out new ways of assessing and evaluating performance 
whilst remaining committed to the principles of self-regulation. However, it may 
also be the case that the profession has adopted such devices in order to prevent 
other political driven reforms in health care that may undermine the basis of 
professional regulation (Evetts 2002). 
The informal mechanisms in medical practice 
Within the formal regulatory procedures of medicine are important and 
complimentary informal practices that, unlike the function of the GMC, have more 
relevance in the day to day work of doctors. In particular, peer groups are central to 
the informal regulation of medical performance, where small "chats" and 
discussions act as a mechanism for quality control, and where professional respect 
and collegiality are pivotal. Due to the limits of formal regulatory systems to 
consistently penetrate the day-to-day aspects of medical work, it can be argued that 
individual practitioners have responsibility for maintaining standards and are 
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themselves the guardians of professional conduct (Allsop and ~ l u l c a h y y 1996, Dent 
1995). However, these cultural and regulatory practices are consistently identified as 
limiting the capacity of risk management strategies, as with the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary (Kennedy 2001, Klein 1998, Moore 2000). 
Rosenthal (1995, 1999) has explored the day to day mechanisms for regulating 
medical quality, highlighting a range of informal and quasi-formal features that are 
premised on the idea that only those from within the profession can effectively 
recognise and deal with medical problems. She draws attention to a style of informal 
regulation known as the "quiet chat", which normally invol ves close colleagues and 
senior medical representative from within the hospital talking with the "problem 
doctor" in order to discuss their concern and promote self-awareness. Rosenthal 
identifies a difference between the "little stick" talk that conveys friendly concern 
and the "big stick" talk that implies more official action may proceed. These chats 
are premised on the idea that the doctor will be responsible in improving their own 
performance. Another form of informal control is termed "protective support" where 
colleagues take on some of the workload and responsibility of the "problem doctor". 
She found that this technique has been known to carryon for several years until the 
burden of extra work among peers becomes too great. Rosenthal also highlights a 
quasi-formal mechanism of regulation unique to the NHS. The "three wise men" 
approach involves the appointment of three senior consultants for the informal 
investigation of problem doctors, acting as an unusual link to the more formal role of 
the GMC (Rosenthal 1995). Rosenthal's work demonstrates the informal 
mechanisms of regulation that operate alongside and within the formal and state-
sanctioned systems. It is these day to day practices that seemingly reinforce the idea 
of self-regulation. 
Within the modern NHS there are other mechanisms for quality control that, 
although formal and structured within the organisation of health care, provide 
opportunities for professional peers working within the same speciality or area to 
come together and discuss examples of practice. Peer review, case conferences, 
morbidity and mortality conferences and more recently medical audit illustrate other 
localised and internal mechanism for the regulation quality. These can include 
routine reviews of patient charts to verify performance, specific reviews of particular 
concerns, such as readmissions, infections or substandard care or the sharing of 
details about complicated or unique cases. Arluke (1977) has examined the role of 
'death rounds' as a mechanism for reviewing medical performance. He suggests that 
professionals adopt particular strategies and rituals for mitigating potential problems 
or poor outcomes, which include de-emphasising professional competence and 
highlighting the complexity of the case. Common to all these forms of informal 
professional regulation is the central role of collegiality and peer review which 
reinforces the notion of self-regulation. 
Serious questions have been asked about the ability of these systems to effectively 
regulate medicine and maintain public and political trust (Gladstone 2000, Irvine 
1999. Moore 2000). Moore (2000) and Leape (1999) argue that a feature of 
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medicine is the pursuit for, and myth of, perfection. These writers suggest that when 
things do go wrong in medical work a "blame mentality" arises due to the desire for 
perfection. Furthermore, it has been argued that a common response is for 
professionals to "close ranks" with a "conspiracy of silence" (Moore 2000). This 
was identified at the Bristol Royal Infirmary where a small group of lead clinicians 
held an "imbalance of power" and prevented the problems of infant mortality from 
being openly addressed (Kennedy 2001). These quasi-formal customs of 
professional quality control are therefore a key component in the regulation of 
medicine and can serve to exclude non-medical groups thereby perpetuating the idea 
of self-regulation. 
Trust and developments in professional regulation 
Although the formal and informal systems of medical regulation are premised on 
state-recognition they can also be characterised by a trust arrangement between the 
state, the professional and its practitioners. Specifically, there is trust in the ability of 
the profession and its professionals to ensure the appropriate levels of performance 
and to deal with problem issues. Although the concept of trust is open to theoretical 
debate (Hollis 1998), it remains an implicit feature of the regulation of medical 
practice and is central to the social accommodation of uncertainty and risk 
(Luhmann 1991). 
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As suggested above, however, there are significant reservations about the capacity of 
these regulatory devices to secure expected levels of care and in consequence the 
risk of health care has risen to the fore of policy. Irvine (1999) suggests that the 
GMC has been unable to maintain public trust citing five prominent criticisms. First 
the unwillingness to demonstrate medical c o m p e t e n c e ~ ~ second the failure to protect 
patients from problem doctors; third dissatisfaction with the paternalistic attitude of 
some d o c t o r s ~ ~ fourth the slow and unrepresentative mechanisms of regulation; and 
fifth the lack of openness and transparency about professional procedures. 
The recognition of these problems has necessitated changes in the regulatory 
character of medicine. One substantial development has been Medical Audit which 
was introduced to formalise the previously uncoordinated processes of peer review. 
It was defined as 
" ... a systematic, critical analysis of the quality of medical care, including the 
procedures used for diagnosis and treatment, the use of resources, and the 
resulting outcome for the patient" (Department of Health 1989). 
Audit represents an explicit attempt to define the standards of medical work, gather 
systematic information about performance, compare performance amongst peer 
groups and identify deficiencies (Walshe 1999). Although professionals desired a 
voluntary, confidential, internal and educational approach (Harrison and Pollitt 
1995), the implemented system was compulsory and involved the collection and 
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analysis of performance data. This prompted some professionals to argue that it 
reduced their clinical freedom, yet the actual format remained predominantly based 
within the established systems of medical work (Dent 1995). 
"The medical profession has so far been largely successful in its attempts to 
shape and control medical audit for its own interests" (Harrison and Pollitt 
1995: 104). 
Another development from within the medical profession has been the introduction 
of re-certification or revalidation (Irvine and Irvine 1997). This represents a more 
continuous approach to regulation, as opposed to market entry and exit, where 
licensure is periodically assessed and re-validated throughout the professional 
career. The main attributes of revalidation are the production of a performance 
portfolio of practice, annual appraisal and periodic review by the GMC (General 
Medical Council 2000). 
More recently, there have been renewed attempts by the government and the 
profession to restate the basis of medical regulation and strengthen the basis of 
medical quality control. The consultation document Supporting Doctors, Protecting 
Patients (Department of Health 1999) centred on modernising the "privileged" basis 
of self-regulation. This included making the GMC more transparent, accountable, 
targeted, consistent and proportional. Importantly, these changes were envisaged 
within the context of health care reform since 1997 and the implementation 
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document Assuring the Quality of Medical Practice (Department of Health 2001c) 
further outlined these proposals and showed how professional self-regulation must 
fit within the current quality agenda of the NHS, such as clinical governance. These 
changes are addressed shortly, but it is important to note that the notion of medical 
regulation is now explicitly linked to compliance with other reforms of the service. 
Furthermore, the 'patient safety' health policy agenda currently being developed in 
the NHS implicitly reflects a concern, or lack of trust, with the capacity of 
professional regulatory systems to effectively deal with errors in the delivery of 
medical services. 
The rising prominence of distrust and scepticism in the NHS can be regarded as one 
of the principal forces driving change in the regulation of medicine and the 
improvement of health care quality. As suggested above the triangular relationship 
between the State, the profession and civil society is held together by reciprocation 
and trust (Salter 2000), it can be argued therefore that the inability of the profession 
to sufficiently restore this trust and the increased political necessity to improve 
service quality and acquire public trust is driving the quality agenda of the NHS. The 
errors and mistakes that occur in health care delivery symbolise the inabilities and 
limitations of current regulatory systems and the 'patient safety' agenda is central to 
the restoration of trust in the NHS. This policy programme represents the empirical 
site for this work. 
Regulation in question 
Caution has to be taken with overstating the potency of any regulatory system as 
they can be misapplied or abused in several ways. Ashworth et al (2002) suggest that 
there are some common sets of problems for regulation. The first includes 
"resistance by regulatees" where those being regulated undermine the process 111 
order to maintain their own organisational status. The second is "ritualistic 
compliance" when regulatees 'go through the motions' or 'pay lip service' to the 
regulatory process but do not fully conform to the expectations. The third, 
"regulatory capture", highlights the problem of regulators becoming too close to the 
regulated and not being able to conduct the regulation with from an external 
perspective. And the fourth, "performance ambiguity" refers to the difficulty of 
defining performance and the inability of regulators to actually understand the 
standards of work. Ashworth et al (2002) suggest several explanations for why 
regulation can be inhibited in these ways and of relevance here, they highlight 
professional groups as being able undermine regulatory systems because of their 
claims to 'autonomy', their preference for established internal regulation, their 
insistence on high levels of representation within the regulatory process and their 
ability to define the basis on which performance is assessed. 
When considering changes in medical professional regulation it is therefore 
necessary to explore the ways in which occupational changes may appear to reveal 
conformity to new regulatory parameters, but actually masks resistance to change or 
the maintenance of pre-existing regulatory arrangements. Given the symbolic and 
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practical importance of (sanctioned) self-regulation to medical work it is likely that 
any possible changes will be met by a myriad of occupational responses, both 
conforming and resisting policy expectations. 
Managerialism and organisational performance 
One of the most substantial and analysed changes in the organisation of the NHS has 
been the rise of managerialism. This has often been discussed in terms of limiting or 
challenging aspects of medical professionalism or power. In this section attention is 
gi ven to the developments in public sector management and the rise of 
managerial ism in the NHS, with more detailed consideration given to the 
management of quality. It is argued that these represent alternatives to 
professionalism for the organisation and delivery of public and health care services, 
and in consequence offer significant challenges to medicine. However, like the 
discussion of medical autonomy and regulation it is important not to overstate the 
impact of these managerial developments and their capacity to limit medical status. 
NCH' Public Management 
One of the most significant developments in the public sector over the past fifteen to 
twenty years has been the attempt to reform the public sector in line with the 
principles of the private sector with new regimes of management (Hoggett ILJ91, 
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Hood 1991, Hughes et al. 1997). This is typically associated with New Right 
theories of public sector accountability and ideological preference for market 
mechanisms. These changes have been described in terms of New Public 
Management (NPM) (Carter 1991, Hoggett 1991, 1996, Hood 1991). 
Several common themes underpin NPM as a style of organisational control in the 
public sector (Hood 1991, Hughes et at. 1992). First, there is concern with service 
organisation in terms of processes (efficiency) opposed to outcomes (effectiveness). 
Second, management is focussed on reducing expenditure and controlling costs. 
Third, greater use of private sector practices and mantra, for example the 
"excellence" movement (Peters and Watennan 1983), characterised by meeting 
targets, cultural change, and devolved freedom to managers. Fourth, the 
transformation of the public sector from a bureaucratic model to a fragmented 
structure with quasi-autonomous units. Fifth, a shift from traditional forms of public 
sector regulation, associated with professionalism, to more centralised techniques of 
performance assessment and monitoring. 
Hood (1991) suggests that as a doctrine, rather than a fad, NPM is based upon 
organisational principles that replace traditional bureaucratic and professional 
systems. Hoggett (1991, 1996) describes the changes as post-bureaucratic, where 
strong central government control is implemented through devolved strategic 
management, which is distinct from professional hierarchies and where the will of 
central government is implemented through managers accorded "freedom within 
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boundaries" (Hoggett 1996). Here strict rule structures are substituted for cultural 
conformity, "relative autonomy" and empowerment; while performance measures 
direct and assess the extent of local conformity (Carter 1991). 
Walshe (2002) has argued that an important consequence of the changes in public 
sector management is the proliferation of complimentary "third party" regulatory 
agencies, reflective of the "regulatory state" or "audit society" (Power 1997). He 
points out that despite the Conservative governments commitment to de-regulation 
(Gamble 1 Y92), between 1979 and 1997 a range of new bodies were created to 
oversee the performance of the public sector, but importantly remained outside the 
realm of service provision, for example the Audit Commission and the Health and 
Safety Executive. He points out that as well as representing "new ways to get things 
done" (Walshe 2002: 968), these agencies also provide distance between politicians 
and difficult decisions. A significant commentator on the changing character of 
regulation is Power (1997) who has described an "audit explosion" during the 1980s 
and 1990s. He points to the growing number of regulatory agencies that inspect the 
performance of the public sector and public interest, and suggests that this is 
associated with changes in NPM and the growing demand for "verification" as the 
state withdraws from direct responsibility for service provision. In line with the 
ideas of devolved freedom he notes that regulation has become internalised within 
roles, but with transparent accountability for state approval. 
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Managers and doctors in the NHS 
Managerial changes in the NHS are associated with these wider developments in 
public sector management, in particular the political concern for greater political and 
consumer accountability and the efficient use of resources (Ham 1992). To 
contextualise their impact on the health service and the medical profession, an 
interesting comparison can be found with Alford's (1975) examination of power 
within the US health care system. He found that doctors represented a dominant 
group that directly or indirectly controlled how servic ' ~ ~ operated, premised on their 
professional status. In contrast he found that hospital organisation was increasingly 
being administered by "corporate rationalizers" or managers whose work 
"contradicts and challenges some fundamental interests of professional monopolies" 
(Alford 1975: 15). To improve service efficiency these managers were seen as 
"challenging" the dominant position of medicine and had ideologically little regard 
for medical values. Of interest here is the extent to which managerial changes in the 
NHS have transformed the character of medical professionalism. As Fuchs (1974: 
56) argued: 
" ... it is impossible to understand the problems of medical services without 
understanding the physician. And it is impossible to make significant 
changes in the medical field without changing physician behaviour" 
Accepting the corporatist organisation of health care in the 1970s, (Department of 
Health and Social Security 1972), the first significant development in health service 
management occurred following the recommendations of Griffiths' NHS 
Management Inquiry (Department of Health and Social Security 1983). This report 
reflected the wider political and organisational changes of the era associated with the 
demands for efficiency and Thatcherite ideology (James 1994). It made explicit 
comparisons with the private sector and suggested that the NHS was burdened by 
excessive consultation, corporate planning and incoherent leadership. It suggested 
that the service, which had recently been given a 'clean bill of health' (Merrison 
1979), required organisational and cultural change, replacing inept leadership with a 
new managerial role that could "draw together" responsibilities "at different levels 
of the organisation, for planning, implementation and control of performance" 
(Department of Health and Social Security 1983: 11). General Managers, it was 
argued, would take the initiative in local service planning, avoiding protracted 
decision-making and delivering necessary organisational changes and efficiencies. 
It has been suggested that the authority of general managers appeared to challenge 
the orthodox working arrangements of the service as they represented 
"countervailing powers" (Cox 1991) to those already established in the service. The 
main function of these new organisational actors centred on making performance 
improvements, cost-savings, efficiencies and streamlining (Cox 1991). To support 
these duties systems of performance measurement were also introduced to enable 
benchmarking, companson, and enabling central government to assess 
improvements (Scrivens 1988, Carter 1991). This reflected many of the features of 
NPM as it represented a devolved mechanism through which central government 
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could achieve desired change or secure "local conformity to ministerial goals" 
(Flynn 1992: 107). Harrison (1988) believes that the 1980s saw the end of 
"diplomatic management" in the NHS as general managers represented a new 
politically inspired organisational group that was radically different from the 
traditional administrative culture. As such it has been argued that General 
Management, like the Alford's (1975) "corporate rationalizers" represented a major 
challenge to the established position of the medical profession (Cox 1991). Elston 
(1991: 68) believes that the management reforms: 
" ... cut a swathe across established lines of professional responsibility and 
clinical freedom". 
However, it is necessary not to overstate the impact of General Management on 
medical work. It is important to return to the earlier observations where it was 
suggested that medical influence has always been bound within organisational 
systems. While it may be the case that general management introduced new duties to 
re-organise and manage services the impact on the medical profession was limited, 
especially in the technical areas of medical work (Harrison and Pollitt 1995, Strong 
and Robinson 1990). Doctors were frequently "immune" to management decision-
making because the focus of managerial activity was often external to medical work 
(Flynn 1992). It was therefore the non-medical occupational groups that were more 
accessible to management control, such as ancillary and support services. Moreover, 
Lapsey (1994) believes that managers were risk averse and did not possess the 
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knowledge or inclination to challenge medical working patterns. He argues that 
general management and the associated performance measurement practices 
represented two "false revolutions" in the NHS given that these changes were 
directed at the non-technical aspects of service organisation and did not directly 
challenge the aspects of medicine that are premised on expert knowledge. In essence 
the illegitimacy of management in these areas ensured that doctors retained 
important features of their professional status. 
While the management reforms in the 1980s did not necessarily change the character 
of medical professionalism directly, they did represent a transition on which further 
policies have been based. Enthoven (1985) suggested that although General 
Management had made important and necessary changes in service organisation, it 
was ultimately a limited policy because professionals retained the ability to shape 
service planning and delivery. He highlighted the problems of organisational 
inflexibility and "gridlock" and the benefits of adopting market structures. Working 
for Patients (Department of Health 1989) endorsed this view and set out plans for an 
internal market in the NHS that would deliver efficiency, responsible use of 
resources and enhanced patient choice. In essence the purchaser/provider split 
replaced the bureaucratic and integrated funding model by substituting global 
budgets with contracts for specific packages or transactions of care (see Bartlett and 
Harrison 1993, Bartlett and Le Grand 1993, Ham 1992, Ham 1997). With the 
internal market, the structural interests of the medical profession faced several new 
challenges (Flynn 1992). Building on the general management reforms, the co-
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ordination and operation of the internal market relied heavily on managerial and 
accounting processes to formulate competitive contracts. This shifted a great deal of 
the responsibility for service planning and organisation towards market forces and 
management practice. Consequently, the control of the non-technical aspects of 
medical work shifted significantly into non-medical hands. Hunter (1994: 6) argued 
that the reforms: 
" ... can be seen as an attempt to secure a shift in the balance of power 
between doctors and managers in favour of the latter". 
Flynn (1992: 101) believes that these changes were clear political attempts to 
regulate medical activity "premised on the rational-economic and calculative 
approaches to efficiency", reflective of the "challenging" managerialism found in 
the US (Alford 1975). Harrison (1999) describes the changes as both continuity and 
change. He identifies several important changes within the profession, for example, 
the increased structural abilities of GPs to influence service delivery, and the 
emergence of managerial responsibilities for local medical leaders, such as Medical 
Director (Hunter 1994, Tremblay 1998). On the other hand, he saw continuity in 
terms of the medical profession's ability to carry out their work with relative 
freedom from managerial interference, given that managerial attention was largely 
focussed on economic and contracting issues, not directly medical work. 
Nevertheless, the structural position of medicine within the organisation of health 
service was significantly altered by these changes (Alaszewski 1995, Cox 1991. 
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Elston 1991, Flynn 1992), further shifting the organisational, occupational and 
technical features of medical work. 
As reforms, General Management and the Internal Market have had a longstanding 
influence on health service organisation. The impact on medical professionalism 
remains open to question. In terms of medical autonomy it can be seen that at the 
level of policy, organisation, and economics the influence of medicine may be 
reduced. It remains important, however, to appreciate that these dimensions of 
medical professionalism were always bound up with organisational systems and 
networks through which action was mediated. These changes may represent the 
diminution of medical authority in particular areas of health service organisation as 
new actors have acquired more responsibilities; yet the technical basis of medical 
work remains largely unchallenged. This is because management activity \vas 
directed at other aspects of service organisation, and importantly had little 
legitimacy to engage with medical expertise. This reinforces the view managers and 
politicians cannot feasibly replace medical expertise (Owen 1976, Freidson 1970) 
and therefore the core basis of professional status, if not the environment in which it 
is practiced, persisted largely intact. 
The management of organisational quality 
For this thesis an important consideration within the changing character of public 
sector management is the shift from professional forms of quality control to mor(' 
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managerial forms of quality assurance. From a management and organisational 
theory perspective these changes reflect the rejection of Fordist and Taylorist 
methods of control and "end-of-line" inspection and key developments in global 
management theory and practice, including the adoption of the 'excellence 
movement' (Peters and Waterman 1983), culture management and new techniques 
of quality assurance (Allen 1989, Drummond 1992, Reason 1999, Taylor 1970). 
Deming's (1986) significant contribution to the quality movement centres of the 
Incorporation of quality throughout the entire organisational process rather than at a 
post-production stage. He suggested that organisations should work towards quality 
in what they "plan", "do", "check", and in their "action" (the PDCA cycle) 
(Rosanser 1991). Like Deming, Juran (1988) identified factors associated with 
successful quality improvement that could be embraced within management 
practice. He also puts forward the concept of the "quality trilogy" that involves 'top-
level' management driving forward improvement, through "quality planning" (or 
understanding quality from the perspective of the customer); "quality control" 
(evaluating products against the expectations of customers); and "quality 
improvement" (identifying problems and promoting change) (Juran 1989). 
The general principle behind these models of quality improvement is the 
commitment to quality throughout the production process and calculating and 
managing improved quality (Wilkinson et al 1998). By the 1970s such techniques 
had b e ~ n n successfully implemented in post-war Japan and were being aJopted 
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within Western business to improve global competitiveness (Drummond 1992). 
They are a feature of contemporary management philosophy and practice, 
representing a transition from "quality control" to "quality assurance" (Reason 
1999). 
Quality assurance has increasingly influenced management practice over the last 
twenty years, including the public sector (Drummond 1992). Possibly the most 
celebrated model is Total Quality Management (TQM) (Wilkinson et al 1998). 
Although there are varying definitions of TQM, Wilkinson et al (1998) suggest that 
there are a number of basic principles. The first is 'customer orientation' or 
satisfying the consumer. The second is termed 'process orientation' and revolves 
around dividing organisational processes into a "quality chain" where each link has a 
responsibility for meeting the customer's notion of quality. Finally, the organisation 
must strive for 'continuous improvement' through encouraging employees within 
the 'quality chain' to innovate and experiment with new techniques. TQM has 
become a popular feature of private sector enterprise. and over the last two decades 
it has had an impact on the public sector. 
The management of health service quality and risks 
Pollitt (1993: 161) suggests that quality programmes. such as TQM, represent are "a 
kind of religious cult" that have become increasingly popular in the public sector. 
For Close (1997) the evolution of quality management in the NUS has been 
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influenced by seven factors. The first includes the political drive for increased 
effectiveness in the delivery of care, encapsulated within the purchaser/provider split 
and devices such as the Patient's Charter. The second is the increased role of 
external audits and performance measures in promoting quality. The third is 
international guidance from the World Health Organisation that stipulates the 
measurement of quality within health services. The fourth comprises changes in the 
education and training of NHS staff to promote quality. The fifth includes changes 
in professional regulation, such as Medical Audit. The sixth is the role of consumer 
associations, pressure groups and the media in questioning quality levels in the 
service. And finally, the influence of expert theory and management practice 
associated with quality assurance. 
At the time of the internal market reforms, the Department of Health supported 
proposals from Health Authorities to implement forms of TQM (Pollitt 1993). Since 
that time hospitals have experimented with various forms of quality assurance and 
service improvement (Hart 1997). Within this context of quality assurance and TQM 
one important concern is the management of organisational risks (Hansson 2000). 
This is particularly relevant in this thesis because risk management provides the 
organisational context in which the emerging patient safety policy is being 
developed and implemented (Department of Health 2000). 
Prior to the 1980s the control of clinical risks in the NHS can be regarded as implicit 
and non-managerial. All professionals are involved, to some degree, in calculating 
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and absorbing risks in their work (Hughes 1951), but the control of risk resides in 
the technical basis of work whereby expertise informs decision-making. In the 
context of quality assurance, however, the control of risk becomes explicit. 
systematic and guided by managerial theory. Importantly risk management is guided 
by expertise that originates outside the knowledge of the professional making the 
decision. 
Clements (1995) suggests that risk management can be broadly defined as the 
reduction of harm to an organisation through the identification and elimination of 
risks. Dickson (1995) and Wilson (1999) suggest that clinical risk management or 
"strategic risk modification" typically consists of two components: the collection 
information about risks and then the adjustment of services to control these threats. 
There are numerous ways in which these tasks can be fulfilled, but Dickson (1995) 
argues that a systematic method of risk identification is the introduction of an 
incident reporting system, which involves recording actual and potential risks 
encounter in work processes. Such systems have existed in the NHS since 1955 
when guidance required the reporting of all accidents, and more recently have been 
associated with the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences 
Regulations (RIDDOR) since 1985 (Health and Safety Executive 1998, 2001). 
However, despite the existence of such systems, the growth of more rigorous risk 
management is frequently associated with litigation and risk pressures in the health 
services and the schemes introduced to control them. 
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The increasing pressure of litigation and the introduction of the Clinical Negligence 
Scheme for Trusts (CNST) to manage the financial cost of litigation ha\'e certainly 
prompted more rigorous forms of risk management in the NHS, The number of 
litigation claims has risen dramatically during the 1990s (Marquand and rvli Her 
1997, Wilson and Tingle 1999) and in 1999 it was estimated that there was a 
potential liability of £2.4million (Department of Health 2000). In 1994 CNST was 
introduced to provide hospital Trusts with financial support in litigation cases. In 
essence it acts as an insurance fund that charges a premium to cover some of the cost 
of litigation. Importantly, to participate within CNST and to reduce premium costs 
hospitals have to meet certain "standards" for quality improvement (CNST 2000): in 
a similar way that a burglar alarm can reduce home insurance. These standards have 
included more systematic forms of education, risk management and incident 
reporting. Although voluntary, by 1999 Dineen and Walshe (1999a, 1999b) found 
that virtually all hospital trusts (96.4%) were members of CNST and had therefore 
developed, in some form, systems of risk management and incident reporting. 
Risk management has therefore become an established approach to quality 
improvement within the NHS. For this study, the developments in risk management 
are particularly important because, as it will be shown, the current policy context for 
patient safety is premised upon many of the procedures put in place in response to 
RIDDOR and CNST. Furthermore, these methods of quality improvement are of 
interest because they are predominantly implemented and coordinated by managerial 
groups. 
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(1999) show that it draws on tried and tested managerial and professional techniques 
of quality improvement. For example, it builds on professional schemes such as 
'clinical audit'; whilst it is also influenced by techniques of 'quality assurance' and 
management theories of proactive 'systems re-engineering'. Clinical go emance 
therefore represents the coming together of both established professional forms of 
internal regulation and external managerial techniques for quality assurance. 
Figure 2.1. The integration of clinical governance. (source: S cally and Donaldson 
1998). 
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Of interest is the way in which this unification or responsibility for quality will 
necessitate a re-negotiation of the relationship between managers and medical 
professionals (Dewar 1998). In particular the establishment of accountabilitv 
relationships that enable senior managers with overall responsibility for quality to 
engage with the performance of professionals and take action when necessary 
(Dewar 1998). 
Conclusion: professionalism and the management of quality 
Hughes and McGuire (1992) suggest that the "settlement" of 1948 secured a strong 
position for the medical profession, whereby political control at the national level 
was tempered by professional control at the local level, especially in the form of 
"clinical freedom". This political relationship was articulated Bevan: 
"I conceive it the function of the Minister of Health to provide the medical 
profession with the best and most modern apparatus and to enable them 
freely to use it, in accordance with their training, for the benefit of the people 
of the country. Every doctor must be free to use that apparatus without 
interference from secular organisations" (cited in Hughes and McGuire 1992: 
92). 
The political settlement for the NHS has had a longstanding impact on the 
organisation of the service and major reforms have necessitated are-negotiation uf 
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the relationship between the state and the profession (Titmuss 1963). What is 
important for this research is the extent that health service reform alters the features 
of professionalism associated with 'autonomy' and 'regulation'. One of the major 
developments in the NHS over the last twenty years has been the rise of 
managerialism. Although it has been argued that managers have challenged medical 
autonomy, it is important not to overstate occupational change. In particular, it is 
necessary to avoid the view that medical autonomy has been wholesale eroded by 
management. Although increased managerialism has certainly brought about new 
forms of organisational responsibility and authority eroding aspects of medical 
influence, the core feature of technical autonomy (Freidson 1970) has remained 
largely in the hands of medical practitioners. 
Important for this study are changes in the management of the health service quality. 
Over the last ten years there have been several incidents and scandals that have 
called into question the capacity of medicine to regulate its work appropriately. In 
consequence, managerial forms of quality improvement, such as TQM and risk 
management, have been increasingly adopted within management practice. What is 
interesting is the extent to which progressions in the quality agenda, including 
clinical governance and the new patient safety agenda, are offering to transform the 
relationship between medical and managerial groups. This is because these new 
managerial duties focus on both non-technical and technical aspects of medical work 
and potentially engage with diagnosis and treatment, and the evaluation of care. On 
the one hand this may involve new forms of external and direct regulation of 
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medical work; on the other hand it may involve new forms of surveillance and 
governmentality that lead to doctors monitoring their work in accordance with 
managerial and political expectations. 
This chapter has therefore outlined the broad theoretical context for this research. 
This can be summarised as the changing character of medical professionalism 
centred on the relationship between medical and managerial groups in the 
management of medical errors as a threat to service quality. The following chapter 
provides an account of the specific policy developments patient safety. This policy is 
then critically de-constructed and it is asked whether it will bring about a transition 
in the character of medical regulation including a re-negotiation of the "proper 
relations" between the state and the profession. Over the following two chapters 
attention is therefore given to the various theoretical perspectives that engage with 
the changing character of medical/managerial relations in the context of error 
management. It is not possible, however, to identify a single theoretical framework; 
instead a range of divergent approaches is taken to facilitate a more thorough study 
the different facets of the patient safety policy and its consequences for 
medical/managerial relations in the NHS. This includes the constructive and 
discursive dimensions of medical error, where the occupational interpretation and 
meaning relates to particular strategies for organisational control. In addition to these 
epistemological considerations attention is given to the cultural and structural 
dimensions of medical work and error management in terms of their capacity for 
promoting or resisting changes in quality improvement and occupational change. 
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These distinct theoretical fields are 'pragmatically' (Watson 1997) amalgamated in 
the study of medical professionalism and managerialisrn in the context of patient 
safety health policies. 
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3. 'fhe 'Patient Safety' Policy Agenda 
Introduction 
It is now apparent that mistakes in the delivery of health care are a major threat te, 
health service quality. Research in the United State of America, Australia, and the 
United Kingdom has demonstrated this 'problem' and called for new methods of 
quality improvement. In England and Wales the NHS response comprises a 
reporting system to learn about the volume and character of errors and managerial 
systems to promote organisational learning and change. Importantly, this policy 
framework builds on past experiences in health service management, including 
forms of quality improvement and clinical risk management, and is couched within 
the clinical governance framework. As a mechanism of quality improvement it is 
therefore argued that this new facet of quality improvement has the potential to 
provide a new frontier for medical/managerial relations in the NHS, specifically 
around the regulation of medical mistakes. 
This chapter provides an account of this patient safety policy agenda. It commences 
with a review of national and international research findings that demonstrate the 
level of errors in the respective health care systems. Attention then turns to a 
discussion of the theoretical foundations on which policy is based. The application 
of these ideas is described through an overview of the 'patient safely' framework, 
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with specific attention given to three interrelated issues. The first is the concept of 
error operationalised in policy that provides the basis on which managerial and 
professional action is to be based. The second and more tangible aspect of the policy 
is the introduction of an incident reporting system to enable individual hospitals and 
the NHS at large to learn from mistakes and share lessons. The third component is 
the way in which hospital systems are being developed to analyse incidents and 
promote organisational change. Of importance within this discussion is the 
application of specific managerial theories and extension of management roles to 
promote organisational quality. 
The scale of medical mistakes 
One of the first major pieces of research on the extent and character of health service 
errors was the landmark Harvard Medical Practice Study (Brennan et al 1991, Leape 
et al 1991). This research involved a retrospective chart review of hospital inpatient 
records in the New York State region for the year 1984. From their random sample 
of case notes the expert panel ,was able to identify, with significant statistical 
reliability, 98'609 adverse events from 2'671'863 cases: an adverse event rate of 
3.69%. It was also estimated that 69% of these were caused by error and in terms of 
patient harm 56.8% experienced minimal disability with complete recovery, 1 3 , 7 ( ; ~ ' '
experienced considerable disability with eventual recovery, 2.6% resulted in 
permanent disability and 13.6% led to death. Extrapolating these figures for the 
entire USA it was calculated that potentially 98'000 people are killed every year b ~ ~
adverse health care events. 
"The burden of iatrogenic injury was thus large" (Brennan and Leape 1991: 
373) 
It has been suggested that this research is likely to significantly underestimate the 
level of errors (O'Neil et al 1993). It takes no account of errors that did not lead to 
some form of disability and methodologically the analysis is based on the 
information recorded in patient notes, not unrecorded events (0' Neil et al 1993). 
Further research using alternative techniques, including self-reporting and 
observation, suggest that the actual level of error may well exceed the findings of the 
Harvard study (Andrews 1997, Bates et al. 1995). 
Similar results have been found in Australia (Wilson et al 1995, Wolff and Bourke 
2000) and in England and Wales (Department of Health 2000, Vincent et al 2001) 
suggesting that this problem is not necessarily a feature of a particular organisational 
or funding system, but is more deep-seated within the delivery of health care. The 
scale of adverse events in the NHS has been estimated by the expert report All 
Organisation with a Memory (Department of Health 2000). Like the Harvard study, 
it was shown that 10% of inpatient admissions experience some form of adverse 
event totalling 850'000 events a year. In addition to the human cost, it was also 
estimated that the financial cost of these adverse events is £2billion a year in further 
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care: not to mention the additional costs of litigation. Vincent et al. (2001) h a \ " t ~ ~
reinforced these NHS figures through a retrospective case review, which found that 
10.8% of patients admitted to hospital experience an adverse event or 1l.7% if 
multiple events to a single patient are taken into consideration. Importantly, they 
estimate that about half of these are preventable. 
These levels of error are indeed startling. Put in the context of the other major threats 
to health their significance becomes even more dramatic. Official figures for 1999 
show that the major 'killers' in England and Wales were coronary heart disease and 
stroke (218,062), all cancers (133,749), lung cancer (29,406) and breast cancer 
(11,548). However, it is estimated that adverse events equate to potentially 40,000 
deaths a year (Moore 2000). These findings have been extrapolated to suggest that 
'going into hospital' is potentially more dangerous that flying in an aeroplane, 
driving a car or motorcycle or even mountain climbing, and the number of deaths 
per year could be represented by two large passenger aircraft crashing every week 
(Patient Safety Training 2003). Given the scale of errors in the delivery of health 
care it is not surprising that health policy is now endeavouring to systematically 
address this problem. 
Theories of error and error management 
Before moving onto to outline the patient safety health policies that have emerged to 
address this problem, attention is given to the theoretical and empirical context on 
70 
which policies are premised. Reflecting the three main lines of enquiry in this study. 
attention is given to the concept of error, the principles and implementation of 
incident reporting and the function of error management. 
The concept of "error" in health service research 
Although empirical research has demonstrated the 'problem' of errors in health care, 
of interest in this thesis is the way in which 'error' is defined and employed in 
research and the implications that this has for policy recommendations. Sandars and 
Esmail (200 1) and Walshe (2000) have highlighted a range of definitions that have 
been employed within health service research. Examples include McLamb and 
Huntley's (1967) "any response to medical care in the hospital that is unintended, 
undesirable and harmful to the person"; Craddick and Bader's (\983) "untoward 
patient events which, under optimal conditions, are not a natural consequence of the 
patient's disease or treatment"; and the Harvard Medical Practice Study's (Brennan 
and Leape 1991) "an unintended injury caused by medical management rather than 
by the disease process"; Walshe's (1998) own definition consists of "an untoward or 
undesirable occurrence in the healthcare process which has or potentially has some 
negative impact on patient or patients and results or may result from some part of the 
healthcare process". Such definitions can also be joined by the likes of Vincent et al. 
(1998: 1154) who refer to "incidents in which a patient is unintentionally harmed by 
medical treatment"; or Leape (1999) who refers to an "unintended act", either by 
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omission or commission, or an act that does not achieve its intended outcome that 
leads to a negative patient outcome. 
Although these definitions vary, there are some common themes. The first is what 
Walshe (2000) terms "negativity" in that an event has an undesirable and detrimental 
impact upon the healthcare process or the patient. The second is "patient 
involvement/impact" referring to the crucial involvement of the patient as the focal 
point of the negative impact, as opposed to wider risk management tenninology that 
could include financial damage. The third feature is "causation" and suggests that 
the negative patient event is the consequence of some kind of action or inaction. 
Walshe's (2000) analysis captures the predominant characteristics that seem to 
underpin the various definitions of error. However, it is how the concepts have been 
used and what they fail to fully acknowledge that makes them sociologically 
interesting. Much of the prevailing terminology tends to shy away from the word 
"error" and adopts variations of "adverse event" or "incident". The reasons are not 
explicit but it is possible that a rejection of the word "error" in favour of "adverse 
event" may avoid unwanted associations with individual responsibility and blame 
that are seen as unhelpful for improving patient safety (Wilson and Haraden 200 1). 
Another interesting feature is the way these definitions have been used to inform 
research, and in doing so they reflect the philosophical foundations of these studies. 
In particular there tends to be little recognition of the interpretative, subjective or 
constructive domains of error; how the definition of error implicitly moulds research 
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findings through reflecting particular assumptions, ideologies or discourses; or 
alternatively how health service staff may make sense of errors along different line:; 
This theme is explored in the following chapter. 
Technical typologies of error 
Another contribution to the conceptualisation of error goes beyond a general 
definition of negativity and causality, to specify technical types of error. This is been 
achieved in a number of areas of health care, for example, taxonomies of drug 
errors, errors in primary care or accidents in obstetrics (Dean et al. 2002, Drife 1993, 
Dovey et al. 2002). These accounts vary from studying the frequency and types of 
mistake to more theoretical discussions of the care pathway. Neale (1995) has 
provided an interesting illustration of the different stages of medical work from 
which he identified a range of types of medical error. Specifically he refers to the 
technical aspects of work associated with diagnosis, treatment procedures, drug 
treatment and general patient management. From this he highlights error types such 
as 'misdiagnosis', where there is misinterpretation of information, unfamiliarity with 
the disease, or poor reasoning that leads to an incorrect diagnosis. He also shows that 
patient safety can be compromised through the procedures of medicine where 
specific diagnostic tests or treatments harm the patient either as a side-effect or 
through poor practice, such as drug errors. In this way, Neale (1995) highlights the 
opportunities for error within the technical components of medical work. Such a 
model could include many stages where different "windows of opportunities" and 
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"types" of error could occur (see figure 3.1) and in consequence provide some form 
of technical definition of error. 
Figure 3.1 An outline of the phases of medical work and the opportunities for error 
The opportunities for medical error 
I I I I I 1 
... 
Initial Diagnosis Decision- Treatment Assessment Outcome 
Assessment making 
Neale's (1995) account of medical error also reveals an underlying assumption about 
the character of error. He suggests that these different types of medical 
"misadventure" can be brought about by "unforced errors", including lapses in 
memory, "mistakes" in diagnosis or "violations" of established protocols. In addition 
he suggests that there can be an "organisational predisposition" to error, where there 
is insufficient training that leads to unfamiliarity, high workloads that can distort or 
adversely influence performance, and poor interactions within teamwork acti vities. 
In this way, Neale is reflecting certain assumptions about medical mistakes that 
appear 'common sense' and stemming from the actual work of doctors. Moreover he 
develops these ideas with particular reference to psychological theories, specifically 
the }-Iuman Factors approach, which has been increasingly endorsed in policy and 
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professional literature (Berwick and Leape, Reason 2000, Vincent et al 1998, 
Vincent and Reason 1999). 
Psychological and human/actors approaches to error 
The study of accidents and errors has traditionally been associated with the 
theoretical developments in cognitive and social psychology, which provide 
explanations for why individuals and groups make mistakes. These psychological 
theories have been enhanced by the principles of ergonomics and organisational 
theory to advance a theory of individual error that considers the systems of human 
behaviour and interaction. Importantly these theories now shape contemporary 
management practice and current health policies (Department of Health 2001, 
Reason 2000). 
From a psychological perspective, errors occur at the level of individual behaviour 
due to cognitive and mental aberrations. For example, when the routines of 
behaviour and processes of decision-making lapse, become fractured or disjointed. 
Rasmussen and Jensen (1974) classify human performance in three ways 
demonstrating the different ways mistakes can arise due to cognition, decision-
making and action. The first type of performance is skill-based and is associated 
with pre- stored codes and patterns of behaviour. The second is rule-based and relies 
upon instructions that guide action. The third is knowledge-based and relies upon the 
acquisition of knowledge and experience to direct action. Within this cognitive 
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framework problems with action arise through either 'errors', which involve lapses 
or deficiencies with rule and skill based action, or 'mistakes' that are associated with 
the knowledge base. "Errors" can include slips where there is a break in the 
psychological processes associated with routine action, such as a "descriptive" slip 
where an appropriate action is carried out on the wrong object or an "associate 
activation error" where an action associated with one object is carried out on 
another, e.g. answering the telephone when the doorbell rings. Alternatively 
"mistakes" are associated with knowledge-based processes and can include "biased 
memory" when behaviour relies upon rules that have been followed many times 
before but are inappropriate for novel situations; or "coning of attention" where 
action is based upon insufficient information. Such mistakes normally occur where 
previous rules and routines are insufficient and when the individual is placed under 
considerable pressure. 
This cognitive approach has a great deal to offer for conceptualising medical errors. 
It can be expected that doctors rely upon a whole range of mental schemata, 
instructions and knowledge-based processes in their work. Errors can therefore 
occur along any of these dimensions, for example, slips can occur when there are 
multiple competing demands and routine behaviour becomes complicated. 
Furthermore, medical practice is associated with the acquisition of expert knowledge 
and experience and mistakes inay therefore occur in novel situations where this 
knowledge cannot fully account for a particular disease or where practitioners rely 
on previously tried and tested procedures that may be inappropriate. 
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Social psychologists have advanced these cognitive theories through incorporating 
the principles of ergonomics and organisational theory, by examining the interface 
between behaviour and systems. Most notable is Reason's (1995, 1999, 2000, 
Vincent and Reason 1999) contribution to the human factors approach. Reason 
(1999: 71) defines human error as "the failure of planned actions to achieve their 
desired ends- without the intervention of some unforeseen event". He develops 
Rasmussen and Jensen's (1974) work suggesting that along with errors (slips and 
lapses) and mistakes, there are also violations. These include 'routine violations' 
associated with cutting comers; 'optimising violations' which refer to motivational 
causes, such as thrill; and 'necessary violations' where organisational support is 
lacking. 
His most significant contribution to the conceptualisation of error is through his 
analysis of the relationship between individuals and complex social systems where a 
distinction is made between active and latent errors. The former refers to the 
individual event or mistake: the unsafe act or failure to act that results in a mistake. 
The latter draws attention to the unsafe human and organisational systems that 
create, enable or exacerbate an active error. Reason (1999) argues that although 
individuals are prone to make mistakes, they do not intend to make them; it therefore 
becomes necessary to appreciate the ''upstream'' decisions and systemic factors that 
enable mistakes or fail to control mistakes. This can include poorly designed 
working arrangements, poor defence and early-warning mechanisms, or an over-
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reliance on automation. In this way, organisations are characterised as possessing a 
range of systems that offer opportunities for error, and when a specific arrangement 
of interactions exists the opportunity becomes more likely. Analytical attention is 
directed not just at the 'front line' individual but also the chain of decisions and 
systems within the organisation. 
The theory of error management 
Building on these psychological theories of error a specific approach to error 
management has become increasingly popular in private and public enterprise; 
associated with the wider transition from Fordist quality control to quality assurance 
(Drummond 1992, Reason 1999). Accordingly it is suggested that the entire 
production process should feature a series of defensive barriers that can protect 
against accidents and also alert the organisation to potential dangers. 
Reason (1999) argues that to promote organisational quality it is necessary to 
develop safer organisational systems and mechanisms to learn from mistakes. As 
shown above this approach rests on the distinction between "active" and "latent" 
errors. It is argued that given that individuals do not intend to make mistakes, and 
psychological precursors to mistake are difficult to control. e.g. tiredness or stress. it 
is necessary to focus on the systemic or latent factors (Vincent and Reason 1999). 
He suggests that error management consists of two components. The first is "error 
reduction" and centres on developing systems to limit the occurrence of mistake. 
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The second is "error containment" and is concerned with limiting the impact of 
mistakes when they occur. For error management to be effective it therefore needs tIl 
detect and understand the threats to organisational safety, and then introduce the 
necessary defensive mechanisms. Not only is this approach similar to wider models 
of quality assurance, but it also reflects the core characteristics of risk management 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
For Reason (1999, 2000) error management requires the introduction of measures to 
discover, consider and safeguard against the latent factors that enable, facilitate or 
exacerbate active errors. Furthermore, given that mistakes can never be fully 
eradicated it is important for an organisation to continually seek out and manage 
potential errors. Pivotal within the Human Factors approach therefore is the 
introduction of information and analysis systems that can detect errors, analyse the 
systemic or latent features and promote organisational change. For Reason this 
involves the promotion of an error reporting and management system, whereby all 
organisational actors who experience error or potential error report the specific and 
contextual details to an organisational unit responsible for safety. Although this 
approach may appear to shift the responsibility of error "upstream" within the 
organisation, it also enables the organisation to appreciate the ways in which 
defensive mechanisms fail (Reason 1993). 
For incident reporting and systemic learning to be possible Reason (1999) believes it 
is necessary to acquire the active participation of all organisational actors and this 
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requires overcoming several potential barriers. First it is necessary to foster and 
adopt an organisation culture that is not plagued by blame but instead values 
openness and learning. He argues that the Western Culture is characterised by the 
ideals of freedom and it is this "illusion" that cultivates a culture of blame because 
individuals feel they have to be accountable for their autonomous actions. However, 
blame encourages people to conceal their mistakes and seek out individual remedies, 
but in doing so this prevents organisations from learning and adopting safer working 
practices. Important therefore is the need to accept that individuals will make 
mistakes and look to the wider contributing factors. Reason believes it is necessary 
to foster a ''just culture" where the individual becomes the "victim" rather than the 
"villain" . 
"We must design systems that acknowledge human fallibility, recognise its 
variation, and are forgiving of unsafe acts" (Reason 1993: 13). 
Secondly, it is necessary to foster a "reporting culture" whereby actors openly and 
honestly relay infonnation about errors that they have experienced. Here he 
identifies five factors that promote such a culture and overcome the disincentives to 
reporting. These include indemnity against disciplinary action as far as reasonably 
possible; confidentiality or de-identification; the separation of the agency for 
collecting and analysing information and those with the authority to punish; rapid 
and useful and feedback; and ease of making a report. Through adopting these 
practices it is believed that organisational actors will be more inclined to report 
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mistakes they encounter and eventually this will lead to a safer organisational 
culture. 
Reason's model of error management therefore advocates a culture of quality that 
drives forward action, a culture that has respect for potential breaches in system 
defences, a culture that is open and collects information about mistakes, a culture of 
reporting, a 'no blame' culture, a flexible culture that enables change, and a culture 
of learning. With these cultural characteristics in place Reasons (1999, 2000) 
suggests that it is possible for organisations to appreciate not just the active errors 
but also the latent systemic factors. 
Fundamentally Reason (1999) believes that this "safety" culture can be 
"engineered". Here he suggests that an 'organisational culture' is something that an 
organisation "has", it is a property of the organisation, like the structures of 
accountability or finance and it is open to managerial manipulation. Reason 
acknowledges the contested notion of organisational culture, but firmly endorses the 
view that organisational leaders can foster cultural changes within organisations. 
However, as it will be discussed in the following chapter there are some major 
criticisms of this theory of culture that are central to this thesis. 
This Human Factors approach to understanding accidents and mistakes has been 
applied widely. For example, with the sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise at 
Zeebruggc individual blame was superseded by the failures of the parent company, 
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which was described as "infected with the disease of sloppiness" (Department of 
Transport, 1987). More recently the Ladbrooke Grove Rail Inquiry, whilst 
recognising the role of the train drivers, stated that "there was a lamentable failure 
on the part of Railtrack to respond to recommendations" and make line 
improvements (Cullen 2001). This approach has also become commonplace in the 
aviation industry where pilots and cabin staff are expected to report problematic 
events and threats to safety (0' Leary 2002). 
In the field of health care, the Human Factors approach has been increasingly 
endorsed in academic study over the last ten years (e.g. Vincent 1993, 1997), while 
more recently it has been adopted within large-scale public inquiries and health 
policies. For example, the Toft Report (Toft 2001) analysed the fatal misapplication 
of the drug vincristine and identified a chain of events that precipitated the act of 
drug administration. The Bristol Inquiry (Kennedy 2001) was also influenced by 
these ideas, suggesting the wider organisational cultures and relationships were 
crucial in masking the events surrounding infant mortality. The application of the 
Human Factors approach to health care highlights a range of factors that can 
negatively influence clinical practice and increase the chance of error (Vincent et al. 
1998), Vincent and Reason (1999) identify "task", "team", "situational" and 
"organisational" factors that can contribute to the risk of error. The control of these 
risks may involve standardising work "tasks", improving "teamwork", alleviating 
"situational" factors such as workload and stress, and appreciating the wider 
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systemic contribution found with the "organisation". In the delivery of health care 
this could include understanding a range of factors: 
• The institutional context - the economic and regulatory context of the 
• 
service; 
Organisational and management factors - financial constraints, policy 
objectives and cultural practice; 
• Work environment - staffing levels, skill mix, work load and support; 
• Team factors - communication, supervision and structure 
• Individual factors - knowledge, skill, and motivation; 
• Task factors - clarity of the task and the use of protocols; 
• Patient characteristics complexity and severity of condition, 
communication, social factors and personality. 
(Vincent et al 1998: 1155) 
As well as representing a new approach to error management, the Human Factors 
approach is reflective of the wider transition towards quality assurance and risk 
management. Vincent et al (1998: 1154) describe it as "a hybrid discipline that 
focuses on the human component within complex socio-technical systems". The 
practical application of error management centres on gathering information about 
mistakes and risks to safety in order for the organisation to learn from its 
experiences and promote safer systems, ultimately improving quality. Importantly, 
this theoretical approach is now a foundation to current health policies. 
The Policy Framework and the National System 
Despite advances in the health service quality agenda, associated with both increased 
quality management and clinical risk m a n a g e m e n t ~ ~ it has been argued that there 
remains insufficient information about and control of health service errors 
(Department of Health 2000). In the NHS there has been a long history of collecting 
information about performance, such as the complaints system, information from 
litigation investigations, performance measures, official enquiries, the Confidential 
Enquiries, and more recently risk management mechanisms. Although these provide 
a great deal of information about the quality of services, they remain problematic in 
providing a systematic mechanism for dealing with health service errors (Donaldson 
1999, Walshe 1999b). Walshe (l999b) suggests that these various sources of 
information suffer from a lack of co-ordination and in consequence he advocates the 
introduction of a more robust information system for understanding the causes of 
error and making organisational change (Department of Health 2000). 
In response to the empirical data about NHS errors, matched by growing public and 
political concern, a new approach to patient safety is currently being developed 
within the service. Three important policy documents have provided the context for 
policy formulation and implementation. Firstly, the expert report An Organisation 
with a A1emory (Department of Health 2000) mirrored the US report To Err is 
Human (Kohn et al 2000), by estimating the scale of mistakes in the service. 
identifying the weaknesses of existing systems and proposing a series of changes. 
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The recommendations made in this report were explicitly influenced by the Human 
Factors approach and advocated the introduction of an error management systL'm, 
consisting of an incident reporting and error analysis scheme. The government's 
response, Building a Safer NHS for Patients (Department of Health 2001 a) endorsed 
these recommendations and outlined the introduction of a new policy framework. At 
the national level this is spearheaded by the creation of a new quasi-autonomous 
special health authority, the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA), which has 
responsibility to provide national leadership and education, co-ordinating quality 
improvement, and directing change and policy implementation. At the primary and 
secondary levels of the NHS a new localised system of error management is to be 
adopted, initially called the National System for Learning from Adverse Events and 
Near Misses, but now known as the National Reporting and Learning System. The 
policy describes this as a mandatory adverse event reporting system for the 
collection of information about errors, the development of systems for the analysis 
of mistakes and the promotion of management procedures to support organisational 
change. Within this system it is expected that high profile events will be reported 
nationally to the NPSA and local procedures should be in place to manage threats to 
patient safety (Department of Health 2000, 2001a, 200lb). Subsequently, the 
Department of Health and the NPSA have published the guidance document, Doing 
Less Harm (DH 200lb), which provides further detail for the implementation and 
operation of this National System, including ten requirements for local execution. 
These provide more specific and technical guidance for managing the 
implementation of this new National System. 
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Three main features of this policy framework are of interest in this study: 
• The conceptualisation of "error"; 
• The implementation and organisation of incident reporting; 
• The analysis and management of errors. 
These three components represent the backbone to the National System. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that there is a sequential relationship between these 
stages where the success of one element or stage is dependant on the former. These 
three components will now be explored in greater detail drawing on the available 
policy documentation. 
Errors and adverse events in policy 
It was shown earlier that there are several common assumptions underlying the 
vanous definitions of error (Walshe 2000) and there has been a significant 
contribution made by psychological theory. Within policy the definition of error has 
reflected many of these ideas, with a focus on the patient, negativity and causation, 
along with consideration given to the active and latent distinction. Furthermore, as 
the various policy documents have been published the concept of error has evolved 
from the theoretical to the practical with specific types of error identified. Important 
in this research is the conceptualisation of error promoted in policy and the way in 
which it underpins the emerging system of error management. The document Doing 
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Less Harm (Department of Health 2001b) recognised the importance of providing a 
consistent and workable definition of error that provides NHS staff with an 
indication of the events that require reporting. In the context of the National System 
it is therefore necessary to appreciate how the concept of error reflects particular 
theoretical assumptions and advocates specific forms of action. 
An Organisation with a Memory (Department of Health 2000) provided the first 
major national review of errors in the NHS. In order to carry out its research and 
develop any recommendations one of its primary tasks was to define the meaning of 
error. Interestingly, the document makes a distinction between the terms "error" and 
"adverse event". The former is described as (Department of Health 2000: xii): 
"[T]he failure to complete a planned action as intended, or the use of an 
incorrect plan of action to achieve a given aim", 
While the latter is characterised as: . 
"[A]n event or omission arising during clinical care and causing physical or 
psychological injury to a patient". 
The distinction between these definitions is located in the consequence of action; 
taking the inappropriate action or inaction is an 'error', but if this results in a 
negative patient outcome then it is termed an 'adverse event'. Provision is also made 
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for occasions when a negative outcome does not follow: a "near miss". For this 
policy document an error is something that precedes an adverse event or a near miss. 
which are themselves defined by the extent of harm (see figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.2. The conceptualisation of error in policy 
ERROR 
ADVERSE EVENT 
Yes) 
(Harm 
No) 
NEAR MISS 
These definitions have subsequently been developed through the policy document 
Doing Less Harm (Department of Health 200lb: 13). Here the concept of error is re-
defined as an 'adverse patient incident', with near miss and adverse event flowing 
from the variable impact on patient health (figure 3.3). Now the term 'error' rarely 
appears in health policy, reinforcing the view that it has unproductive connotations 
for the current reforms of the service (Wilson and Haraden 2001). In this elaborated 
definition there is again a distinction between the primary event and the consequent 
"adverse event" or "near miss". Nevertheless, all these terms are implicitly 
concerned with the conceptualisation of error, even if it has been re-defined for 
political reasons. 
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Figure 3.3. A further conceptualisation of error In policy (source Department of 
Health 200 I b). 
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In order to facilitate the assimilation of these terms within hospital management the 
guidance document Doing Less Harm provides further conceptual clarity through 
detailing specific examples of adverse events in different health care settings. For 
example, some "general" examples include: 
• Delay in diagnosis, wrong diagnosis or incorrect patient assessment; 
• Administration of wrong drug or incorrect quantity of the right drug; 
• Defective medical devices. 
Examples relevant to "acute" services include: 
• Removal of wrong kidney; 
• Patient known to be allergic to penicillin but notes not checked and patient 
not questioned. Patient suffers respiratory arrest. 
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• Blood specimen obtained for cross matching from the wrong patients. 
Subsequent transfusion of the right patient results in massive reaction. 
This represents an attempt to move beyond an abstract definition towards the 
creation of some form of typology, for example, diagnosis errors, drug errors, or 
communication errors, and serves to further define the character and nature of 
"error" in technical terms. 
Some important characteristics underpin the policy conceptualisation of error or 
adverse event. First, is an implicit rejection of the word "error" in favour of more 
technical and politically correct terms such as "adverse event". Second is the 
implicit endorsement of psychological and human factors theories blended with the 
technical aspects of health care delivery. These features can be seen as serving two 
important functions, first they enable a concept of error that accounts for individual 
behaviour but also systemic factors such as teamwork, reflecting the prevailing 
theories of error management. Second, by conceptualising error in this way it assists 
in the promotion of cultural change, by emphasising organisational responsibi lities 
as well as individual, and therefore promoting the idea of a "just" culture that IS 
required to encourage incident reporting. 
Incident reporting 
One of the major recommendations of An Organisation with a Memory, \\as the 
introduction of a mandatory incident reporting scheme to enable the collection of 
information about hospital adverse events and near misses. It was conceived that this 
would build upon existing hospital systems associated with clinical risk 
management, but also include clear standardised definitions of the information 
required, have specified reporting procedures, be supported through computer 
software and be cOllll:'lehensive in coverage. To facilitate reporting the policy also 
argued that it is necessary to make cultural change in the service, to instil a 
"reporting culture" whereby professionals see reporting as a positive and blame-free 
aspect of their work. Again this policy recommendation reflects the prevailing 
Human Factors approach to error management (Reason 2000). 
Building a Safer NHS for Patients reinforced these recommendations and specified 
that the National System should be concerned with "identifying, gathering 
information on, recording and reporting adverse events and near misses" 
(Department of Health 2001a: 34). It was suggested that this information should 
relate to issues of: 
• What happened? (description, harm, people/equipment involved) 
• Where did it happen? 
• When did it happen? 
• How did it happen? (the immediate causes) 
91 
• What action was taken or proposed? 
• What impact did the event have? 
• What factors did or could have minimised the impact? 
(Department of Health 2001a: 37). 
Like Reason's (1999) discussion of organisational culture, this document also 
suggests that the culture of NHS hospitals and professionals should be modified in 
order to encourage and facilitate reporting. 
"A pre-requisite for achieving a successful approach to reducing risk and 
enhancing patient safety is to create a health service whose culture and 
behaviour reflects a strong commitment to providing high and ever 
improving standards of care and a service that meets the needs and 
expectations of patients and the public" (Department of Health 2001 a: 17). 
Within policy the promotion of a "reporting culture" is based upon strong 
managerial and medical leadership whereby a new environment and culture should 
be created to secure open and honest reporting. A key aspect of this is the emphasis 
on the blame-free and non-punitive qualities of the new system. It is also recognised 
that there are other barriers to reporting, including a lack of awareness of its 
function, a confusion about the process of reporting, the burden of workload, the 
extent of paperwork, fears of retribution, the assumption that it is somebody else's 
responsibility, and the lack of feedback. It is presumed that managerial effort should 
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be directed at tackling such barriers and problems in an attempt to promote a culture 
of reporting. However, beyond outlining these barriers to reporting and the 
overwhelming need to change organisational culture, there remains no specific detail 
as to what is meant by cultural change or how it should be implemented, other than 
referring to raising awareness or demonstrating the utility of incident data. It can 
only be expected that further documentation will be published in the future to 
develop the implementation of this policy. 
The analysis and management of change 
In line with more general forms of risk management, the collection of incident 
reports is not an end in itself, but provides the organisation with ability to recognise 
its risks to quality, understand their causes and promote change. An Organisation 
with a Memory (Department of Health 2000) recommended that a "single overall 
system for analysing and disseminating lessons" should be introduced throughout 
the NHS. It suggested that mandatory incident reports should be analysed in such a 
way that the common characteristics across incidents can be appreciated and the 
underlying factors can be a s c e r t a i ~ e d . . Again these changes are to be introduced 
within the wider context of cultural change, with policy claiming that it is necessary 
not just to develop a culture of openness and honest, but also a safety culture that 
embraces learning and is flexible to service change. 
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Building a Safer NHS for Patients (Department of Health 2001a) further outlined 
how the analysis of incident data should be implemented within the health service: 
"The key to successful learning from adverse events is meaningful analysis 
at both local and national levels to establish patterns, trends and causal 
factors" (Department of Health 2001a: 38). 
It appears that the role of local hospital leaders is to collect incident reports, 
ascertain where particular errors are occurring and reoccurring, and based upon the 
frequency and importance of these patterns focus their efforts to understand the 
factors that are producing these trends. Here the Human Factors approach becomes 
pivotal as it is suggested that the philosophy of "root causes analysis" should be 
applied to uncover the latent errors within the organisational systems that facilitate, 
exacerbate or fail to protect against these frequent episodes. Despite a lack of 
specific detail it is suggested that the general features of root causes analysis 
include: 
• Determination of the human and other factors most directly associated with 
an event, and the process and systems related to its occurrence; 
• Analysis of the underlying systems and processes through a series of 'why' 
questions to determine where redesign might reduce risk; 
• Identification of risk points and their potential contribution to the event; 
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• Determination of the potential improvements in process or systems that 
would tend to decrease the likelihood of such events in the future, or a 
determination, after analysis, that no such improvement opportunities exist. 
(Department of Health 2001 a: 39). 
Through understanding the patterns of errors and more importantly their underlying 
causes policy suggests that service providers will be able to target action to avoid 
future risks. In recognition of high profile problems in the NHS, Building a Safer 
NHS for Patients outlined four areas for "targeted" improvement. These include a 
reduction to zero of patients being harmed through spinal injections, as with the case 
at Queen's Medical Centre, Nottingham (Toft 200 I); a reduction by 25% of 
incidents of harm in obstetrics and gynaecology, by 2005; a reduction of 40% in the 
number of errors involving prescribed drugs, by 2005; and a reduction to zero of the 
number of mental health patients committing suicide through hanging from non-
collapsible beds or shower curtain rails (Department of Health 200 I a: 45). This 
appears to reflect the current trend for measurement and targeting in the public 
sector, as managerial action is directed through targets and political accountability 
secured through performance assessment (Power 1997). 
Doing Less Harm (Department of Health 2001b) provides greater clarity about the 
processes of implementing incident analysis and management. In particular 
Requirement 4 states that reported incidents should be graded in terms of the actual 
impact on patient health and the potential future risk to patients and the organisation. 
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To facilitate analysis the policy proposes a matrix for grading risk. This has two 
scales, one for "severity" and one for "frequency", each of which is assessed on a 
scale from one to four or low to high. The resultant cross-referenced grading is then 
colour-coded: low risks (green), two medium risks (yellow and orange) and high 
(red) risks. Through grading reported incidents in this way, it is expected that a 
designated risk manager can then ascertain the need for further investigations, root 
cause analysis and national communications. Incidents that are rated as low risk (low 
severity/low frequency) require minimal further investigation as it is presumed that 
the risk of further harm is negligible and resources can be better directed elsewhere. 
Instead this information should be used to develop trend analysis across the 
organisation and identify patterns that may have underlying organisational or 
systemic factors. Incidents that are graded yellow, orange and red promote further 
managerial attention, on the assumption that they represent more serious risks to 
either the patient or the organisation. Requirement 5 states that where these more 
risky incidents occur it is necessary to conduct local investigation to ascertain the 
causes and promote an improvement strategy. 
The guidance on 'root cause' investigation is explicitly developed from the Human 
Factors approach. It states that investigations should identify the reasons for 
substandard performance; identify underlying failures within management systems; 
make recommendations; and develop improvement strategies. This includes 
collecting evidence about the events through the use of observations, interviews and 
documentation; assemble this information and compare it to relevant standards and 
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guidelines. In terms of implementing "root cause analysis" it is suggested that it is 
essential that the principles and practices of this approach are understood fully. It 
defines this process as "a structured investigation that aims to identify the true 
causes of a problem, and the actions necessary to eliminate it" (Department of 
Health 2001 b: 37). The proposed system of root cause analysis appears to reinforce 
the ideas of Reason (1999, 2000) and directs the relevant organisational investigator 
to explore the contribution that management systems have in influencing the "sharp 
end" of medical work (figure 3.4). In this way, through understanding the 
underlying, systemic or "upstream" causes of error, the organisation is able to 
develop and implement new organisational processes and defensive mechanisms that 
can promote safer working practices. 
Figure 3.4. Policy model of root cause analysis (Department of Health 2001 b: 39). 
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Importantly, the guidance also specifies that this process should be co-ordinated by 
somebody with status and knowledge within the organisation. This is so they will be 
able to understand work processes, liaise with staff effectively and have the 
authority to implement change. It also suggests that this should be a senior manager 
or clinician, although assistance should be sought from the relevant local managers 
and experts. This raises issues about the expertise required to investigate incident 
and also the responsibility and authority to make service changes. 
Conclusion: a new managerial agenda? 
The National System for Learning from Adverse Events and Near Misses is 
explicitly based upon the theories of error management developed from the Human 
Factors approach. As such it relies upon a particular formulation of 'error' that on 
the one hand accounts for individual psychology and behaviour, and on the other 
hand recognises the underlying patterns of organisational behaviour and processes. 
As well as reflecting the active and latent distinction, health service research and 
policy have also identified specific types of health care error in both individual 
practice and hospital systems. It is also expected that the National System will build 
upon previous experiences in clinical risk management in order to introduce a new 
incident reporting system. Here it is presumed that hospital managers and leaders 
will instigate cultural modification or "engineering" in order to secure reporting. The 
National System also advocates 'root cause analysis' to enable hospital staff to 
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understand the latent and systemic causes of error. These three features of policy 
represent a sequential process: it is expected that only through understanding what 
constitutes an error will hospital staff be able to report one; whilst it is also 
presumed that only when professionals appreciate the relevance of reporting and do 
not regard it as a punitive process will they report; it is only when people report that 
hospitals will gather the necessary information about error; and it is only when this 
information is available that the underlying causes can be understood and change 
promoted. 
Although this policy has been formulated to tackle the 'problem' of health service 
errors, of interest for this study are the implications that the National System may 
have on medical/managerial relations in the NHS. It represents a significant 
development within the quality agenda as forms of quality assurance are augmented 
with psychological theories of error management. Furthermore, as a mechanism for 
promoting organisational quality, the National System builds upon previous 
managerial expenences 10 quality assurance and clinical risk management. The 
system therefore represents a new approach to the control of quality that is 
predominantly located within management practice as opposed to medical regulatory 
practices. This can be demonstrated along the three themes that have been 
highlighted in this chapter. The first is the concept of error that underpins the 
National System, which is based upon particular theories that are distinct from 
medical knowledge; the second is the introduction of a managerial reporting system 
to monitor lapses in performance and efforts to create a reporting culture; and the 
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third compnses new structural lines of accountability and responsibility brought 
about by a managerial-led incident reporting and root causes analysis. Together 
these represent a particular narrative about error and error management that build 
upon psychological theory and management practice, but crucially they also 
diverges from established occupational assumptions and techniques for quality 
control in health care. The following chapter therefore questions and de-constructs 
these three components of policy and develops a theoretical context in which the 
impact of policy on medicaVmanagerial relations can be assessed. 
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4. De-constructing 'Patient Safety' 
Introd ueti 0 n 
In the prevIOus chapter it was shown how a new policy framework is being 
developed in the NHS to address the problem of health service errors. It was also 
shown how this policy is premised upon a specific theoretical approach to the 
conceptualisation of error and its management, associated with the Human Factors 
approach. Furthermore it is argued that while the National System is likely to build 
upon previous experiences in clinical risk management, it could also represent a new 
frontier or challenge to medicaUmanagerial relations in the NHS. 
This chapter is concerned with unpicking and de-constructing the National System 
and its theoretical foundations in order to elaborate the potential changes in 
medical/managerial relations. With reference to various sociological theories it 
questions the concept of error promoted in policy and the implications for cultural 
and organisational change. The chapter identifies locations or domains in which 
medical/managerial relations may be changing. 
The chapter argues that rather than conceptualising error in realist theoretical terms 
it is possible to build appreciate the role of discourses and culture in the social 
construction of error. In this way the social meaning of error can be interpreted as ;\ 
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locus of organisational power as different social groups come to define and then 
control errors. It is also argued that the idea of cultural change can also represent ;\ 
site for organisational control as management strategies represent ideological or 
hegemonic devices for securing occupational compliance, whilst equally divergent 
cultures can be seen as resistant forms of social power. Complementing the cultural 
dimension it is also argued that structural forms of organisational control are 
introduced by the National System, in the form of systematic incident reporting, root 
cause analysis and managed change, which could represent dimensions of control 
and power in the NHS. 
Initially, the chapter proceeds with a review of the sociological literature that relates 
to the study of error. These reveal the importance of culture, social interactions, and 
social structures in the social conceptualisation of error. Building on these 
contributions, theories of risk are used to develop a basis on which the social 
meaning of error can be empirically studied and the domains of organisational power 
explored; in particular highlighting a distinction between realist and constructionist 
approaches. The chapter then moves on to question the cultural and structural forms 
of control introduced by the National System. Here theories of organisational control 
are reviewed, from Weberian notions of bureaucracy to more recent accounts of 
cultural change and post-bureaucratic organisation. As well as illustrating theoretical 
problems with the prevailing notions of 'error' and 'cultural change', the chapter 
identifies the sites of power associated with policy that could provide ne\\' 
challenges or constraints on medical professional autonomy and self-regulation. 
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The concept of error 
The term 'error' commonly makes some kind of reference to unexpected or 
undesired outcome. Two further rudimentary points can also be made about the 
concept of error. The first is that it can be used to describe both action and inaction. 
Secondly an error refers to both process and outcome, i.e. an error in action mayor 
may not lead to an error in outcome, but equally, an appropriate action may lead to 
an error in outcome due to other considerations. However, error remains a highly 
political, contentious and problematic concept. 
The last chapter showed that there certain theories of error have had a major impact 
upon health policy. It is the contention of this thesis that the bulk of health service 
research, theory and policy represent a prevailing conceptualisation or theoretical 
zeitgeist of medical error. This can be found in the way in which the most prominent 
definitions share several important characteristics (Walshe 2000), and are influenced 
by psychological and pseudo-scientific theories of error management that concei ve 
error as something technical and tangible. An error is, therefore, seen as a real event 
that can be monitored and evaluated, whether by researchers or managers. 
Surprisingly, there has been comparatively little sociological writing on errors or 
mistakes. In her work on accidents, Green (1992, 1997) suggests that the study or 
accidents is marginal to mainstream sociology because it falls outside the 
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conventional concern for understanding rational behaviour or social facts; accidents, 
she suggests, are events that remain where no rational or moral explanation can be 
found. Nevertheless the available sociological studies of errors reveal important 
features about the social character of mistakes, such as the role of social interaction , 
knowledge and culture, and therefore provide an important contribution that is often 
overlooked in the prevailing orthodox of theory and policy. 
Sociological theories of error, work and organisations 
Initially, it is worth exploring Everett Hughes' (1951) analysis of Mistakes at work. 
He makes the point that all human work runs a chance or risk of mistake. In 
consequences, he suggests that special social relationships develop in the "reduction 
and absorption of the risk of failure" (p.322) where social norms and expectations 
develop to accommodate mistakes when they occur. In terms of these social 
relationships he makes particular reference to those that develop between lay groups 
and specialised groups; where the lay person delegates the risk of mistake to the 
specialist in order to relieve themselves of risk and responsibility. This is based on 
the assumption that the specialist by the nature of their experience will run less of a 
risk of error. A simple example could be with home improvements and the different 
absorption of risk through either DIY or hiring a specialist. In such an example, if 
work is completed badly then the DIYist has nobody to blame other than themselves, 
whereas with the specialist it is expected that the work will meet agreed standards 
with certain financial and legal guarantees. 
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The social relationships surrounding knowledge and expertise are therefore 
important considerations for the absorption of the risk of error. Not only do these 
structure the relationship between the lay and the specialist, but also implicitly shape 
the definition of mistake. Hughes suggests that different social groups will have 
variable expectations of acceptable and unacceptable work. When the lay delegate 
risk to an expert, mistakes are likely to be seen more severely, than if the risk had 
been run by the lay person. The specialist, however, may argue that it is only they 
that have the skills to perform the work and equally only they have the knowledge to 
be able to define a mistake. Hughes suggests that this leads to specialists developing 
symbolic rituals to facilitate the identification of mistakes and also to contain social 
exposure; while they also develop collective rationales and defence mechanisms to 
control their own psychological, moral and financial risks. 
Hughes' work shows how the meaning of error is negotiated within particular social 
relationship, and provides a useful contribution for a sociological approach to the 
study of medical errors. In the first instance, he shows that error, and the risk of an 
error, can be located within social relationships that are characterised by specialised 
knowledge. In the case of health care, doctors represent specialists who offer to take 
on the duty of providing care. From this perspective it is possible to see how 
definitions of mistake can be contested and open to different interpretations. The lay 
interpretation may not benefit from specialised medical knowledge (Calnan 1987), 
while medical professionals can argue that it is only they who can define the quality 
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of their work. As shown previously, this is a central tenet of traditional sociological 
theories on medical regulation (Freidson 1970). Interestingly however, Hughes 
(1951) acknowledges that for health care, the definition of mistake remainS 
problematic because "health is, after all, a relative matter" (p.323). 
A more recent contribution to the sociology of errors, mistakes and disasters has 
been made by Diane Vaughan (1999). Her work has developed from studies of the 
sociology of deviance and organisational theories of high-risk industry and 
technology (Perrow 1984). She argues that "the sociology of mistakes is in its 
infancy" (Vaughan 1999: 284) and in consequence there is a real conceptual and 
theoretical void for the sociological analysis of organisational errors and mistakes. 
Her examination of disasters, most notably the Challenger Shuttle disaster, follows 
from Merton's (1970) work on bureaucratic dysfunction. Like Parsons (1951), 
Vaughan suggests that formal organisations seek to attain a degree of conformity in 
'goal-driven' social action. In an attempt to develop a new conceptual language and 
framework, she proposes that "organisational deviance" occurs when this conformity 
is not achieved, and such situations are predisposed to result in organisational "dark 
sides". These she defines as 'mistakes', 'misconduct' or 'disasters' with the 
appropriate classification depending on the normative standards that have been 
violated, the groups that have been harmed, the extent of the harm, and the social 
response to the harm. With this new conceptual language she advances an 
explanatory model of error that relates cognition and individual action, to the role of 
teams, system process, organisational structures and the wider environment or 
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structures of society. Importantly, rather than focussing on individual psychology 
she provides a framework to account for the social context in which a dysfunction 
occurs. Although this bears similarities with prevailing theory, it is fair to argue that 
Vaughan's work identifies the social factors as opposed to the human factors that 
relate to error. 
Although recognition is given to the work of Reason (1997), West (2000) adopts 
Vaughan's model of error in her study of health care errors, in which she identifies 
four social and cultural features of health service organisation that can promote 
organisation deviance or "dark sides". Firstly, the 'division of labour' and rigid 
demarcations between occupational roles, expertise and responsibility can run 
counter to the desired objectives of action. Secondly, the 'homophilic' character of 
health care leads to work groups communicating predominantly with like-minded 
peers, resulting in fewer challenges to working practices and enabling problematic 
activities to go undetected. Thirdly, problems in the delivery of health care are not 
adequately addressed because there tends to be a 'diffusion of responsibility' where 
problems are seen as somebody else's responsibility. Finally, there can be 'goal 
displacement' where multiple and competing priorities can relocate the focus of 
action towards activities that may be more prone to mistake or less concerned with 
quality. 
From this perspective it can be seen that traditional sociological theories, such as 
those associated with Parson (1970) and Merton (1970) can indeed be developed 
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within a more contemporary framework. The significance of these works here is 
two-fold. The first is to advance a sociological theory of errors, the second with 
showing that the prevailing theories of social psychological may neglect important 
social and cultural factors that are relevant to understanding errors. 
Health care organisations and iatrogenesis 
A profound contribution to the study of medical error is Illich's (1976) prominent 
attack on the medical profession. Here medical errors are analysed in the wider 
context of medical professionalism and the institutionalisation of medical 
knowledge. His main argument is that medicine has been largely ineffective in its 
contribution to the decline of infectious diseases (see also McKeown 1979); 
furthermore because of the social dependence on this ineffective knowledge many of 
the health problems facing contemporary society are medically produced. He argues 
that the level and character of iatrogenic or "doctor-inflicted injuries" within health 
care is alarming: stemming from the drug dependencies and side-effects, to mistakes 
in the delivery of care, to unnecessary and dangerous procedures. 
"Among the murderous institutional torts, only modern malnutrition injures 
more people that iatrogenic disease in its various manifestations" (lllich 
1976: 26). 
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Illich suggests that medical errors should be checked or controlled through external 
mechanisms, such as litigation proceeding, but he argues that medical professionals 
have the ability to define and re-define the threatening qualities of their work, 
through re-conceptualising medical faults as "random human error" or "system 
breakdown" (p.30). In consequence, doctors have the ability to deflect blame and 
responsibility. Illich provides an account of medical error that reveals the importance 
of institutionalised knowledge and the capacity of doctors to redefine problems in 
way that deflects responsibility. It is the acceptance of medical expertise throughout 
society that ensures any negative features of medicine are overlooked and de-
problematised. 
The social construction and control of surgical errors 
One of the most important contributions to the sociological study of medical errors 
has been made by Bosk (1979). His work is immensely important in this thesis, not 
only does it represent a substantial exploration of medical errors, but it also 
highlights the socially contingent, negotiated and constructed character of error, 
particularly on the "shop floor". His ethnographic research explored how surgical 
trainees and their supervisors (attendings) recognised, discussed and constructed a 
shared meaning of error through the course of their work and education. He also 
found that the different constructions or 'types' of error correlated to specific social 
control and socialisation rituals in surgical training, demonstrating the link between 
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social meaning and action. These types included 'technical', 'judgement' and 
'normative' errors. 
Technical errors involve mistakes in performance related to the technical procedures 
of delivering health care; commonly associated with the complex nature of medical 
training and not abiding by the established practices of surgery. Judgement errors 
centre on decision-making processes, where the trainee decides upon what is 
otherwise considered the wrong course of action or misdiagnosis. These mistakes are 
characterised by incomplete knowledge and the "trial and error" character of 
surgical training associated with the acquiring expertise and experience. Normative 
errors however, centre on individual personality characteristics and inappropriate 
behaviour, such as poor bedside manner or failing to communicate with patients and 
peers. 
An important feature of Bosk's work was to understand how these different 
constructs of error function in the surgical training process. Specifically, how social 
control rituals and practices were premised on the social meaning of error negotiated 
and established between attendings and their trainees. Generally, he found that 
'judgement' and 'technical' mistakes served as valuable lessons within the training 
process. They provided an opportunity to assess the skills and abilities of the trainee; 
identifying areas for extra training and improvement. Through case conferences and 
ward rounds, these were in essence "forgiven" but "remembered". Importantly, 
however, if a clinician had acted inappropriately with a client or had failed to draw 
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attention to a mistake then this 'normative' error elicited a social response that was 
not centred on the learning process, but symbolised something negative about t h ~ ~
character of the trainee that could potentially damage their relationship with the 
supervisor. The philosophy behind medical training was to encourage trainees to 
gain clinical exposure without excessive supervision and as such mistakes become a 
"regrettable but inevitable part of the baptism under fire that is house officer 
training" (Bosk 1986: 466). The construction of errors was therefore central to the 
learning processes of surgery providing a basis for the development and 
maintenance of social control rituals that serve to protect professional standards and 
boundaries. 
Not only does Bosk's research reveal the negotiated and constructed social realm of 
error, but it also illustrated more about the informal regulatory features of medical 
work. Such a perspective can also be seen in Arluke's (1977) discussion of symbolic 
control rituals in surgical work, in particular the role of the surgical 'death rounds' 
(the review of fatalities in surgery) jn maintaining professional status. Arluke found 
that these social processes served to normalise mistakes and maintain the authority 
of medical professionalism. Through his ethnographic research he found that 
surgeons talked about patient mortality in a way that enabled the social meaning of 
sub-standard surgical performance to be reconstructed. Specifically, surgeons tended 
to make sense of death by de-emphasising the importance of the fatality and its 
relationship with surgical performance, and instead the social processes centred on 
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the umqueness of the disease, learning and containment. In this way Issues of 
professional competence were substituted for physiological complexity. 
These ethnographic studies demonstrate that the meaning of error is variable, 
unstable and constructed through localised social processes. The concept of error can 
therefore be modified in line with particular cultural and professional assumptions 
and norms to facilitate social practices and control rituals. 
How doctors understand mistakes 
Another contribution to the study of medical errors has been made through 
Rosenthal's (1995, 1999) study of "problem doctors". Developing the works of Bosk 
(1979) and Freidson (1970) she identifies several themes that characterise the 
medical understanding of error that are related to problems in medical knowledge 
and the demands of professionalism. 
Rosenthal (1995, 1999) reports the doctors frequently find it difficult to define the 
boundaries between avoidable and unavoidable mistakes in their work, and generally 
medical practice was characterised as uncertainty and risk-laden. In consequence. 
she found that when doctors talked about mistakes there was a tendency to 
emphasise the complexity and "permanent uncertainty" of medical work, which 
served to explain and even mitigate questionable performance. Given this 
uncertainty, it was also found that doctors accepted a certain level of mistakes in 
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their work, which she characterises as "necessary fallibility", or the acceptance of 
imperfection. To accommodate the inevitability of error Rosenthal found that the 
doctors exhibited a strong bond of collegiality and "shared vulnerability". This 
provided them with a high degree of empathy, understanding and togetherness that 
was important for dealing with the psychological and professional costs of mistakes. 
Like Bosk it was found that such cultural characteristics were vital in the 
professional control of mistakes underpinning the way doctors expressed a "strong 
impulse" (p.2l) to be "understanding" and "forgive" whilst avoiding confrontation. 
It could be interpreted that this tacit norm of "non-criticism" not only serves to 
reinforce occupational closure, but it also reinforces feelings of secrecy and 
conspiracy that have undermined the trust in the profession. Nevertheless, it was also 
found that the capacity for collegial acceptance had its boundaries and "egregious 
errors" associated with gross misconduct, consistent misadventure or the inability to 
learn from mistakes, were not readily accepted by peers. Rosenthal (1995) suggests 
that underlying all of these findings is the assumption that only medical 
professionals can assess medical mistakes. The exclusivity of medical knowledge 
and experience, therefore, ensures that non-professionals do not have the legitimacy 
to evaluate medical performance reinforcing the notion of self-regulation (Freidson 
1970). 
Rosenthal's work has made an important contribution to the study of medical errors 
highlighting a range of important socio-cultural facets of medical work that 
characterise the way doctors understand mistakes. These norms and practices serve 
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to accommodate and even mitigate sub-standard performance, in ways that have 
been criticised by the like of the Bristol Inquiry as they function to conceal third-
party exposure (Kennedy 2002). 
Medical errors and medical uncertainty 
Central to Rosenthal's work (1995, 1999) is the recognition and management of 
uncertainty in medical practice and highlights the work of Rene Fox (1975, 2000). 
Fox (1975, 2000) questions the supposed scientific certainty of medical knowledge 
and suggests that it is characterised by "gaps", inconsistencies and uncertainties. 
These uncertainties are pivotal to the issue of error (Hughes 1951), as important 
cultural and professional strategies develop to accommodate these gaps and also 
control the errors that also arise from them. 
Fox describes three types of uncertainty that characterise medical work including the 
difficulty in managing the vast knowledge and skills of modern medicine; the 
uncertainties that stem from gaps and inconsistencies in scientific knowledge; and 
the problems associated with individuals variations in skill and ability. She shows 
that particular socialisation processes have developed in medical training and work 
to faci litatc the control of these uncertainties, for example, the intellectualisation of 
knowledge and uncertainty, particularly through defining medical knowledge 
problems in scientific terms, and a detached attitude towards uncertainty, whereby it 
is regarded as a "constant presence" but remains shrouded in silence. Fox (2000) has 
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more recently "revisited" her work in the context of contemporary medical practice 
suggesting that changes in technology and scientific knowledge have exacerbated 
the uncertainties of medical knowledge and practice. 
Fox's (1957) work highlights an important relationship between uncertainty and the 
social practices that strive to accommodate uncertainty. In terms of medical errors 
this work has much to offer not just in explaining how errors may arise through the 
"gaps" in knowledge and experience, but also in how medicine is characterised by 
social processes that accommodate these uncertainties and their consequences 
(Rosenthal 1995). It may be the case that this uncertainty not only provides the 
source of mistake but importantly it shapes the interpretation and conceptualisation 
of error. For example, if uncertainty characterises the origin of a mistake it may also 
be the case that uncertainty surrounds how this mistake is interpreted as efforts are 
made to reconcile this uncertainty whilst mitigating any negativity. 
Uncertainty, risk and trust 
Related to the concepts of uncertainty and error is the important sociological topic of 
risk. As Hughes (1951) points out all work runs the 'chance' or 'risk' of mistake. It 
can be argued, therefore, that the meaning of 'error' relates to an evaluation of 
action, inaction and/or outcome, to which some form of chance can also be attached. 
Furthermore, the uncertainties associated with these actions are also characterised hy 
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the determination of chance or risk. Luhmann (1991) argues that the concept of risk 
is a contemporary semantic for rationalising uncertainties. As such, error, risk and 
uncertainty constitute a conceptual triangle, each can be analysed as a distinct social 
subject but they are implicitly related. The study of risk can therefore contribute to 
the sociological study of error. 
The study of risk has a long anthropological history and has recently gained renewed 
attention, being considered a central sociological concept for the study of ecological, 
technological and social uncertainties (Beck 1991, Giddens 1990, Luhmann 1991). 
Of importance here is the relationship between risk, uncertainty and error. Luhmann 
(1991) suggests that historically different rationalities have ordered the social 
understanding and response to uncertainties and threats. In the modern era he 
identified the language of scientific knowledge as informing the evaluation of 
uncertainties, specifically through the calculation of 'risks'; whereas historically 
religious and magical superstitions have guided these social meanings and 
responses. For Luhmann (1991 )the social semantic of uncertainty has, therefore, 
changed to the assessment and evaluation of risks, typical of ecological and 
technological uncertainties; in a similar way that Beck (1992) highlights the 
transition from 'hazard' to 'risk' (discussed below). 
Luhmann's (1991) analysis of uncertainty and risk is premjsed on a Parsonian 
systems approach, where society is characterised as interconnected actors within a 
bounded system or network. Interestingly his work highlights a distinction between 
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'risks' and 'dangers', where risks arise from the actions and interactions within the 
system and dangers are located in the external environment. In this way rationalities 
of risk are expressed through the decision-making and communication processes of 
the social system where there is an evaluation of uncertainty. For Luhmann an 
important consideration is the distinction between the decision-makers and those 
effected by decisions. Luhmann argues that decision-makers typically have the 
knowledge, expertise and capacity to recognise uncertainties through specific and 
often expert rationalities of risk, such as medical knowledge, whereas the non-
decision-makers without the benefit of this rationality must have confidence in the 
assessment of the decision-maker. Confidence or trust is therefore a central feature 
of social relationships that are concerned with the recognition and ordering of 
uncertainty. Specifically, for the modern era the language of risk represents the 
prevailing rationality for decision-making and trust (Luhmann 1991). 
This concern with trust is also found in Giddens' (1990) work on late modernity and 
risk. He suggests that trust is a central feature of contemporary society exhibited 
through a range of social practices and relationships, such as knowledge, symbols, 
communication and intimacy. For Giddens trust is imperative for accommodating 
uncertainty and providing individuals with 'ontological security'. He suggests that 
trust is pivotal where there are contingent outcomes and in late modernity this 
implicitly involves an evaluation of risk. This can occur between people, 
organisations, institutions or ideas, but importantly it serves as the basis of 
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protection from threats and uncertainties (the structural approach to risk is discussed 
shortly). 
Although the notion of trust has implicit common sense meaning, it remains a 
problematic concept that has been theorised from various perspectives (Hollis 1998). 
Underlying any notion of trust are social relations based on uncertainty (Gambetta 
1988) or risk (Luhmann 1991), where there is ignorance or unpredictability in the 
consequence of action. From an economics perspective trust and risk are often 
discussed in terms of self-interested rational action associated with weighing up the 
probabilities of exchange (Jaeger et al 2000). From a more sociological approach 
trust is not necessarily conceptualised in terms of self-interested calculations but is 
reflective of socialisation processes, group membership or cultural norms that 
encourage trust or recognise trust as a moral virtue or value (Gambetta 1988). For 
Luhmann (1991) trust is formulated within social systems characterised by 
uncertainty. 
It can be argued that 'risk' and 'trust' are implicit features of medical 
professionalism. The work of Luhmann (1991) and Giddens (1990) can be used to 
explore how the risks or uncertainties associated with health and medicine are 
couched within a particular social system and structure. Specifically, patients must 
have the confidence or trust in their doctor to be able to understand and rationalise 
their health uncertainties. Simultaneously trust exists outside the doctor-patient 
relationship and is found at social, cultural and political levels, for example as 
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shown earlier the medical regulatory framework or triangle (Salter 2000) is premised 
on such trust, but it has also been argued that this trust is being eroded by recent 
health service scandals (Irvine 1999). The relationship between uncertainty, risk and 
trust therefore highlights important social relationships central to the control of 
health service quality. It could be suggested that error, risk and uncertainty are 
united by the concept of trust which sits at the heart of this triangle. This illustrates 
the contribution of theories of risk to the study of error. 
Errors and Risk: finding a social framework of error 
Although sociological research has revealed some of the 'social factors' 
underpinning the cause of error (Vaughan 1999) and also the negotiated and 
constructed dimensions of error (Hughes 1951, Bosk 1979), there has been little 
explicit attempt to develop or articulate a social framework for the study of error. 
Given the conceptual triangle between uncertainty, error and risk, it is worth 
considering the theories and epistemologies of risk in greater detail in order to 
advance a coherent theoretical framework for this research. In particular 
consideration is given to what Lupton (1999) terms a "continuum of epistemological 
approaches" for the study of risk. 
Lupton's (1999) first epistemological approach to risk is described as the "realist". 
From this perspective risks are regarded as real ontological events that can be 
objectively and scientifically understood. The epistemological approach therefore 
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aims to 'truthfully' reflect the chance and outcomes of the risk and is commonly 
associated with scientific and technical approaches (Luhmann 1991), such as 
engineering and management. From this perspective the likelihood of risk can hL' 
assessed (as a statistical calculation) and given a probability, to which particular 
strategies can be developed to accommodate or control this risk. Tansey and 
Q'Riordan (1999) demonstrate this technical approach to risk (R) calculation, 
suggesting that it involves ascertaining the magnitude (M) and the probability (P) of 
exposure and developing an appropriate formula, e.g. R=PM. In terms of the 
conceptualisation of error this approach would propose that errors are indeed 'real' 
and can be objectively and scientifically evaluated, calculated and then controlled. 
Importantly, there is little regard for the social or cultural context in which risks are 
understood, politicised or controlled. 
Lupton's (1999) terms her second epistemological approach the "weak 
constructionist" and suggests that it is associated with sociological, cultural and 
anthropological theories. Here it is recognised that risks may possess objective and 
real properties, but it is the way in which these risks are interpreted and understood 
that is important. From anthropological and socio-cultural perspectives attention has 
been directed at how social groups come to define risk in relation to the 
contradictions, confusions and norms of social existence. The anthropological work 
of Douglas (1966) explored the rituals of pollution and cleanliness in relation to the 
body where risks were interpreted and controlled through particular cultural 
practices. fv10re recently she has explored the cultural context of technological 
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change and highlighted the political character of risks in Western society (Douglas 
and Wildavsky 1982). Her work has been particularly critical of individualised, 
psychological or technical theories that focus on cognition. Her work demonstrates 
that the meaning of risk is frequently the product of societal attempts to secure and 
manage order in changing social circumstances, suggesting that risks are culturally 
relative and reflect social, cultural and political notions of responsibility and blame 
(Douglas 1992). Therefore risks may be entirely "real", but the social meaning is 
developed within the cultural context. 
Lupton identifies a second "weak constructionist" position which is associated with 
the more recent concern with modernity and global change. This epistemological 
approach recognises that risks may indeed be real, but the prominence of risk in 
contemporary society reflects particular facets and contradictions of modernity. 
Luhmann (1991), Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990) have articulated a new 
sociological interest in theories of risk, particular within the context of late 
modernity. Like Luhmann (1991), Beck (1992) suggests that modernity is 
characterised by global parameters of 'risk distribution' and the management of risks 
(Elliot 2002). For instance, the hazards and uncertainties of science, socio-economic 
change and environmental damage have come to characterise social organisation. 
Within 'risk society' increasing significance is accorded to rational. scientific and 
authoritative expertise that lay claim to the social processes of understanding and 
controlling risk. Paradoxically, this expertise is itself the focus of contest and risk as 
alternate ideas about risk develop and question the basis of social meaning leading to 
121 
greater uncertainty and risk. Crucially, Beck (1994) sees the social and individual 
preoccupation with risk as reflecting the centrality of instrumental rationality in 
modern society: hence society is concerned with understanding and managing risks 
rather than mere hazards. 
Lupton's (1999) third approach is termed the "strong constructionist" and is closely 
associated with the ideas of Foucault, in particular the relationship between 
knowledge, social power, regulation and governmentality. To summarise it is 
suggested that a characteristic of modern society is surveillance and regulation. This 
can be achieved through various mechanisms but the most prominent and insidious 
is the role of knowledge that shapes social meaning and action, either directly or 
through "technologies of the self' (Foucault 1970, 1980, 1991). From this 
perspective the social meaning of risk is constructed through particular social 
practices that are reflective of and contributing to social discourses. Hence risk is 
regarded as a constructed phenomenon that conveys particular ideas and 
assumptions, and provides a basis of social control. Within this framework the idea 
of governmentality has been developed to understand the social control of risks 
(Lupton 1999, 2002). It is shown how ideas of "dangerousness" have been 
transmuted to risk, where potentially dangerous activities or people are 
conceptualised as a series of risk factors (Castel 1991, Dean 1999, Turner 1997). 
Within this approach social discourses and expert knowledge arc pivotal in the 
process of defining and regulating risks, for example expert knowledge about 
smoking can be used to identify "at risk" people. The social constructionist 
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epistemology therefore suggests that the way in which risks are understood is 
reflective of particular discourses; and risks are social constructions as opposed to 
objecti ve phenomena. Furthermore, claims to the "truth" or "objectivity" of risk are 
also social constructs that reflect discourses and political attempts to define risky 
situations and regulate social action (Gabe 1995). 
Lutpon's (1999) discussion reveals that there are a range of different approaches to 
the study and control of risks. The four perspectives offered could be generally 
reconfigured as two broadly different philosophical perspectives: the 'technical' and 
the 'social' (Tansey and O'Riordan 1999), or the realist and the constructionist. The 
realist is primarily concerned with advancing an objective concept that is open to 
technical calculation and control; while the constructionist approach suggests that 
interpretation and meaning is shaped by social interaction, negotiation, culture and 
discourse, and provides a basis for social order and control. From the constructionist 
perspective any realist approach would also be seen as constructed from particular 
bodies of knowledge and constellations of ideas or practices. It is the way in which 
these constructs compete to define the social world that is of importance because 
they are also competing to control the social world (Fuller 1999, Turner 1999). 
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A cultural and discursive approach to error 
From the above discussion of error, uncertainty and risk it is possible to propose a 
sociological approach to error that advances existing sociological research and 
di verges from the realist zeitgeist of psychological theory and health policy. 
Building on Lupton's (1999) discussion of epidemiological approaches it is possible 
to incorporate the works of Bosk (1979), Fox (1975), Rosenthal (1995) and Hughes 
(1951) within the context of theories developed by Luhmann (1991), Beck (1992) 
and especially Douglas (1966) and Foucault (1980). In this way a social framework 
can be articulated to guide further research on the socio-cultural and discursi ve 
dimensions of error 
This alternate sociological approach seeks to understand the socio-cultural 
dimensions of perception, interpretation and meaning. Rather than attempting to 
uncover or provide a 'real' account of error that portrays ontological stability, this 
socio-cultural perspective proposes that the meaning of error is unstable, subjective 
and negotiated. Douglas' (1985) suggests that prevailing psychology approaches to 
risk have lead to a distinction between the 'expert' and 'lay' in the capacity to 
perceive and calculate the 'real' attributes of risks. Conversely she argues that these 
psychological theories have no appreciation of the social influences that shape 
perception, in particular the "culturally learned assumptions and weightings" 
(Douglas 1992: 58) that inform individual and group perception and interpretation. 
From this perspective it can be argued that the prevailing psychological theories of 
error and error management are indeed reflective of a realist approach that seeks to 
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calculate and control errors in a similar fashion to orthodox risk management. 
Furthermore, it could be the case that policy also establishes a distinction between 
the expert (those in possession of the knowledge and skills associated with error 
management) and the lay (those with other assumptions about error). However, by 
highlighting the social and cultural dimension of risks Douglas (1985) makes 
reference to the shared conventions, expectations, and obligations that underpin the 
cultural relativity in perception, interpretation and meaning. Furthermore, by 
considering these social issues she locates risk within broader political concerns with 
responsibility and blame as it is used as a tool for allocating and mitigating 
accountability (Douglas 1992). By adapting this approach to medical error, it 
therefore becomes necessary to appreciate the cultural differences between social 
groups in the perception and interpretation of errors: to recognise those cultural 
categories that are central in the processes of developing the meaning of error. 
To augment this cultural perspective consideration is also given to the Foucauldian 
notions of risk and how they may be adapted for the study of error. Here attention is 
directed at the relationship between the subjective interpretations of error, the 
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cultural field within which these are made and social discourses and knowledge. The 
work of Foucault is typically regarded as concerned with understanding the 
dynamics of power and control within society (Armstrong 1997, Fox 1997). 
Importantly, through his various studies of madness, medical knowledge, crime and 
punishment, sexuality, and knowledge/power, Foucault (1970, 1973, 1980, 1991, 
1998) has been concerned to develop a theory of power that reveals the relationship 
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between constellations of ideas, assumptions, communications and social power. 
Like Nietzsche (1996), Foucault has attempted to show the genealogy of ideas and 
knowledge, to understand how they have developed within particular social, cultural 
and historical periods and served to influence the meaning given to the social world 
and the basis of social power. In this way particular discourses serve as a mechanism 
of power, providing the language and theories in which the social world is 
interpreted. For example, medical knowledge shapes the way in which the body and 
illness are given social meaning, and in consequence, how they are surveyed and 
controlled, through the medical "gaze" (Foucault 1973). Building on his theory of 
knowledge/power Foucault (1991) develops a notion of control or regulation termed 
governmentality. Here knowledge underpins the basis by which control is secured as 
individuals internalise ideas that inform their perception and behaviour. In modern 
society this is a specific strategy for power that goes beyond external surveillance 
and control to internalised self-control in accordance with prevailing ideas and 
discourses. 
"There is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a 
gaze. An inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will 
end by interiorising to the point that he is his (sic) own overseer, each 
individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself." 
(Foucault 1980: 155). 
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Such an approach has been used to show how particular notions of risk can serve to 
define and control forms of 'risky' behaviour (Lupton 1999). When adapted to the 
study of errors it enables the researcher to look at the relationship between 
knowledge and the meaning of error, and the forms of social regulation that these 
discourses promote. It is therefore critical of the realist orthodoxy found in 
prevailing theory and policy and crucially enables these ideas to be interpreted as 
mechanisms for social control. Equally, it enables the appreciation of alternate ideas 
about error and the role that other discourses can have in countervailing those put 
forward in policy. 
Summary: discourses on error and power 
Bosk (1986) has been critical of universal definitions of error, suggesting that there 
are two limitations on the search for ontological certainty. The first is associated 
with the inherent uncertainty of medical knowledge and practice that makes it 
difficult for a doctor to be absolutely certain about which procedures should and 
should not be performed. The second difficulty is associated with the complexity of 
the care process where mUltiple responsibilities make it difficult to distinguish an 
error from the host of other risks that the patient may experience. In consideration of 
medical uncertainty and complexity, Bosk (1986) questions whether a single 
operational definition of medical error could be found that could encompass all the 
various issues and in consequence he advocates a socially negotiated approach to 
error. 
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Despite these theoretical reservations, health policies have attempted to develop an 
objective and realist notion of error that is premised on prevailing psychological 
theories and technical parameters of error and medical work It is possible to argue 
that such definitions of error are epistemologically realist: they implicitly claim that 
an error has stable characteristics that can be objectively observed, truthfully 
reflected and rationally controlled. Conversely, taking into account a more 
constructionist perspective it is possibly to conceptualise error as a social construct 
that is reflective of particular social and cultural practices and knowledge. The 
sociological contribution to error offers a radically different perspective to those 
found in psychological, management and pseudo-scientific theory. In particular the 
relationship between uncertain knowledge and practice (Fox ] 975), the relationships 
between practitioners (Bosk 1979, Rosenthal 1995) and the desire to maintain 
professional standards in the face of error (Arluke 1977, Rosenthal 1995) highlight 
the important social dimension to error. From tins perspective, error is not 
conceptualised in universal and objective terms, instead the meaning of error is 
implicitly seen as contingent and derived from the social setting and the influences 
of wider knowledge and assumptions. In essence the study of error moves beyond a 
concem with 'human' or even 'social' factors and engages with the social fiction., 
that characterise the social meaning of error. 
By theorising error in this way, it can be argued that the prevailing discourse fOlmd 
in policy and theory represent a particular strakgy for the control of errors that 
implicitly includes the managerial control of medical errors. Crucially, it represents 
a new 'expertise' for the control of medical quality that originates outside medical 
practice. This discourse could therefore constitute a major development in 
medical/managerial relations as it promotes new systems for the analysis and control 
of medical practice. These may be associated with new managerial strategies of 
control, where knowledge about error enables managers to engage in the technical 
aspects on medical practice and regulation. Alternatively, the implementation of 
policy may represent forms of govern mentality as doctors strive to maintain 
occupational control by adopting the conceptual language of policy and therefore 
conforming to the assumptions of Human Factors. However, it is necessary not to 
overlook the divergent constructions of error by others working in the health service, 
especially doctors. Drawing on and contributing to established medical discourses, 
the medical interpretation of error may be significantly different from prevailing 
theory and policy and could serve to maintain boundaries of medical expertise and 
occupational status (Freidson 1970). The construction of error is therefore a potential 
site for organisational and occupational power. 
Structures and cultures of organisational control 
In the prevlOus chapter it was shown how the implementation of the National 
System involves the introduction of potentially new organisational systems for 
incident reporting and the management of errors. Furthermore it was shown that 
both theory and policy advocate the manipulation of organisational culture in order 
to secure reporting and compliance to change. While the previous section in this 
chapter explored the conceptual basis of error, attention now turns to the theories of 
organisational control and culture, exploring the effect that patient safety policies 
could have on medical/managerial relations in the health service. 
This section provides a review of prominent organisational theories and shows their 
relevance to the 'hospital', 'medical work' and importantly the new policy context. 
Unlike the sociology of error, organisational theories are well-developed and reflect 
many of the theoretical developments and cleavages in the social sciences, in 
particular the shift from positivist accounts of structural control, to interactionist 
theories that emphasise the more social and cultural basis of the work order (Morgan 
et al 1985). These different perspectives have been interpreted as competing 
techniques for securing organisational control, with hard bureaucratic rules 
structures being superseded by more soft cultural modification strategies for 
acquiring workplace compliance (Willmott 1993). It is argued that both of these 
forms of organisational control are evident in the proposed National System and 
offer challenges to established patterns of medical work. Within this discussion it is 
also shown how the notion of cultural change espoused in policy is also open to 
considerable debate. 
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Bureaucratic structures 
It is customary to commence a discussion of bureaucratic structures with reference 
to Weber's (1970, 1992) theory of bureaucracy which has made a lasting impression 
of the sociology of organisations. An important feature of Weber's work is the basis 
of social authority and legitimacy, where 'power' is at its most basic the ability of 
actor A to influence the behaviour of actor B. For modern society he believed that 
the legitimacy of this power is typically secured through "rational-legal" forms of 
authority (as opposed to 'charismatic' or 'traditional'). This legitimacy is based on 
applying the appropriate means to a given end (zweckrational) and also behaviour 
that strives to realise some "absolute value" (wertrational) (Weber 1992: 28). He 
argued that the co-ordination of this rational-legal authority was most commonly 
associated with bureaucratic forms of social organisation, as a social device to 'get 
things done' efficiently and rationally. 
For Weber, bureaucracy represented a particular form of social organisation and 
officialdom, typically associated with clear internal structures of 'roles and rules'. 
Bureaucracy can be described as a system with fixed areas of responsibility that are 
governed by legitimate regulations, where the authority to give commands is ordered 
through a hierarchy of super- and sub-ordination; where those holding organisational 
positions have the necessary level of expertise and experience; and the management 
of the organisation is based on the documentation of action through "files" which 
constitute the "bureau" or the "office". Organisational control and compliance is 
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therefore secured, maintained and recorded through the legitimate structures of 
formal rules and responsibilities. Weber (1970) believed that bureaucracy IS 
technically superior to other forms of organisation because of its precision, speed 
and un-ambiguity, secured through the thorough co-ordination of social action, 
documented knowledge and the reduction of friction. 
These ideas have had a major impact on organisational and management theory 
(Parker 2000). One aspect of bureaucracy and organisational theory that has received 
considerable attention is concerned with the appropriate role of management 
hierarchies and the levels of super- and sub-ordination (Chandler 1990). One of the 
most infamous ways in which these ideas have been developed is through "scientific 
management" or Taylorism, which is often associated with the Fordist 
manufacturing production (Allen 1992). Taylor (1970) was particularly concerned 
with the effective organisation, control and application of labour. Of importance to 
his work is the idea that operational managers should "scientifically" order the 
workforce through gathering the knowledge relevant to production, classify this 
information and reduce it to clear procedural tasks and rules that direct the 
workforce. He suggested that within the division of labour "the work of every man 
(sic) [should be] fully planned out by management". Parker (2000) believes that 
implicit within this theory is the belief that individuals are self-interested, and in 
order to secure their compliance it is necessary to systematically order work. Here 
organisational control is secured through the rigid planning and allocation of roles 
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and responsibilities, developing those ideals of bureaucracy expressed by \Veber 
( 1970). 
Despite the appeal of such structural and positivistic accounts of social organisation 
there remain several problems with the application of bureaucracy. Merton (1970) 
pointed out the "dysfunctional" properties of bureaucracy, in particular the "trained 
inflexibility" of organisational actors that inhibits change and the tendency towards 
"goal displacement" amongst the workforce whereby 'following the rules' overrides 
the task. Moreover, Burns and Stalker (1966) provide an important qualification to 
the theory of bureaucracy through showing the relationship between organisational 
structure, task and innovation. Their analysis focussed on particular organisational 
dimensions, such as specialization, standardization, conflict resolution and authority. 
They showed that "organic" organisational systems with flexible, flat and blurred 
structures were more effective for nurturing and implementing innovation as 
compared to the rigid bureaucratic "mechanistic" model. Such criticism has 
highlighted that bureaucracy is not necessarily the most effective or superior model 
of social organisation, which is especially important given wider socio-economic 
changes over the last 30 years. 
Despite Weber's account of bureaucracy and its criticisms, it is important not to 
overlook the centrality of culture and meaning within the works of \Veber (1992). 
Parker (2000) suggests his ideas contribute to both debates about organisational 
structures and cultures, especially with his methodology of versteizen. In his 
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discussion of rule conformity Weber (1992) highlights the importance of "meaning" 
that underpins social action and highlights how rules can be "imprinted" and 
normalised with social action. Social action is therefore reflective of formal 
legitimate rules, but also the meanings and values of the individual within the 
organisation. Here he talks of "social rule-following" (1992: 106), highlighting the 
importance of the perceived validity of action that implicitly refers to the shared 
meanings or cultures surrounding social action. In consequence, Weber's account of 
organisational control goes beyond the rational-legal structures of bureaucracy to 
include the cultural values that become established within patterns of social meaning 
and action. 
Etzioni (1969, 1970) has developed these ideas through his theory of organisational 
compliance. Here he puts forward a theory of control that accounts for types of 
authority but also the character of social involvement. From these two dimensions he 
suggests that there are three main forms of compliance. The first is "coerci ve 
compliance" which relies on the role of physical sanctions and rewards in the pursuit 
of control. The second is "utilitarian compliance" and is associated with calculated 
remuneration to secure workforce commitment. Finally, "normative compliance" 
relies upon the acceptance and commitment to organisational symbols and rituals 
that are perceived as "good". 
It can be seen therefore that Weber's account of bureaucracy deals with the broad 
structures of social organisation, but it also implicitly refers to the values and 
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cultures of organisational life. In consequence Parker (2000) has suggested that 
much of the literature on corporate management is debating with the "ghost" of 
Weber, because he refers to both "hard" and "soft" (Salaman 1992) forms of 
organisational control. 
Interactional theories and post-bureaucratic 'culture management' 
In contrast to the rigid management of organisational roles and responsibilities, 
alternate theories of organisational work have been developed that emphasise the 
normative basis of order. The 'interactionist' approach emphasises the shared and 
accepted meanings that enable individuals to make sense of the work place (Morgan 
et al 1985). For example, Strauss (1963) highlighted the negotiated order of the 
workplace where formal rules were regarded as inappropriate and therefore local 
bargains and negotiations characterised the basis of social organisation. These 
theories have been applied to account for the normative and ideological order of the 
workplace, particular through forms of 'culture management'. 
Of interest here is the development of "soft" bureaucratic systems and the rise of 
culturalism within management theory (Parker 2000). The Human Relations 
approach (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1970) provides a theory of organisational life 
that goes beyond the structural bureaucratic model by highlighting the informal 
character of organisations. Here attention was directed at the social relationships, 
interactions, norms, values and sentiments that give rise to and reinforce workplace 
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order. Developing this perspective McGregor (1990) articulated his two pronged 
theory of managerial control. Fundamentally he argues that people do not like work, 
and in to secure their effective labour it is necessary to coerce, direct and control 
workers. For McGregor this managerial control can be secured through two different 
accounts of human motivation. Theory X is associated with traditional managerial 
and bureaucratic control strategies, which he claims lacks an appreciation of human 
nature. Alternatively Theory Y advocated fostering self-control and gaining the 
normative commitment of staff, aligning organisational goals to those of the 
workforce and encouraging individuals to develop their skills and innovate within 
their roles. Building on the Human Relations approach, McGregor's work highlights 
the social and human character of organisational labour, as opposed to role and rule 
structures. 
Such theories have had a longstanding influence on management theory, providing 
an alternative to structural techniques of control and authority. The importance of 
these theories has become more pronounced over the last 30 years, typically 
associated with socio-economic changes and the retreat from bureaucracy. It has 
been well-documented, theorised and discussed how advanced industrial societies 
have moved to a post-industrial, post-Fordist, post-modern or late-modem era (Allen 
1990, Beck 1992, Bell 1973, Giddens 1990). Society is theoretically characterised 
by radically different social, political, organisational and consumptive structures 
with reflexive individual identities and lifestyles. Important within these changes is 
the decline in rigid hierarchical organisational structures and the emergence of more 
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dynamic and flat organisations. This is often associated with transitions in global 
capitalism, the need for renewed Anglo-American competitiveness and other 
developments in manufacturing such as TQM, Human Resource Management and 
Just in Time (Strangleman and Roberts 1999, Willmott 1993). 
Heydebrand (1989) suggests that these socio-economic changes have prompted 
significant developments in social organisation, particular the development of post-
bureaucratic organisations as a way of ordering and controlling work. This does not 
refer to new unified concept, but represents the fragmentation of older patterns of 
organisation. These changes have been described along six dimensions: 
• The size of the labour force has become more dynamic and flexible to 
accommodate wider market demands; 
• There has been a shift from the production of goods to the delivery of 
services and the manipulation of symbols; 
• Technological changes have required new and less stable forms of 
knowledge; 
• The division of labour is more diverse with less hierarchies with more flat 
and empowering organisational structures; 
• The control of labour has shifted to more "soft" techniques associated with 
neo-Human Relations and cultural modification; 
• The ownership and control of organisations are becoming decentralised and 
more informal. 
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Wi th these changes there has been a rise in new managerial approaches to 
organisational control and the increased importance of cultural as a basis of 
management in lieu of formal structures. Parker (2000) suggests that a series of 
influential management texts or "guides" published throughout the 1980s have 
nurtured the idea that culture is a component of an organisation that can be managed 
in order to secure greater effectiveness from human resources, for example, In 
Search of Excellence (Peters and Watennan 1982), Corporate Cultures (Deal and 
Kennedy 1988) and Theory Z (Ouchi 1981). Cultural modification, control or change 
has therefore become an emergent theme of corporate management and 
organisational analysis since the late 1970s. Willmott (1993: 515) suggests that: 
"According to its leading authorities, the 'strengthening' of corporate culture 
enhances organizational performance by securing greater commitment and 
flexibility". 
One of the most interesting aspects of this "culturalism" (Parker 2000) or "corporate 
culturism" (Willmott 1993) is the manner in which culture is conceptualised in 
management theory. Meek (1988) suggests that management "experts" have 
borrowed the concept of culture from the traditions of anthropology and sociology. 
It is used to account for systems of belief, norms, expectations, rituals, stories and 
standards of behaviour, but she also suggests that there is a correlation between 
specific cultural formations and good/bad organisational performance. In 
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consequence, managerialism has become associated with creating successful 
organisations through effective 'culture management', where culture IS 
conceptualised as a "variable" open to manipulation and modification by 
organisational leaders. As Wright (1994:4) suggests 
"Culture has turned from being something an organisation is into something 
that an organisation has, and from being a process embedded in context to an 
objectified tool of management control." 
Within the management literature culture is something that can be manipulated and 
changed in order to produce behavioural changes (Parker 2000, Roberts 1997) that 
are required for corporate effectiveness (Bliss 1999, Ou Gay 1996). One feature of 
this approach is the enhanced role of employee "autonomy" and "empowerment" to 
accompany the flattening of hierarchical role structures. In consequence, it is argued 
that organisations are made smaller, flatter and more flexible as the traditional 
patterns of compliance are minimised, and more normative control developed 
(Knight and McCabe 1999, Taylor 1997). As Willmott (1993) suggests cultural 
change is seen as a mechanism to win the "hearts and minds" of employees in order 
to align human performance to corporate goals. Parker (2000) argues the mission of 
culluralism is concerned with altering the identities of employees to produce greater 
organisational 'fit' or control. This conceptualisation of culture is well established 
within management theories and is typical of quality assurance (Taylor 1997) and 
developments in the public sector (Hood 1991). 
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These managerial theories have been criticised, whilst the symbolical and 
"metaphorical" notion of culture has been re-asserted to appreciate the political and 
moral dimensions of culture. This perspective has evolved from sociological and 
anthropological approaches where culture is contingent, interactional, emergent and 
a "metaphor" for understanding organisational life (Smircich 1983, Willmott 1993). 
In this way culture is more abstract than tangible, including both beliefs and action, 
while the political and insidious role of cultural manipulation can also be revealed. 
Meek (1988) believes that managerial theories have failed to account for the debates 
that surround the concept. Furthermore, she points out that the managerial approach 
reflects an implicit structuraVfunctionalist position, whereby functional order can be 
attained through the creation of a suitable collective consciousness. She argues that 
this idea of culture fails to account for multiple overlapping and competing cultures, 
and the way in which alternate meanings and values can act as a mechanism for 
organisational control and resistance. In particular she is critical of the idea that 
specific cultures can relate to good or bad forms of organisational behaviour; and the 
path to corporate success necessitates the marginalisation of "deviant" cultures. 
From these alternative perspectives organisational cultures are various and dispersed 
within organisations, emerging from the shared experiences and norms of 
organisational Ii fe (Wright 1994). Furthermore, cultural formations not only 
represent the meanings of those in the workforce, but they also provide the basis for 
control by representing and reinforcing particular constructions of organisational 
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life. For example, Taylor (1997) and Knights and McCabe (1999) have examined the 
implications of quality assurance programmes in the context of occupational 
cultures. Here it is suggested that while schemes such as TQM advocate enhanced 
employee freedom and empowerment to improve quality, they also represent 
attempts to change the beliefs and values found within organisations. In this way, 
changes that offer greater freedom from structural control are interpreted as relying 
on forms of normative control through the manipulation of values and ideological 
conformity. Alternatively Roberts (1997) has explored the implications for culture 
within changing patterns of apprenticeship and employment training. He highlights 
the way in which new training programmes have "diluted" the input of workforce 
experience in favour of managerial direction. However, he points out that because 
managers are not omniscient the ideas and systems they promulgate can be 
subverted and re-interpreted at the level of the "shop floor" through alternate 
meanings and values. Similarly, Roberts and Strangleman (1999) have examined the 
idea of "cultural cleansing" where "traditional" and "old fashioned" patterns of work 
are rejected by new managerial cultures. Howeverr-they also suggest that it is 
possible to identify a myriad of cultures that offer resistance to managerial 
prerogative through alternate values and beliefs. 
Culture has become an important aspect of organisational and management theory, 
particular over the last 30 years with the apparent rejection of traditional 
bureaucratic structures. However, questions have to be asked about the formulation 
of culture within theory and policy and the way it is applied in management practice. 
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Notions of culture 
The above discussion of organisational control demonstrates a transition from 
bureaucratic-type 'role and rule' structures to the increased significance of 
normati ve conformity and the manipulation of culture. However, it is apparent that 
the notion of organisational culture is contested and distinct theoretical approaches 
offer divergent explanatory models (Meek 1988). The debates surrounding 
'organisational culture' are reflective of the general theoretical problems associated 
with the concept of 'culture', how it can be researched and its explanatory status 
(Eagleton 2000). 
Tyler's (1924: 1) classic all encompassmg definition described culture as "that 
complex whole which includes knowledge, art, belief, morals, la\\', customs, and any 
other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society". Despite such conceptual 
openness, the idea of culture remains problematic _(Eagleton 2000). It is conceived 
and researched along various conceptual lines, from the material and structural 
aspects of society; symbolic, ritualistic and routine practices; stories and myths; 
expressions of art and language; identity and group membership; and to the sharing 
of cognitive beliefs and values. Such different approaches typically lead to divergent 
theories and explanatory models of culture, from those that emphasis the structural 
quali ties of culture that enable a society to function, to those that explore the 
hegemonic and resistant aspects of culture, all of which have been born out by work 
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in sociology, social and culture anthropology and cultural studies (Ellen 1993, Kuper 
1996). 
The above discussion on organisational culture highlights important theoretical 
debates. Parker (2000) has attempted to clarify the different perspecti ves through the 
adaptation of Burrell and Morgan's (1979) typology of sociological paradigms. 
Although somewhat crude and problematic his work demonstrates the underlying 
theoretical and explanatory differences associated with organisational culture. 
Firstly, Parker (2000) refers to the 'structural functionalist' approach where culture 
consist of the beliefs systems, values and expectations of a social group reflective of 
organisational structures. In line with traditional anthropological work (Kruper 
1996), culture is described as a 'social glue' that holds people together and provides 
the basis of social stability. Culture therefore has a functional role through 
establishing a collective consciousness that provides stability and goal-orientated 
behaviour (Parsons 1951). As shown aboY.e,_ managerial theorists conceive that 
culture represents a characteristic component of an organisation that is reflective of 
its structure and can be manipulated to secure this stability and compliance. 
Like the functionalist perspective, Parker (2000) suggests that the 'radical 
structuralist' paradigm assumes that cultures are reflective of wider organisational 
and social structures. However, from this perspective it is t h ~ e q u i r e m e n t s s of 
capitalism that structure culture in order to secure a compliant workforce to the 
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needs of capitalist enterprise. Demonstrating the theoretical divergence betv.'een 
functionalist and Marxist approaches, this explanatory model highlights the 
hegemonic function of culture and how values are shaped by ideological apparatus. 
Taken together the functionalist and radical approaches put forward a notion of 
culture that is shaped by the "environment". 
Alternatively, Parker (2000) highlights the interactional dimensions of culture. He 
suggests that the 'interpretive' approach provides a more locally contingent and 
interpretive perspective where cultures emerge from the actions, interactions, 
meaning and shared meanings of the organisational workforce and are reflected 
through the symbols, actions, and language of work. While social structures arc 
contextually important, culture is used to explain the emergent meanings, practices, 
and other significant factors that characterise participation within organisational life. 
From this perspective, culture is seen as varied and overlapping and is used to 
explain how the localised social orders of an organisation constitute the basis of 
culture. 
Developing this perspective, Parker (2000) suggests that 'radical humanism' 
examines the way in which emergent beliefs and meanings are not only developed 
through the interactional aspects of an organisation but also represent a site for 
control and resistance. In this way, organisations are seen as consisting of multiple 
cultures that are often competing to provide meaning and order to work life. Parker 
(2000) suggests this perspective blends Weber's idea of verstehen (Weber 1992) 
with a Marxist account of power. Culture is therefore conceptualised like ideology 
and is used to explain normative and discursive domains of social control and 
resistance. Here the work of Foucault (1980) is useful as locally developed and 
shared meanings are seen as developing with reference to a myriad of discourses 
(Clegg 1998), and the formulation of meaning reinforces and constructs 
organisational life and order. Crucially culture is interpreted as reflecting localised 
values and beliefs that struggle and compete to shape the construction of work place 
identity and order. 
Parker's (2000) models of organisational culture highlight important theoretical and 
explanatory differences. Each perspective provides a distinct explanatory framework 
through which research and theory can be guided. For this study particular emphasis 
is given to the distinction between the structural-functionalist theories of 
management theory, specifically Human Factors, and the more emergent and radical 
notions of culture that highlight the localised and conflicting nature of culture. From 
this latter perspective it can be argued that culture(s) can be empirically examined 
and theoretically developed to explain how occupations make sense of themselves, 
their work and the organisation, within the context of relativistic workplace practices 
at the sub-organisational level. Furthermore, these can be active in reinforcing 
domains of influence and control whilst resisting other cultures and structural forms 
of control typical of management practice. 
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Error management and the medical labour process 
Given these theoretical accounts of organisational structures and cultures it is 
necessary to show their relevance to medical work and patient safety policy. 
Initially, it is worth reviewing the observations made in chapter two about 
medical/managerial relations. While the NHS has existed as a large and, for most of 
its history, a unified organisation it has also been characterised by the working 
arrangements of large professional groups, such as the medical profession. As such it 
has been argued that it is difficult to conceptualise the NHS and its hospitals as a 
single bureaucratic structure (Morgan et al 1985) because professional groups have 
exhibited distinct occupational hierarchies (Bucher and Stelling 1969, Freidson 
1970). In consequence, changes in hospital organisation, administration and 
management have tended to co-exist with established professional systems in a kind 
of symbiotic relationship, given that neither could adequately function without the 
other. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to characterise recent refonns of the NHS as being 
reflective of recent trends in organisational theory. For example, in response to the 
lack of political accountability in the service, the NHS Reorganisation (Department 
of Health and Social Security 1972) aimed to deliver maximum 'delegation 
downwards and maximum accountability upwards' with new organisational 
structures ufrom Whitehall to the ward". This refonn can be seen as the first major 
attempt to bureaucratise the NHS with layered administrative units to delegate and 
oversee responsibilities. However, throughout the 1980s and 1990s health policies 
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have reflected the changed political and managerial ethos of the era (James 1994) 
with forms of New Public Management (Hoggett 1991 ), such as general 
management and the internal market. Here there was a rejection of bureaucratic 
structures with greater reliance on devolution and market mechanisms and the 
implementation of contemporary management practice, such as TQM, risk 
management and cultural change. As such it has been argued that the like wider 
corporate business, the health service has experienced changes associated with post-
Fordism and the rejection of traditional bureaucracy (Nettleton 1998, Ranade 1994). 
What is important therefore is to understand how the current "modernisation" and 
"patient safety" agenda within the NHS offers to further alter the organisation of the 
service and importantly influence the medical labour process (Harrison 2002, 
Harrison et al 2002). 
The patient safety agenda introduces a range of organisational changes to the service 
that offer to modify the established patterns of medical work and the 'regulation' of 
quality. On the one hand of error management is fashioned from the popular theories 
of TQM and quality assurance where it is argued that quality is the responsibility of 
all those who work within an organisation (Reason 1999). This requires the 
devolution of quality control to those at the 'coal-face' whilst retaining strong 
managerial leadership for the direction of improvement and the alignment of quality 
to the customer (Drummond 1992, Wilkinson et aI.1998). It may appear that such 
schemes actually foster and reinforce a high degree of employee 'ownership', 
control and 'relative autonomy', and endorse professional forms of quality control. It 
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has been argued, however, that these management systems bring about new patterns 
of occupational control. Taylor (1997) highlights an "optimistic" interpretation of 
TQM where it is argued that due to the competitive nature of contemporary business 
it is necessary to strip away bureaucratic structures and introduce a dynamic style of 
quality improvement 'close to the customer', fostering 'enterprise' within the 
workforce, 'empowering' workers to 'add value' to their work and the company, and 
making them responsible and accountable for the content of their work. 
Alternatively, he also discusses a "pessimistic" interpretation of TQM that dra\vs on 
Foucauldian theories of surveillance and governmentality (Foucault 1991) and 
proposes that TQM represents a form of 'self-surveillance' (Taylor 1997). From this 
perspecti ve, as traditional bureaucratic structures are removed new panoptic styles of 
control develop whereby workers are given greater freedom and discretion in their 
work, but action must accord with managerial preference and indirect supervision. 
From this perspective Foucault's theory of governmentality (Dean 1999, Foucaul t 
1991) provides an interpretation of new managerial processes that reveals the 
underling basis of control. 
The theoretical development of error management requires an appreciation of these 
two perspectives. On the one hand the patient safety agenda could be interpreted as 
reinforcing professional discretion and autonomy in the pursuit of quality 
improvement. On the other hand, it can be seen as empowering employees but 
ensuring that error management is 'in tunc' with managerial preference. Such a 
theoretical critique has been applied to clinical governance where it has been 
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suggested that this policy reflects a fonn of post-bureaucratic control that focuses on 
the "mentality of rule" and governmentality (Flynn 2001). The National System 
could equally be explored in such a way, particularly given the centrality of cultural 
change and nonnative within theory and policy (Reason 1999, Department of Health 
2001). 
As shown above popular management theories regard culture as a functional 
"variable" of an organisation that is amenable to modification to secure workplace 
change and order. Alternatively, culture can be conceptualised as a "metaphor" for 
making sense of organisational life through emergent and shared meanings, beliefs 
and practices. ImportantLy, this approach holds that organisations are characterised 
by many cultures that are actively making sense, ordering and controlling 
occupational life (Parker 2000). 
It has traditionally been the case that medical work has been analysed in tenns of the 
application of expert knowledge and there has been comparatively little regard for 
medicine as a culture of cultural practice (Lupton 1998). It is possible to argue that 
the NHS is characterised by many cultures reflective of management strategies, 
occupations and tile emergent features of health care provision within a complex and 
varied health care system (Lupton 1998, Parker 2000). Although Reason (1999) 
recognises that different theories of culture exist he reinforces a structural-
functionalist view by arguing that organisational leaders should foster and adopt a 
"safety culture" and specifically a "reporting: culture". By failing to consider the 
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interactional and radical aspects of organisational and occupational cultures, both 
theory and policy fail to recognise how cultures can not only be barriers to change, 
but actually be actively resistant and adaptive to new management reforms. By 
developing an explanatory model of culture that emphasises the emergent, localised 
and conflicting character of workplace beliefs, values and cultural practices, this 
thesis provides a study of how the implementation of policy may meet crucial forms 
of cultural resistance that fall outside the theoretical boundaries of prevailing 
management theory and health policy. 
It is also clear from the policy that there are to be new formalised structures of 
administration and management, specifically the National System involves the 
introduction of reporting, analysis and management systems. As well as the forms of 
cultural or "soft" organisational control, the system also involves documented and 
systematic processes that reinforce a more bureaucratic model. For example, the 
National System operates on the assumption that incident reports will be returned to 
a centralised managerial group that has responsibility for collating and analysing the 
information contained in these forms. From this information managers can then 
identify the underlying causes of error with reference to a particular theoretical 
framework, namely Human Factors, and then errors and risks can be appropriately 
controlled; bearing many similarities to Taylorist forms of organisational control 
(Taylor (970). 
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In the context of health service reform and increased managerialism in the NHS, 
Harrison (2001,2002, Harrison et al 2002) has developed a theoretical framework to 
account for potential c.hanges in medical professionalism. His concept of the medical 
labour process is premised on the assumption that medical work is "social" and 
consists of more than just the technical application of knowledge through isolated 
interactions. His model (see figure 4.1) consists of a vertical axis to represent the 
sources of "valid knowledge about the effectiveness of medicine" (Harrison 2002: 
467); at one extreme this is internalised and personal to the doctor; at the other it is 
external and located within abstract bodies of knowledge. The horizontal axis 
represents the way in which this knowledge is put into practice; with one extreme 
being internal and associated the use of knowledge because the doctor regards it as 
appropriate; while at the external end knowledge is implemented through 
institutional means such as rules and regulations. 
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Figure 4.1. Four models of medical care practice (sources Harrison et al 2002:7) 
Implementation 
mainly internal 
Valid knowledge mainly from 
from personal experience 
Reflective practice Professional 
model consensus model 
Critical appraisal Scientific-
model bureaucratic model 
Valid knowledge mainly 
from external research findings 
Implementation 
mainly external 
From this matrix four types of medical work are proposed. The first is termed 
"reflective practice" and resembles idealised theories of professional work where 
doctors are constantly self-critical of their work. Here schemes such as Medical 
Audit are used to support this process. The second model is termed "professional 
consensus" and centres on the collaboration between professional colleagues to 
develop guidance for the occupational 'rank and file', for example developing 
collegial guidance from case reviews. The "scientific-bureaucratic" model differs 
from the previous two types as it rejects personal experience as the source of valid 
and applicable knowledge and instead favours knowledge accumulated through 
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scientific data, for example Randomised Control Trials. Furthermore, it suggests that 
doctors are too busy and unskilled to interpret this information and therefore medical 
work should be guided and regulated through bureaucratic protocols and guidelines. 
The fourth model is termed "critical evaluation" and like the previous type assumes 
the valid knowledge is located in external scientific findings, but it suggests that its 
application cannot be rigid and prescriptive but must be open to the experience and 
interpretation of professionals at the 'coal face'. From this model Harrison suggests 
that current developments in the NHS, particular those associated with clinical 
guidelines, clinical governance, consumerism and health service risks have 
reinforced the centrality of the scientific-bureaucratic model of medical labour. He 
argues that the accounts of post-Fordism and NPM have failed to acknowledge the 
character of professional labour process, which has experienced both traditional 
Fordist and post-Fordist developments (Harrison 2001: 475). 
From this work it can be argued that as well as promoting cultural change the patient 
safety agenda reflects aspects of the scientific-bureaucratic model. It holds that the 
appropriate knowledge to understand, analyse and control medical errors resides 
within particular psychological and Human factors theories associated with "root 
causes analysis". Furthermore, this is external to medical knowledge and represents 
a distinct and valid expertise. In consequence, a managerial lead is required at both 
the hospital and national level to develop new knowledge about health service 
quality and through management change the quality of professional work can be 
improved and medical errors controlled. The National System therefore represents 
new organisational structures for directing service Improvements and managIng 
medical errors. 
Bringing the two strands of the National System together it is possible to interpret 
this policy as representing both traditional bureaucratic but also culture based forms 
of occupational control. It is important is to understand the impact of such changes 
on medical labour and appreciate the consequence of this policy for 
medical/managerial relations in the NHS. 
Conclusion: discourses, cultures and structures of control? 
The previous chapter described the patient safety policy, and suggested that three 
core components represented a conceptual and practical 'backbone'. In this chapter 
attention was given to questioning and de-constructing these three features of policy: 
the conceptualisation of error, the promotion of incident reporting and the 
establishment of managerial procedures for the analysis and control of errors. It has 
been shown how sociological theories offer alternatives to the prevailing 
psychological and managerial orthodoxy of policy. Furthermore, through 
appreciating these different perspectives it is possible to engage with the changes in 
medical/managerial relations. Several research questions emerge from this 
theoretical and policy context. 
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First, does the conceptualisation of error advocated in theory and policy represent a 
new discourse about error and error management that is providing certain 
occupational groups within the NHS with a knowledge basis for the assessment and 
regulation of medical performance? Specifically have health service managers been 
imbued with an expertise that has the potential to define and control errors, in the 
same way that medical professionals have been characterised with the discursive 
power for defining and regulating issues of health and disease (Freidson 1970, 
Foucault 1973)? Conversely, does the construction of error represent a contested 
site for organisational power as medical professionals perceive, interpret, and give 
meaning to error with reference to divergent cultural and discursive features of their 
work? Importantly, how does the construction of error by medical professionals 
foster specific forms of professional regulation? Underlying this question is a 
general concern to reveal the weaknesses of the realist conception of error found in 
both theory and policy. 
Second, a key component of error management is the introduction of an incident 
reporting system buttressed by cultural "engineering" (Reason 1997). However, 
questions needed to be asked about the capacity of managerial-led incident reporting 
to penetrate medical working practices and culture. Specifically what are the 
experiences of medical professionals in reporting incidents and what are their 
attitudes towards reporting as a mechanism for error management? Drawing on the 
above discussion of organisational culture a key consideration here is the extent to 
which medical cultures are distinction or resistant to the 'reporting culture' 
promoted in policy. What effect, therefore, are cultural change strategies having on 
medical practice, but more importantly how are alternate cultural fonnations 
resistant to incident reporting? Again this implicitly challenges the theoretical basis 
of policy through questioning the notion of organisational culture. 
Third, the research is concerned to understand how managerial procedures 
associated with analysing and controlling medical error may represent new structural 
forms of quality control within the health service that are divergent from established 
medical regulatory systems. Drawing on the theoretical accounts of the medical 
labour process and organisational control, the research aims to explore the extent to 
which new procedures and managerial processes may supersede established 
professional forms of quality control, especially since they are based on a new 
managerial expertise and theory of error management. 
Together these three themes mm to explore the changing relationship between 
medical and managerial groups within the NHS. It appears that the application of 
policy through management practice represents the potential for discursive (the 
definition of error and basis of error management), cultural (normative control and 
behavioural change) and structural (new procedures and valid knowledge) control of 
medical work. Of interest is the extent to which these changes will impact upon 
medical (technical) autonomy and (sanctioned) self-regulation. Earlier it was shown 
that autonomy, bounded and contained, refers to aspects of diagnosis and treatment 
and the ability to evaluate performance, whilst the regulatory systems of medicine 
are, at the practitioner level, contained within internal informal and formal practices. 
This policy may therefore provide a new frontier for medical/managerial relations as 
managers have a distinct and valid knowledge base from which to define aspects of 
medical error and produce occupational change, buttressed by cultural and structural 
changes to the health service, in the form of incident reporting and new management 
practices. However, questions also have to be asked about the extent to which these 
changes will be fully implemented and the degree of conformity or resistance found 
in medical work. 
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5. The research 
Introduction 
University training courses, research text books and the tacit assumptions of "being 
a sociology PhD student" seem to imply that the three-year (empirical) doctoral 
process can be roughly divided into three stages. The first year is concerned with 
literature searches, reading around the 'topic', completing research training courses, 
clarifying the 'topic', developing a research programme, even a pilot project, and at 
some point justifying to yourself, supervisors and internal assessors that your 
knowledge and capabilities are adequate to go forth and undertake research (and you 
should no longer be considered an MPhil candidate). The second year is typically 
seen as the time of conducting field work, whether this be through quantitative, 
qualitative or mixed methods, collecting "data", sorting this information, carrying 
out preliminary analysis, and maybe collecting some more data, throughout which 
more reading and some writing may occur. The third year is the time of "writing-up" 
when all the data is thoroughly analysed and together with reading this becomes the 
basis of a thesis. 
This is obviously some kind of desired 'ideal type' and in many ways it is fiction. It 
is not uncommon for the first stage of the process to take longer than a year, 
particularly if applying for ethical approval, conducting research some distance from 
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the university or if conferences, summer vacations and other circumstances prevent 
the itinerary from going to plan. Conducting the research can also be hampered, for 
example by the difficulty of finding and keeping participants, and the writing-up 
process can undulate between weeks of frantic creation to weeks of stagnation or 
struggling with an over-whelming volume of data. Meanwhile, there are problems of 
juggling teaching commitments, the ever-present threat of technological failure, the 
peculiar relationship with supervisors and the implicit pressure to get something 
published or go to conferences. The result can be that a thesis emerges sometime in 
the fourth or fifth year of the process, much to the dismay of supervisors, the 
university and funding bodies. 
My doctoral process has been shaped by the desire to meet the ideal itinerary whilst 
tackling the realities of "being a sociology PhD student". This is not said as an 
excuse to mitigate any shortcomings or longevity in the process, but merely to 
suggest that the process of completing a PhD is far from straightforward and the 
processes of research do not easily follow textbooks or simple rules. In many ways 
my research has consisted of three stages, but these have not always been distinct. 
This did involve a year of developing the research focus, reading and re-reading 
works around, and sometimes far removed, from the topic, writing three broad 
literature reviews, completing training courses, developing a methodological agenda 
and submitting a summary of my efforts for internal examination before being 
transferred from an MPhii to a PhD. It is true also that my second year was largely 
concerned with gathering data through qualitative methods. While the third year has 
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been primarily spent writing chapters, re-drafting sections, developing ideas, 
rejecting ideas and hopefully producing a thesis. However, within this process 
detours were taken, for example, elements of the fieldwork were conducted early in 
the first year and continued throughout the writing-up period. Meanwhile I have 
analysed data throughout the research process, not merely at the end. What follows 
therefore is an account of my research process, describing and explaining activities 
over the last three years, drawing on theoretical justifications and reveal ing 
peculiarities. 
Unlike other chapters this is written in a more reflexive and personal style, this can 
hopefully be seen with the preference for first person pronouns and through the 
candid accounts I have given of the research process. It has been greatly assisted by 
the use of my, Wright Mills (1983) inspired, sociological field journal in which I 
have captured many of the thoughts, observations and decisions that have been 
central to the research; some of the passages in this chapter are taken directly from 
this logbook. Furthermore, by writing this chapter towards the end of the research 
process I have been able to address debates and issues in a more reflexive manner, 
whilst also considering issues that did not easily sit within the other chapters. The 
chapter has been written with reference to a range of methodological and qualitative 
research textbooks, which have been invaluable throughout the process in helping to 
tackle problems, for example with selection. However, they h a \ ' t ~ ~ not been used 
prescriptively, only as a guide, and in this chapter I have not wanted to review 
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methodological debates that are well covered elsewhere, rather I have used them to 
justify decisions I have made and practices I have followed. 
The research questions 
Consideration is first given to the questions that guide this study. These have been 
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developed over the previous three chapters. In its broadest sense the research 
engages with the theoretical debates concerning medical professionalism in the 
context of increased managerialism in the NBS. The specific focus of this study is 
the improvement and regulation of medical quality, specifically the management of 
errors. This policy context comprises the introduction of the National System which 
includes new procedures for gathering information about errors, analysing their 
causes and promoting organisational change, in line with Human Factors theory. 
Three specific questions emerge from this policy and offer to change existing 
medical/managerial relations in the health service. First, does the conceptualisation 
of error found in theory and policy represent a discourse on error that has the ability 
to legitimise specific forms of social action concerned with reporting and managing 
errors? Alternatively, is it the case that medical professionals construct errors in a 
way that promotes a divergent form of social action and provide a basis of social 
power? Second, how do medical professionals participate in forms of incident 
reporting? Are efforts at cultural change in the NHS having a meaningful impact on 
medical reporting, or are the cultural features of medical work resistant to incident 
reporting? Third, do new management systems for the analysis of errors and the 
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promotion of organisational change introduce new structures of organisational 
authority and power that override existing professional approaches to the control of 
quality? Together these questions examine the role of discourses, cultures and 
structures in the context of error management and medical/managerial relations. 
Furthermore, these research questions constitute a critique of the theoretical 
assumptions of prevailing theory and policy, especially the concept of error and the 
notion of cultural change. 
Initial considerations on the research process 
Preliminary forays and honing the research 
Upon arri val at the University of Nottingham I was interested in the topic of medical 
professionalism and managerialism in the NHS, along with a developing curiosity in 
the emerging quality agenda of the post-1997 Labour government. However, it was 
decided relatively early in the year that a more narrow focus was needed to 
operationalise a research project or as it was once suggested to find a "brick" that I 
could feasibly investigate over three years that could fit within a larger theoretical 
"wall" . 
Initially. this process involved reading about the quality agenda in the NHS and 
finding issues that were pertinent to my broader interest in medical/managerial 
relations. Alongside this review of the literature and policies. I also made s e \ ' ~ r a l l
preliminary forays into the health service to talk with medical and managerial 
representatives in order to identify issues that coincided with my broader theoretical 
interests, and find topics that were of relevance to those working in health care. This 
process was aided considerably by previous employment within the health service, 
and the existence of informal "networks" with people working in or researching in 
the NHS. Specifically, I had discussions with a Medical Director, one consultant 
physician and two NHS managers, all from hospitals in the local area, along with 
several academics working in health service research. 
From these initial discussions a range of potential research topics were identified 
that related to the changing character of medical professional work in the context of 
quality improvement. After investigating the literature and policy documentation 
four topics seemed to predominate, these included "evidence-based medicine", 
"performance management", "risk management" and "National Service 
Frameworks". Each of these represented considerable scope for empirical research, 
but of the four I felt that "risk management" and "performance management" were 
the most appealing in terms of maintaining my interest,- but also in terms of 
conducting a study without requiring a detailed appreciation of 'technical' medical 
work. Two other factors clarified my final choice, first was my previous work on 
performance measures in health care (Waring 2000), which encouraged me to seek 
out other aspects of health policy, the second was the emerging political and media 
concern around risk and patient safety in health care. This included the "scandals" 
surrounding the Bristol Royal Infirmary (Kennedy 2001) and the increased attention 
given to medical mistakes, malpractice and negligence in the media, in particular the 
163 
Channel Four senes Why Doctors Make Mistakes (Moore 2000). Moreover the 
publication of An Organisation with a Memory (Department of Health 2000) 
initiated a policy agenda that coincided with my doctoral process. -. 
In order to further clarify the study further forays into the health serVlce were 
arranged with a local hospital that was identified as having developed advanced 
systems of risk management. Through discussion with the hospital's risk manager it 
was found that forms of error management had already been developed in the NHS, 
especially through participation in the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Tmsts 
(CNST) (see chapter two), and it was felt that a new managerial framework would 
soon be proposed by the Department of Health based on the recommendations of An 
Organisation with a Memory. To understand more about the systems already in 
place and appreciate the forthcoming policy developments, telephone contact was 
made with the Department of Health and the CNST. In addition, a meeting was 
conducted with Joint Chief Executive of the newly created National Patient Safety 
Agency (NPSA) to understand how change was to be promoted and policy 
implemented. Contact was also made with the office of Sir Liam Donaldson, the 
Chief Medical Officer of England and Wales, and a meeting was arranged with a 
representative to discuss the issues surrounding policy implementation. These 
discussions helped me to understand not just the pertinent concerns at the national 
level of the NHS, but they also clarified many of the underlying assumptions behind 
the policy. 
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Throughout the first autumn and winter of the doctoral process, these preliminary 
forays in the NHS, together with my broad interest in the medical profession, 
managerialism and the quality agenda, enabled me to identify and develop the basis 
of this research. I was then able locate further theoretical debates on which this new 
policy could be addressed and wait for the publication of further policy documents. 
Meanwhile attention turned to identifying organisations in which the research could 
take place and developing criteria for selection. 
The methodological approach 
It is common for the 'methods chapter' to engage in debates about the 
methodological approach that guides the research. In many ways this is influenced 
by the questions that the research is trying to answer and also the philosophical or 
analytical approach assumed in the study. However, in this account of the research 
process I have not wanted to give excessive consideration to these issues, rather I am 
more concerned to actually describe and explain what I have done. Nevertheless, the 
methodological approach of this research can be characterised as broadly qualitative 
in style. When developing the study it was clear that there was little contemporary 
qualitati ve empirical data in this area. This is demonstrated by a recent Department 
of Health Call for Proposals for Ethnographic studies into Patient Safety aimed at 
filling this empirical void. Furthermore, the questions that underpin this research arc 
such that I believe the most fruitful approach to the research is to explore the beliefs 
and attitudes of those working in the NHS, to delve into the subjective quality of 
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their work. In consequence, it is recognised that while quantitative methods may 
indeed be suitable for acquiring certain forms of empirical data, I have been more 
inclined to adopt a qualitative approach that engages with-the pluralistic theoretical 
framework of the study. 
There are obviously many different traditions under the umbrella of qualitative 
research, for example biography, ethnomethodology, ethnography, grounded theory 
and phenomenology (Creswell 1998). Moreover, these are not mutually exclusive, 
but can contribute to a varied approach to research and can inform divergent 
analytical and theoretical approaches. I have been interested in exploring the 
relevance of these different perspectives and been especially influenced by 
techniques found in social anthropology, ethnography and grounded theory. At the 
outset of the research, I adopted a broad ethnographic approach, characterised as 
exploring the social world through inductive c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n s ~ ~ the use of 
exploratory unstructured methods; the investigation of small numbers in greater 
detail; and the analysis of data through the irnerpretation of meaning and action 
(Atikinson and Hammersley 1998). As a method of research a range of techniques 
can be employed under this umbrella, such as observations and interviews. 
However, as the research developed the broad ethnographic approach has given way 
to more general qualitative methods with greater focus on individual perceptions, 
meanings and behaviour. The main reason for this transition was the difficulty in 
accessing the organisation for prolonged periods of time and particularly within the 
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clinical setting of the hospital. However, while the general exploratory and 
descriptive aspects of the research may have diminished in relevance, the analytical 
aspects of the research have remained concerned -with understanding perception, 
interpretation, meaning and action. This analytical approach is discussed later in the 
chapter. 
The phases of the research 
Following the development of the research "questions" the research passed through 
several phases associated with selecting a hospital, identifying and accessing 
individual participants and organisational groups, gathering data and then analysing 
and writing-up the findings. As suggested above the research approach moved from 
a broad ethnographic study of managerial systems to a more general qualitati ve 
model centred on interviews. These stages are elaborated below, but it is first 
necessary to provide an overview of this process and highlight the divergent phases. 
Following the identification and selection of a suitable hospital case study, the 
research developed through two main phases. The first centred on understanding the 
broad organisational structure of the hospital, identifying managerial groups 
involved in clinical risk management and incident reporting and exploring the social 
character of error management. Within this phases a combination of observations 
and interviews were used to gather data and refine the research focus. This fieldwork 
can most easily be described as ethnographic in style with attention directed at the 
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emergent social setting of the hospital's managerial systems related to risks and 
errors. The observations and interviews of this stage were conducted with 
participants involved in the corporate administration of the hospital, referred to as 
"managers", along with medical professionals with semor management 
responsibilities who also participated within these corporate groups. In line with the 
traditions of grounded theory this data was used to advance the theoretical basis of 
the study, identify and clarify research questions and assist the identification and 
selection of further participants, e.g. theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss 1967). 
Aspects of this first phase continued throughout the research process, for example 
focussed observations were conducted almost continually for a year, however, the 
examination of hospital management gave way to the exploration of medical work 
and culture. 
Following a period of reflection, the second phase of the field was concerned with 
understanding the impact of hospital risk and error management systems on the 
working practices of medical professiQIlals., Unlike the first phase, this field work 
can not be considered as ethnographic given the lack of observational research 
within the social settings of medical work (Fetterman 1989). Instead the fieldwork 
shifted to a general qualitative study primarily drawing on interview and 
documentary sources. Here attention was directed at doctors and risk managers, 
working at the organisational "coal face" and not directly involved in corporate 
management. 
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Reflections on the research role 
Fetterman (1989) makes the point that ethnography is typically concerned with 
acqUlnng an 'emic' perspective on the social world: understanding the insider's 
point of view in order to account for the normative and ideological 'reality' of 
participants. However, he points out that it is often necessary to first develop an 
'etic' appreciation of the social setting: to understand its structures, boundaries, 
relations and actions from an external perspective, within which the internal 
understanding can be couched. Such considerations not only relate to the style of 
data acquired throughout the research process but also the relationship of the 
researcher to the social setting, for example, is the researcher seen as an insider or 
outsider? 
Participant observation is an established feature of ethnography and qualitative 
research yet its character in the field can be variable. It can range from complete 
involvement in the social setting where a specific role is assumed and the researcher 
becomes socialised into the group or culture; or observations can be more distant 
and external exploring the broader social patterns and structures. The variations in 
observational styles and field relations can depend upon the focus of the study, for 
example whether it is more concerned with the structural/material or the cogniti \'e 
dimension of culture (Fetterman 1989). There have been several attempts to classify 
the role of the researcher during the fieldwork process (Adler and Adler 1987, Ellen 
1984, Gold 1969), and although primarily concerned with observational roles, it is 
necessary to consider their relevance to this study. 
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Junker (1960) and Gold (1969) have identified four such roles along a spectrum that 
ranges from 'complete participant', 'participant as observers', 'observers as 
participant' and 'complete observer'. The aim of these role-types is to clarify the 
relationships between the 'researcher' and 'researched', thereby identifying 
important issues for data analysis and reflection. The 'complete participant' can be 
characterised by the undisclosed nature of involvement, whereby the "true identity 
and purpose ... are not known to those whom he (sic) observes" (Gold 1969:33). The 
researcher therefore takes on a 'role-pretence' and assumes some form of legitimate 
purpose within the social setting therefore enabling the researcher to gather first 
hand social experiences with reduced levels of 'contamination'. Gold suggests that 
this approach to research has two main problems, first the researcher may be 
ineffective at taking on the role convincingly thereby undermining the field 
relations, and second the researcher may 'go native' and fail to fulfil the 
observational role. 
The 'participant as observer' has similarities with the complete role, including the 
establishment of a legitimate purpose or role within the social setting, but crucially 
the research relationship is 'overt'. With this approach Gold (1969) suggests that 
explicit periods of observation are complimented by more opportunistic 
observations, and the rapport with informants is important for access and data 
collection. 
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The 'observer as participant' role is associated with field studies that are 
characterised by interviews and where observations do not accumulate over time to 
furnish the researcher with deeper -insight, instead they are focussed to specific 
social settings. Here the relationship between the researcher and the researched is 
minimal and "superficial", and observations are overt. This approach avoids the 
problems associated with 'going native' or 'role pretence', but the quality and depth 
of data collection may be limited. The 'complete observer' avoids the problems with 
pretence because observations are conducted external to the social setting or group. 
Importantly, those being observed are typically unaware of the research, while data 
collection is made through eavesdropping or other forms of unobtrusive recording. 
Similarly Adler and Adler (1987) have classified the distinct memberships roles 
acquired during fieldwork. Of particular interest is the function of the researcher 
within the social setting and the extent to which the researcher's identity is revealed. 
They suggest that the 'complete member' has an established function within the 
social setting, through which they acquire observational access, legitimacy, and 
normative alignment. The 'active member' also has a functional role and their 
observations potentially covert, but they have established "escapes" that enable them 
to reflect upon data collection and maintain a "critical distance" or "perspective". 
'Peripheral membership', however, is where there is no designated function in or 
contribution to the setting and the observational role is overt and recognised by 
participants. They suggest that each of these research roles involves distinct issues 
about the validity of data and also ethical considerations, for example covert 
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research may acquire more valid information as participants are unaware that their 
views and actions are being recorded, but equally this is being done deceptively and 
without consent. 
Gold (1969) suggests that these roles can be regarded as "master roles" for 
establishing a relationship within a social setting and other sub-roles can develop 
during the course of the fieldwork. As such mUltiple roles and research relationships 
may develop or dissolve throughout the processes of the fieldwork. Importantly it is 
necessary to reflect upon their influence for data collection and analysis. 
During the course of this research I acquired and abandoned distinct research roles, 
particularly as the fieldwork made the transition from studying managerial groups to 
doctors, and as my involvement in the management meetings grew to include greater 
participation. At the outset, observations within the hospital's committees and 
managerial departments were based on my explicit or overt role as an external 
researcher with no f o r ~ " , a J J participatory role within the social setting. This research 
role could therefore be interpreted as 'observer as participant' (Gold 1969) or 
'peripheral membership' (Adler and Adler 1987). The main purpose of these 
observations was to primarily understand the organisational structures and 
relationship, to further hone the research questions, and appreciate the function of 
hospital management with regards to error/risk management. Although this initial 
stage of this study can be described as ethnographic in character it is necessary to 
make it clear that this is not an 'ethnography', rather the techniques of ethnographic 
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observation and interview were utilised (Fetterman 1989). During the second st3ge 
of the research there were little opportunities for observational research and the 
study primarily relied on interview and documentary data. However, later during the 
research process a second phase of observations was conducted at the managerial 
level of the hospital to clarify emergent themes and further explore the changes in 
the organisation. It was during this period that my observational role changed as I 
provided the hospital with feedback and therefore acquired a more legitimate 
function within these social setting as I participated within the decision-making 
processes. My role therefore changed from being on the periphery of the social 
setting to being more 'active'. However, it is questionable whether this role could be 
classified as a 'participant as observer' in the ethnographic tradition because the 
observations were contained to a specific meeting that occurred monthly. 
Nevertheless, it is important to consider the changing relationship with the hospital 
throughout the stages of the research. Moreover, it is also important to highlight that 
throughout the course of the research and in consideration of the ethical position 
taken in the study, the research-relationship with the case study hospital and its staff 
has been completely overt. 
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Selection: the hospital 
A case study 
As shown in chapter three the National System is to be implemented throughout the 
hospitals in the NHS. Although there are linkages with the National Patient Safety 
Agency, the introduction of incident reporting, incident analysis and forms of 
managerial change are located at the hospital level. For this reason the research was 
focussed primarily at the level of the hospital in order to understand the implications 
of this policy for medical and managerial work. 
An initial decision in developing the study was the preference for case study 
research. Hakim (1987) suggests that case studies provide a "spotlight or 
microscope" to focus social research and are particularly useful for analysing the 
implementation of specific policies. Due to their "bounded" character (Stake 2000), 
such studies can provide a rich source of data for descriptive, analytical and "best 
practice" research and afford an isolated arena for thorough and detailed research. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that working within a case study enables detailed and 
continuous research drawing from a range of potential field techniques and 
providing the opportunity to pursue emergent themes and alternate methodologies 
(Hakim 1987). The "hospital" was therefore identified as providing the bounded 
system in which the implementation of policy can be explored. 
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Stake (2000) identifies three different types of case study research, the first is termed 
"intrinsic" because the research is primarily concerned with the specifi,-' 
characteristics of the case being researched; the second is called "instrumental" 
because the case is used to provide insights that contribute to wider generalisations; 
and the third is "collective" as it replicates instrumental research across a number of 
cases. For this research the use of a case study was primarily driven by the desire to 
locate a hospital that could be sufficiently studied within the limitations of a doctoral 
programme in order to understand wider changes in the character of medical 
professional work in the light of a changing policy context. However, this raiSl'S a 
further problem with regards to the extent to which empirical data from a single case 
study can feasibly be used to appreciate wider occupational and social changes 
(Dingwall 1992). In consequence a major issue for the research was the theoretical 
justification for case study selection and the number of organisations to be included 
to enable appropriate empirical analysis and theoretical development. 
Criteria for selection 
As suggested above, one of the implicit pressures underpinning this doctoral 
research is the desire to complete the various research stages within a time frame 
that in some way accords with the 'ideal type'. This did not mean that I wanted to 
sacrifice the collection of data in order to meet a timetable, but I wanted t h ~ ~
opportunity to invest time within the organisation in order to understand its intrinsic 
qualities and also to ensure that the data was thorough and open to generalisations, I 
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decided therefore that the research should be conducted within a single case-study 
hospital. It then became necessary to theoretically and empirically justify the 
selection of a hospital for inclusion within the study. To assist in this process. a 
criterion for selection was developed to establish the 'instrumental' (Stakes 2000) 
character of the hospital. These included: 
• The hospital needed to have a pre-existing incident reporting system or was in 
the processes of developing such a scheme in accordance with policy; 
• The hospital needed to be of "general" character in both size and speciality, i.e. a 
district general hospital, so it would be large enough to include a range of 
medical services and different occupational groups, and therefore not a singk-
speciality unit; 
• It was necessary to consider if the hospital had been through a re-organisation or 
merger because this could have introduced a range of other complicating features 
into the research; 
• The case-study should not have been identified as a 'beacon' hospital with 
exceptional performance as the study may not be representative across the NHS; 
• Alternatively, the hospital should not have been identified as a 'poor performer' 
or involved in a recent major scandal with regards to error, because this could 
influence the attitudes of staff; 
• It was crucial that the organisation was willing to participate in the research; 
• Given the limited resources for post-graduate research it was important to select 
an organisation that was accessible in terms of location. 
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Processes of selection and access 
The initial stages of selection involved making telephone contact with seven 
hospitals within the Trent Region of the NHS (this is the regional administrative area 
within which the University is located). Typically contact was made, via the 
Switchboard, with the office of a risk manager or clinical governance manager 
within each hospital. Through these initial telephone contacts information was 
acquired about incident reporting and risk management procedures within each 
organisation and, where possible, documentary evidence was acquired. This 
provided some background about error/risk management systems in place. Follow-
up contact was then made with three hospitals that most suitably met the criteria for 
case study selection to discuss the feasibility of conducting research within the 
organisation. Through this process one hospital appeared more willing to develop a 
research relationship and further meetings were arranged. 
During the winter and sprIng of 2001 several meetings were held with 
representatives from this hospital to discuss the research project and also to secure 
access from staff members working within the organisation. Initially, this involved 
working with the Risk Co-ordinator who provided relevant insight into the 
organisation of the hospital, the development of incident reporting and clinical risk 
management systems and identified the most successful avenues through which 
agreement could be achieved. This involved further discussions with the Medical 
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Director, Director of Nursing and Corporate Affairs, the Deputy Director of 
Corporate Affairs and culminating in a presentation to the hospital Clinical Risk 
Management Committee. This committee had a key strategic and managerial role in 
overseeing incident reporting and clinical risk management within the hospital and 
acted as a "gatekeeper" for further selection and access. Through discussion with 
these different actors it was believed that the research would contribute to their own 
organisational development. Senior managers and staff representatives therefore 
supported the research. 
The organisation of the hospital 
Before moving on to discuss the selection of participants and medical specialities 
involved in the research it is necessary to first consider the structures of the hospital, 
how they relate to the NHS at large and the variations in terminology used to 
describe the organisation. It is common in sociological theory and research to talk of 
various ontological dimensions, such as structure and agency, or macro, meso and 
micro (Layder 1998). In theoretical terms the characteristics of an organisation can 
be positioned along many of these dimensions, from the individual employee, group 
interactions, relationships and teams, departments and hierarchical structures, market 
or corporate conditions, to the social structures of economy, society and knowledge 
surrounding organisation and the cross-cutting influence of culture. 
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This is equally the case for the NHS where accounts of its structure and organisation 
are well developed (e.g. Ham 1992, Powell 1997). It is shown how on a social 
dimension health care is influenced by assumptions about health and healing (Fox 
1988, Seale 1997), from a political or institutional dimension the service is 
structured, financed and co-ordinated through social and political customs and 
actions (Klein 1989), at the level of regions, districts and hospitals it can be shown 
how decision-making groups plan services and allocate resources. Within hospitals 
there exists a range of sub-organisational structures that are equally important to 
how the NHS operates. Hospitals represent a common focal point of the health 
service, yet it is necessary to consider that they have their own organisational 
features, boundaries of activity, finance, and structure. Moreover, they have their 
own internal specialised departments, service providers, and management groups 
who attempt to co-ordinate these arrangements. 
Of fundamental theoretical importance in this research is the di vergence between 
management and occupational structures within the organisation of the hospital. For 
this research it is the convergence and divergence of bureaucratic management and 
the occupational patterns of medical professional work. The first comprises the 
managerial hierarchies and networks that relate to the broader corporate aspects of 
hospital organisation associated with the Executive Board, systems of Human 
Resource Management and arrangements for internal accountability. The second is 
concerned with the occupational organisation of medical work, with clear 
boundaries between specialities, internal hierarchical layers and the emergence of 
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medical-managers or those doctors that take up roles with the management 
hierarchy. In this way, it is not feasible to interpret the hospital as one unified 
organisation, but rather it is a broad conceptual device to describe the boundaries 
around multiple overlapping and competing structures of organisation. 
For this research the case-study hospital reflected many of these features with clear 
external boundaries and internal demarcations. It was found that the hospital had 
non-executive and executive boards, supported by a range of specialised committees, 
such as the Risk Management or Clinical Governance committee. The centralised 
management structure also consisted of several departments, such as Human 
Resource Management, Estates, Hotel Services and Corporate Affairs. The research 
initially commenced with its focus on the central 'corporate' management structures 
that related to clinical risk management and incident reporting, including the 
Department of Corporate Affairs and the Clinical Risk Management Committee. It 
was also identified that the hospital consisted of four broad Divisions for service 
organisation, these included Surgery, Medicine, Family Health, and Support Service. 
Within each of these Divisional units there were various Directorates that reflected 
the different specialities of health care delivery, for example, Maternity was located 
within Family Health. The early field work revealed that within each of these 
directorates there were often sub-specialties concerning particular aspects of health 
care and these were often based around a particular doctor or professional who 
would lead the team or "firm". The organisation of the hospital therefore appeared 
bureaucratic and hierarchical on a superficial level, but within this structure there 
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were other patterns of occupational organisation and interaction (this was an 
interesting finding in its own right, but for the purpose of this research it was onl\ 
explored in relation to the developments in error management). For the latter stages 
of the research it was important to appreciate these variations particular for the 
purposes of selection and analysis. 
Selection: participants 
Theoretical sampling 
Mason (1996) argues that sampling - the identification, selection and access to 
relevant social units for data generation - is a "vitally important strategic element of 
qualitative research". She also points out that the desire to be representative, in a 
manner typical of positivistic research, is not always suitable for qualitative 
research. This can be the case when the research is concerned with the "meticulous 
views of particular units" and then sampling can be described as "purposive": 
"Selecting groups or categories to study on the basis of their relevance to 
your research questions, your theoretical positions and analytical framework, 
your analytical practice, and most importantly the explanation or account 
which you are developing" (Mason 1996: 94). 
Purposive or 'theoretical sampling' allows for the selection of units or respondents 
hased upon their rcIevanl:c to the research and emergent findings, rather than criteria 
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such as randomness. Murphy et al.(l998) point out that in case-study research this 
technique can be more appropriate than statistically generalisable techniques 
because it is important to select particular actors and occupational groups within the 
case study that are of relevance to the research questions. This research has 
embraced the ideals of purposive sampling and has selected and accessed the case 
study hospital and the respondents based primarily upon the demands of the research 
questions rather than positivistic or statistically reliable criteria. This does not mean 
that selection has not been undertaken without the development of theoretical and 
meaningful criteria. 
Criteria for selection 
Selecting and accessing individual respondents from the hospital was premised on 
the theoretical context of the study as well as interesting and relevant findings 
generated through observations and initial discussions. From these sources of 
information I was able to develop criteria to guide selection and ensure that relevant 
managerial and medical professionals were involved in the research. These can be 
summarised as: 
• The inclusion of "key informants" such as managers and medical representati\,es 
involved in the management processes of incident reporting and clinical risk 
management; 
• 
The inclusion of all corporate level actors involved in the processes of clinical 
risk management. incident reporting. or error management; 
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• The inclusion of managers and medical professionals involved in the vertical 
organisation of incident reporting and clinical risk management within the 
hospital, i.e. those that have roles at Corporate, Divisional and Directorate levels 
of the hospital; 
• The inclusion of medical representatives from a selection of horizontal 
organisational units located at or within the directorate level. 
The eventual processes of selection and data collection consisted of two clear 
phases. For the first stage, the research was primarily concerned with understanding 
how the hospital had implemented forms of clinical risk management and was 
adapting its systems in line with policy. During this stage I was eager to understand 
the work of all individuals located in the "central" corporate structure of the hospital 
involved in clinical risk management, incident reporting and error management. For 
this reason it was decided that the research should initially focus on the activities of 
the Department of Corporate Affairs and the Clinical Risk Management Committee 
(the details of these participants are given below). 
In the second phase, the research was concerned with exploring the implications of 
policy and management change on doctors working at the "coal face" within the 
hospital. The selection of medical participants at the directorate level of the hospital 
was a constant consideration throughout the initial phase of the fieldwork. I used the 
observations and interviews at the corporate level to explore the character of thl' 
hospital in more depth and acquire an understanding of the variolls directorates. 
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Together with a review of the literature, this enabled me to develop a theoretical 
basis for the selection of medical professionals at the directorate level. Some of the 
key questions that emerged through this process included: 
a) What is the nature and extent of error in the area of medical work - how 
"risky" is the speciality, how often do errors occur - for example what are 
the risks of surgery compared to radiography? 
b) Would the technical issues of error make exploration of the social processes 
difficult - such as identification and confidentiality; 
c) What is the importance of error to the hospital - are their major cost 
implications, as with obstetrics? 
d) What social groups do errors affect and how could these alter selection, i.e. 
errors involving the young may have greater status? 
e) How visible is the risk - is it immediate or is there a time-lag that could limit 
error detection and complicate research - for example errors may be more 
immediate with surgery as opposed to oncology; 
f) How willing are certain medical specialities to be involved in the research -
some medical groups may be excessively sensitive to research into errors, for 
example, in cardiac surgery following the scandal at Bristol Royal Infirmary; 
g) What are the variations in clinical risk management that already existed at 
the directorate level or in medical practice? 
h) What is the level of participation in the corporate managerial-led forms of 
error management? 
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Processes of selection and access 
For the first phase of the fieldwork accessing participants at the managerial or 
corporate level of the hospital was assisted through the process of securing general 
access with the hospital. One representative of the Department of Corporate Affairs 
provided me with contact details of all members of this department and the members 
of the clinical risk management committee. I then set about contacting these 
individuals, via telephone, and arranging meetings to discuss the research further 
and conduct interviews. During this process I was also informed about other 
individuals within the hospital who could provide me with further insight. Through 
'snowballing' I therefore identified further participants at the corporate level who 
were also contacted via telephone. 
For the second phase of the fieldwork, the selection of participants at the directorate 
level was guided by the data collected with respondents at the corporate and 
managerial level. Through the observations, interviews and documentary sources I 
looked for emergent and grounded themes that related to the divergence between 
managerial and medical approaches to error management. Another important 
consideration was the number of participants and directorates to include with the 
research, which involved balancing the desire for more data with my ability to 
process and manage that data. I therefore decided that the research should be further 
developed in the Directorates of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Combined Surgery. 
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Acute Medicine, Anaesthesia, and Rehabilitation. The over-riding basis of this 
selection was the variation in incident reporting and error management at the 
directorate level. These differences are discussed in greater detail in chapters six and 
seven, but can be summarised as: 
• Anaesthesia (Division of Surgery) - doctors were involved a form of incident 
reporting that was co-ordinated through the Royal College of Anaesthetists 
and was distinct from the hospital based system; 
• Obstetrics (Division of Family Health) - doctors extensively participated in 
the hospital system and a directorate based risk manager had an important 
role in facilitating this involvement whilst enabling local change; 
• Combined Surgery (Division of Surgery) - doctors were not extensively 
involved in forms of reporting or clinical risk management; 
• Rehabilitation (Division of Medicine) - doctors were not clearly involved in 
the hospital incident reporting system, but had attempted to develop a 
medical-based system; whilst there was also a risk co-ordinator working 
within this directorate; 
• Acute Medicine (Division of Medicine)- doctors were not clearly involved in 
the hospital incident reporting system, but had considered participating 
within a medical-based system, while the risk co-ordinator from 
Rehabilitation was taking on a new role in this directorate. 
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After these directorates were theoretically selected it was then necessary to identify 
key respondents within each area. Initially, I selected doctors with leadership 
responsibility as it was anticipated that these clinical directors. could act as 
gatekeepers for identifying further respondents and promoting the research to their 
colleagues. I then contacted consultant level doctors within each directorate. When 
developing the selection criteria I frequently considered involving of a range of 
medical professionals, including house officers, registrars and consultants as this 
could reveal interesting variations within the medical profession. However, it was 
believed that many of these variations had been explored elsewhere (e.g. Bosk 1979, 
Fox 1975) and by involving these junior doctors consideration would have to be 
given to the teaching dynamic of medical work. [ therefore believed J could gather 
more insight from those doctors with a high degree of pennanency and seniority. 
Along with selecting medical professionals, [ was also interested in the work of risk 
managers that worked in the hospital directorates as these could provide insight into 
how both professional and managerial systems were operating. 
Accessing the clinical directors within the hospital was assisted by the Deputy 
Director of Corporate Affairs who provided me with documents that described the 
main hospital structure and roles. This list of names enabled me to contact each 
clinical director via the hospital switchboard. It was generally the case that this 
contact provided me with the details of other members of medical staff and therefore 
enabled me to arrange more interviews 
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The process of accessing doctors is a potential barrier to health service research. 
Securing access typically involved contacting each doctor's secretary, explaining the 
research, referring to the support given by the Medical Director, if possible 
developing a rapport with the secretary and then arranging a time when the doctor 
may be contacted or when they can ring back. Medical secretaries were therefore 
important gatekeepers for this study. Furthermore, doctors were notoriously poor at 
keeping telephone contacts and it was often the case that it would take me four or 
five attempts to eventually speak to a doctor. Once contact was made I typically 
explained the purpose of the research and arranged a time to meet with them. 
Through the support of the secretaries, and also perseverance, the majority of 
doctors contacted about the research were happy and able to take part. However, a 
selection of consultants claimed they were "too busy" to take part in the research, or 
they felt that they did not know enough about the subject to comment. This is an 
indicative finding in itself, but one I have not had the scope to address. 
The Participants 
The participants involved in the research included fifteen respondents at the 
managerial and corporate level of the hospital, and twenty people at the directorate 
level. The total amount of interviews for the research, including preliminary 
meetings and multiple interviews in the hospital was forty-two. 
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Those participants involved in the first phase of the research (see figure 5.1) 
included a combination of occupational groups drawn from the Department of 
Corporate Affairs, the Clinical Risk Management Committee and other central 
management groups involved in risk/error management. Many of those involved in 
the committee also had roles in other areas of hospital management and sen'ice 
delivery. The data revealed that the purpose of the committee was to gather expertise 
from across the hospital as well as having management input, for this reason the 
composition of participants in phase one includes a range of health care 
professionals and managers. 
In the second phase of the research participants were typically common to each 
directorate, including the Clinical Director, two or more consultants and, where in 
place, a risk manager/clinical governance lead (see figure 5.2). In line with the 
selection criteria discussed above, it was felt that these respondents would reveal the 
required information about the character of risk management at the directorate level 
of the hospital, professional forms of quality control, and how these systems related 
to those managed at the corporate level. 
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Figure 5.1 Participants in phase one: hospital management and corporate 
• Medical Director * 
• Director of Pharmacy* 
• Radiotherapy Manager * 
• Clinical Director of Cardio-thoracic surgery* 
• Clinical Director within Family Health Division* 
• 2 Consultant Physician in Medical Division* 
• Director of Human Resource Management * 
• Manager of Midwifery* 
• Director of Nursing and Corporate Affairs ** 
• Deputy Director of Corporate Affairs ** 
• Two Risk C o - o r d i L ~ ! ! )rs from the Department of Corporate Affairs ** 
• Hospital Litigation officer *** 
• Director of Medical Devices *** 
Note: 
* Member of the clinical risk management committee with other hospital duties 
** Member of the Clinical Risk Management Committee and Department of 
Corporate Affairs 
*** Not a member of the Clinical Risk Management Committee but with other 
management duties linked to clinical risk management 
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Figure 5.2 Participants from the Directorate level of the hospital 
Directorate of Rehabi li tation 
• Clinical Director 
• 2 consultants 
• I risk manager 
Directorate of Acute Medicine 
• 
• 
• 
Clinical Director 
2 consultants 
(shared risk manager with Directorate of Rehabilitation) 
Directorate of Obstetrics 
• Clinical Directo 
• 2 consultants 
• 1 risk manager 
Directorate of Anaesthesia and Theatres 
• Clinical Director 
• 2 consultants 
• I Theatre Sister with clinical governance responsibilities 
Directorate of Combined Surgery 
• Clinical Director 
• 2 Consultants 
• 1 Di visional Clinical Governance lead. 
Ethical considerations 
I 
The ethical considerations can be classified as those specific to the research 
questions and topic, and issues common to social research. The specific ethical 
concerns centre on the highly sensitive subject of medical mistakes. In devdoping 
the study it was clear that the subject of error had gathered enormous media, public. 
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professional and political attention, with connotations of blame, personal failure, 
professional incompetence and litigation, it was therefore necessary to take forward 
the research in a sensitive manner. Furthermore, there was concern that during the 
fieldwork I would be exposed to information relating to patients and possibly 
examples of when threats to patient safety had occurred. It was imperative therefore 
that the research explicitly promoted an ethical standpoint. 
From the outset of 'access negotiations' with the hospital these ethical concerns 
were addressed with the Medical Director and the Director of Nursing and Corporate 
Affairs. This involved discussing the potential ethical issues associated with the 
research and working with these representatives to ensure the confidential, discreet 
and sensitive use of all information acquired through the fieldwork and used in 
dissemination. It was suggested by the Medical Director that the broad terms of 
research should be formalised in writing, detailing these issues and explicitly 
referring to the maintenance of confidentiality and anonymity with particular 
reference to any patient information that may be discussed in the research process. 
This included not using information that could lead to the identification of patients, 
where possible the anonymity of all respondents (it was recognised that this would 
be difficult on an internal basis), the use of infonnation should not be taken out of 
context or used maliciously, and the hospital should have access to all documents 
arising from the dissemination of the research findings. From another perspective it 
was also pointed out that exposure to sensitive information could place a burden on 
the researcher to reveal extreme and persistent cases of error; commonly referred to 
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as "whistle-blowing". It was therefore necessary to establish an agreement that if I 
came across serious cases of malpractice I would contact senior hospital 
representatives and university staff to take the issue further; therefore balancing the 
needs of patient safety and confidentiality. 
Despite clarifying these ethical considerations with the 'hospital', it remained 
necessary to address the issues of consent and confidentiality with individual 
participants. Despite the traditions of covert research it is now regarded as ethical to 
share as much information with those involved in the research process allowing 
them to make an informed decision as to whether they should participate in the 
study. Only through informing respondents about the research are they able to make 
a meaningful choice about their involvement. Furthermore, the information acquired 
through individual interviews and observations had to be gathered and used in a 
confidential manner which respected the sensitivity of the subject and the trust 
established between the researcher and the researched. 
When arranging meetings with participants and before commencing an interview I 
provided all respondents with a brief summary of the research project, including its 
objectives, methods and how the findings would be disseminated. I also explained to 
all respondent that the findings would be used in a sensitive manner to ensure their 
confidentiality and where possible anonymity. In particular I felt it was important to 
emphasise that I was not a medical professional myself and was not interested in 
evaluating or assessing their work, rather I wanted to understand their point of view 
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and anything they told me would not be directly reported to other individuals inside 
or outside the hospital. However, with some participants it was pointed out that 
maintaining anonymity was not always practical, for example, data obtained through 
observations and group interviews by its nature involved multiple individuals in an 
open arena. In such situations it was made clear that maintaining the anonymity and 
confidentiality of those present was not always possible. It was also recognised that 
the information discussed during hospital meetings could be of a highly sensitive 
nature and therefore respondents were asked to make clear situations when they did 
not want specific information used within the research, for example if there were 
legal reasons. 
Data collection: observations 
Within the context of ethnographic research, observations represent a core method of 
fieldwork. This approach involves "immersing" oneself within a research setting and 
systematically observing the behaviour, context, interactions and relationships 
(Mason 1996). Through gathering information in this way, research data is found 
rather than constructed through interviews (Dingwall 1997). Furthermore, 
ethnographic observations are committed to holism (Fetterman 1989, Murphy et al. 
1998), gathering a wide selection of descriptive and analytical findings that actually 
represent the realities of the social setting. Through observations the actions and 
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interactions characteristic of the social setting can be identified and interpreted 
within their original context. 
However, this does not mean that this technique is without its problems. Mason 
(1996) points out that it is impossible to develop a neutral account of the social 
world as observations still rely on the role of the observer to collect, classify and 
conceptualise the findings. It therefore becomes important to be reflexive and 
explicit about what issues and findings are of interests and why they are recorded 
and analysed. Furthermore, the role of the researcher within the field must be 
acknowledged to appreciate the distinct roles and tensions within the research 
process (Gold 1969). As shown above participant observation can take several forms 
from gaining an insight from within or without, from being overt or covert, or from 
having a role. For complex social settings, such as hospitals it is not always feasible 
for a researcher to have a legitimate function in all social settings. It is therefore 
important not just to gather data but to be explicit about the process and 
interpretation of this information. 
Conducting observations 
Following a broad ethnographic approach, the first phase of the field work involved 
observations within the Department of Corporate Affairs and with the Clinical Risk 
Management Committee meetings. Initially, these were conducted with key 
informants working in the Department of Corporate Affairs. Over a period of one 
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month SIX observational excursions were conducted in the hospital to gather 
information about the organisational arrangements, to identify key personnel and 
participants, and to understand the function of the different divisions, directorates 
and departments. Initially this involved spending four half days of between one and 
four hours observing the activities of those working in the Department of Corporate 
Affairs who had responsibility for clinical risk management and patient safety. Here 
the opportunity was taken to watch the corporate 'patient safety' function, exploring 
how information was collected from across the hospital, and how it was managed 
and utilised to enable 'organisational learning'. During this time I was also given 
two small "guided tours" of the hospital and introduced to other individuals, 'key 
informants' and departments whose work related to issues of clinical risk and error, 
including the Medical Director, the manager of Medical Devices, the litigation 
officer and the managers for Infection Control. 
It was through these initial observations and discussions that the Clinical Risk 
Management Committee was identified as constituting the hospital's main 
organisational group with direct responsibility for the management of clinical risks 
and errors. Observations were therefore arranged with this group, which normally 
convened on Wednesday afternoons between Spm and 7pm on a monthly basis. 
These observations commenced in March 2001 where I made a small presentation to 
discuss the research and acquire consent. After this initial meeting observations 
continued with the Committee from August 2001 until January 2002, totalling six 
focussed observations that generated over 12 hours of data. After a break from the 
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observations to enable reflection and prelirrilnary data analysis a senes of three 
further committee observations were conducted during the summer of 2002 in order 
to clarify interesting and emergent themes. In addition, following are-organisation 
of the hospital's committee structure a new Incident Reporting Steering Group was 
introduced in the winter of 2002 and I attend three of these meetings into 2003. Like 
the Clinical Risk Management Comrrilttee these generally lasted about two hours 
and occurred monthly. The observations with this group enabled me to understand 
the changing function of the hospital's comrrilttees, but also it enabled me to provide 
initial feedback about the data collected during the fieldwork. In total thirteen 
committee meetings were observed during the course of the study. 
The observations with Clinical Risk Management Committee and then the Incident 
Reporting Steering Group provided me with greater insight into the corporate and 
managerial approach to error management, providing descriptive information about 
their systems, along with revealing much about the interactions between medical and 
managerial groups. For example, in these comrrilttee meetings "problem" issues 
were discussed providing me with insight into the way in which different individuals 
and occupational groups approached and constructed these "problems". The 
observations also revealed how the hospital was adapting its systems in line with the 
new policy framework. To explore these issues further interviews were conducted 
with the members of this committee and those working in the Department of 
Corporate Affairs. 
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On a reflexive note it is important to recognise my role within this social setting. It 
was generally the case that I was not involved in the processes of the committee and 
due to time pressures of the meeting there was little opportunity for me to raise 
questions during or after the meeting. This was most probably due to my role as an 
outsider and the lack of technical knowledge that I possessed. Furthermore, this role 
often prohibited my inclusion in many of the small discussions that took place after 
the meeting. In consequence, while these observations provided me with insight, I 
was not able to probe or further explore the social setting. Questions or issues that I 
believed important were therefore addressed during the interview phase of the 
research. As discussed earlier, my observational field role was on the periphery of 
the social setting and could be described as 'observer as participant' (Adler and 
Adler 1984, Gold 1969), except on the occasions where I was asked to provide 
feedback to the committee. 
Recording the data 
Despite the open and grounded nature of observations, Burgess (1990) suggests that 
it is important to structure the collection of data to ensure that the selection and 
interpretation of information is systematic and focussed. Throughout the 
observations data was organised through standardised topics that were central to the 
themes of the research. The use of such themes enabled me to more easily categorise 
information during the analysis of the data, these comprised: 
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• The presentation of error 
• The interpretation of error 
• The discussion of error 
• The analysis of error 
• The management of error 
• The general function of the committee 
• Participation within the committee 
• Communication within the committee 
• Decision-making within the committee 
• Conflict and harmony within the committee 
• Descriptive information about the management processes 
• Accounts of the hospital directorates 
Alongside these themes, general descriptive information, observations and thoughts 
were noted to ensure that any novel or grounded findings were recorded. The 
collection of data involved hand written notes within a fieldwork journal and then 
using a word processor these were "written-up" electronically within a day of the 
observation, therefore enabling me to reflect upon the observations and make initial 
interpretations (and also ensure that the notes were legible for future reference). 
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Data collection: interviews 
Interviews have become an extensively used method for sociological research 
(Burgess 1990) and their scope ranges from tightly structured preconceived 
questions to more dynamic flexible conversations. Central to the interview is the 
idea that the spoken communication between respondent and researcher can reveal 
something of the world in which the respondent inhabits and experiences, gathering 
their unique views, descriptions and accounts and then placing these within the 
wider social and interpretative context. However, debate exists as to the actual 
merits of using interviews as a method of social research. Silverman (2001) suggests 
that caution is needed in interpreting interview data as "factual" or "authentic"; 
rather it is necessary to appreciate that interview data arises through a particular 
social interaction (between researcher and the researched) and as such the 
information is context bound within this relationship. Furthermore, Miller and 
Glassner (1997) point out that the language and format of interviews fracture 
individual "stories". However, through recognising the particular symbolic 
interaction of the interview and then interpreting the data or "stories" within this 
light, it is possible to avoid the positivistic or "romantic" trap of presuming that 
interview data is authentic. If it is assumed that individuals construct their world 
then interviews are a particular form of reconstruction with the researcher. 
Building on sHch ideas Mason (1996) has outlined the characteristics of qualitative 
semi-structured interviews. She describes them as relatively informal where the 
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relationship between the respondent and researcher is more akin to a discussion; they 
are thematic and topic-centred; and the relationship between the researched and the 
researcher is central to the data collection process. Several issues must therefore be 
addressed with conducting interviews. First, the informality of the "conversation" 
means that it is extremely important to establish a sound relationship between the 
'researcher' and the 'researched' whereby information is forthcoming and discussion 
is possible. This could include a familiarity with the setting of the research or the 
language used by the participant. Burgess (1990) suggests understanding these wider 
social characteristics can be done through preliminary observations or discussions. 
Second, while the interview can be interpreted as a form of conversation it important 
to ensure that the information acquired relates to the demands of the study. The 
semi-structured interview should, therefore, be guided by a range of relevant topics 
or themes that focus discussion but provide sufficient freedom for ideas to be 
explored. Finally, it is important for the social researcher to appreciate and 
acknowledge their own active role in the interview process and be reflexive in the 
interpretation of data and recognise their own unique contribution in the 
"conversation" (Mason 1996). 
Conducting interviews 
For this study, semi-structured interviews were chosen as the primary method of 
collecting qualitative data. As suggested above interviews were conducting with 
those working within the management centre of the hospital and professionals 
201 
working within the hospital directorates. Following the observations, inter\'iews 
were conducted with members of the Department of Corporate Affairs and members 
of the Clinical Risk Management Committee. Interviews conducted during phase 
one of the fieldwork enabled me to explore the organisational context of the hospital 
in greater depth, and clarify the information gathered through observations and 
develop a more focussed approach to the research. In essence the interviews were 
"conversations with purpose" (Burgess 1990) rather than a scripted series of 
questions. Nevertheless a thematic guide was developed for the interviews to ensure 
that the information related to the theoretical questions. These topics comprise: 
• The concept and construction of error - how is error interpreted or defined? Are 
errors individual, group or organisational problems? How do individual 
meanings compare to 'official' or 'quasi-official' messages on error; and how do 
issues of blame and responsibility permeate the interpretation? 
• Responsibility and error - how do respondents understand and give meaning to 
issues of responsibility and blame. In particular how do issues of responsibility 
and ownership change the way individuals act in terms of the first person, second 
person and third person. 
• Reporting errors - Given that the new government initiatives for managmg 
medical errors is predicated on the reporting processes, it was necessary to 
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• 
appreciate how reporting systems operate within the case-study and how these 
were regarded by staff. 
The role of the Clinical Risk Management Committee - What did respondents 
see as the function of this committee, what role did they and others play in its 
processes and how does it operate in relation to other organisational systems. 
• The analysis of errors - How do individual and the committee go about 
understanding the causes of error, does this reflect policy expectations or does it 
rely upon alternate systems? What does the analysis of error mean to the 
interpretation of error? 
• Organisational relationships - What is the relationship between the committee 
and other hospital systems? How does the organisational context of the hospital 
impact upon the management of errors? 
After interviews were conducted with staff members of the Department of Corporate 
Affairs and the Clinical Risk Management Committee, further interviews were then 
conducted with participants working at the directorate level of the hospital (as 
discussed above). Rather than replicating all the themes used with those at the 
managerial level, the phase one interview data was reviewed to develop a more 
focussed interview structure that would more appropriately address the theoretical 
demands of the research and explore emerging findings. In particular, the schedule 
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for the phase two interviews focussed on the alternate systems of error management 
found at the directorate level, the relationship between the directorates and the 
management level of the hospital, and the socio-cultural features of medical 
professional work. 
All the interviews commenced with a brief introduction that outlined the purposes of 
the research and addressed the ethical basis of the study. The interviews ranged in 
length between 30 minutes and 2 hours, with the average being a little over an hour. 
A major consideration when conducting interviews with medical staff was finding 
the time to fit an interview into an otherwise busy working day. On several 
occasions interviews were cancelled and re-arranged due to emergencies or extra 
pressures in the professional's work. Alternatively, doctors often arrived late for 
interviews due to clinics or meetings "running over". These pressures meant that the 
interviews had to be flexible in order to adapt to medical working patterns. For 
example, with one interview the participant said that they had an hour available and 
then part way through the meeting they received a telephone call informing them 
that they were needed "on the ward"; on this occasion the meeting was re-arranged, 
but on other occasions, especially it had been a difficult interview to arrange, the 
interview would be condensed to gather the most relevant information. 
Unfortunately this also means that with these interviews the opportunity for me to 
explore issues in greater depth was not always available and the inter\'iew took a 
more structured style. 
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Recording the data 
All participants were asked during the interview introduction about the use of a tape 
recorder for data collection and they were re-assured about the ethical basis of the 
study. Generally doctors were accommodating and did not see any problem with this 
at all. On some occasions a participant would comment "this is for your ears only", 
suggesting that they thought somebody else would have access to the tape recording. 
When such doubts about confidentiality seemed to arise I would always reassure the 
participant about the ethical character of the research. One participant, a clinical 
governance lead, did seem rather apprehensive about the use of a tape recorder and 
to allay any concerns I gave them the controls so they could stop it when they felt 
uncomfortable. Nevertheless during all interviews, but more so during this one, 
reflective notes were also taken to identify further lines of questioning and 
interesting issues. 
The use of the tape recorder was particularly useful for capturing the contents of the 
interviews. I also used this equipment to record any after-thoughts I had during the 
course of the interview, typically in the car returning to the university. All tapes 
were marked and stored in a locked drawer at the university to ensure the safe 
storage of the data. They were then transcribed and analysed. 
While observations notes were word processed quickly after a period of fieldwork, 
the process of turning recorded data into a manageable electronic format took a 
considerable amount of time and effort. Typically an interview would be transcribed 
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using a word processor within a week of an interview; however, if more then four 
interviews took place in a week then this process would take longer. All the tape 
recordings were transcribed verbatim using specialised transcribing equipment. 
Although this stage of the research process is sometimes completed with the 
assistance of a specialised audio-typist, I used this opportunity to maintain my 
familiarity with the data and to identify emergent themes from the data. In order to 
distinguish between the various occupational groups involved in the research, 
especially in the context of data extraction and quotation, the participants were 
classified as either 'D' for doctors, 'M' for corporate managers, and 'R' for 
directorate level risk managers or quality leads. These identifications can be seen in 
the use of quotations in the following three chapters. 
The transcribed interviews were all anonymously logged on computer with a 
separate encrypted file containing individual identities. These files where then stored 
on the university mainframe and a back-up floppy disk. The original tapes and hard 
copies of the transcripts were stored in a secure drawer with other documents 
gathered in the study. 
Data collection: documentary sources 
Mason (1996) points out that when usmg documentary data it is important to 
account for how this information is used and how it is 'read'. For example, are 
documents used as literal accounts of the social world that have descriptive quality, 
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or are they used interpretatively to show how certain ideas and assumptions are 
represented through documents? In this research hospital documents have been 
analysed and explored for both purposes. Initially, they were used to engage with the 
wider organisational and managerial context of the hospital, revealing systems and 
procedures, but they were also used to explore the way in which those who produce 
such documents are contributing to the construction of the hospital. 
Along with the collection of observational and interview data I also made use of 
documentary sources to provide contextual information about the hospital. At the 
outset of the fieldwork this involved examining the hospital's website to identify any 
major issues or developments that may have a bearing on the research. It was also 
found that the hospital placed a substantial amount of its official documentation on 
"the web", such as the agendas and minutes from Trust Board Meetings, the results 
of Organisational Research, Trust Strategy Plans, and other performance related 
information. 
During the fieldwork process I also requested any information that the hospital 
thought might assist the study, this included all strategy documents for clinical risk 
management, reporting procedures and incident forms. I also collected documents 
opportunistically during the course of the study, for example if participants referred 
to a particular hospital form, letter or statistical summary I would then request a 
copy. During the observations with the Clinical Risk Management Committee I was 
also included in the e-mail distribution of the agendas and minutes for this group. 
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This provided a useful source of information to support my field notes, and provided 
an interesting alternate account of the events that I had observed. Electronic 
documents were stored with other observation records and interview transcripts, 
while paper records were manually examined and electronic notes were made to 
reflect their contents. 
Data management and analysis 
The analysis of qualitative fieldwork data should not be considered as an after-
thought to the research process, but should form an integral part of a complete 
experience; a continual process reflecting Coffey and Atkinson's (1996: 6) 
suggestion that: 
" ... the process of analysis should not be seen as a distinct stage of the 
research; rather it is a reflexive activity that should inform data collection, 
writing, further data collection and so forth. Analysis is not, then, the last 
phase of the research process." 
The constant analysis of qualitative data, in particular "funnelling" (Silverman 2001) 
has been central to the development of the research questions, the selection of the 
case study, the identification of respondents and the appreciation of emergent 
themes. When accounting for this process it is possible to draw upon Baptiste's 
(200 I) discussion of three common stages in qualitative data analysis. The first is 
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concerned with "defining the analysis" or deciding upon the goals of the analysis 
and how best to interpret and convey information. This relates to the theoretical and 
phi losophical context of the research and assumptions about ontology and 
epistemology. Second, data analysis is concerned with "classifying" the data through 
"tagging" or coding sections of information and developing theoretically and 
empirically relevant themes. The third stage is concerned with the development of 
ideas, stories or theories; going beyond the identification of trends or occurrences 
and developing an account of 'why'. Although this research project did not follow 
such as format prescriptively, with much of the initial data being analysed through 
reflective notation, it is still possible to identify and describe such stages within this 
study. 
The analytical framework 
To the objectivist or realist the world is composed of facts that can be empirically 
described to portray a scientific account of the real world (Knorr-Cetina 1981). 
However, it has been argued that the pursuit for scientific "truth" is in itself a 
subjective and interpretive act (Feyerabend 1975, Kuhn 1970) and what becomes 
important, particular for the social sciences, is to understand how the social world is 
constructed through individual and social perception and interpretation (Berger and 
Luckman 1991). As Turner (1999) puts it, the logic of constructivism is that 
something is constructed as a "fact" through the representation and eventual sharing 
of meaning, but the meaning and appreciation of these events occurs through social 
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and cultural processes. As shown in chapter four this research is concerned \\'ith 
exploring how such ideas relate to the social construction of medical errors. 
However, I am cautious not to assume an excessively post-structuralist or relativistic 
position where all existence and ontology is located within human subjectivity 
(Velody and Williams 1999). To re-introduce the idea of ontology consideration is 
given to the critical realist position (Bhaskar 1979, Bhaskar and Lawson 1998), 
which has attempted to address the excesses of post-structuralism and the rejection 
of ontology (Scott 1998). One of the fundamental principles of this approach is the 
distinction between what is real and what we perceive to be real. Outhwaite (1998) 
describes this problem of ontology as being concerned with intransitive reality, that 
which is real and independent of human understanding, and transitive reality, those 
dependant concepts and theories that are developed to understand reality. In 
consequence it is argued that there is a "real" or objective world, but this can only be 
understood in a dependent fashion as it relies on human perception and interpretation 
in order to make sense of it. 
In the development of these ideas I am also making certain assumptions about the 
character of society in terms of action and structure, particular focussed around 
ideas, knowledge and culture. On the one hand I believe that perception and 
meaning does indeed belong to the individual, but they are reflective of and 
contributory to social groups norms and customs, and in turn they are reflective of 
and contributory to wider social structures, in particular discourses of knowledge 
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and communication. In this way, the social world is seen as "stratified" (Layder 
1998) with the dimensions of agency and structures existing simultaneously and 
inter-dependently (I appreciate there are enormous debates on this subject, e.g. 
Archer 1982, Giddens 1984, Lopez 2000). What is interesting for my research is the 
interplay between medical discourses at the level of social knowledge but also at the 
level of medical work and culture; how they come together to influence perception 
and interpretation and ultimately shape the meaning and construction of reality. 
This is the main theoretical and analytical basis for this research and together with 
the methodological approach discussed earlier constitutes the underlying basis of the 
study. The concern with meaning has been developed from the basic premises of 
Weber's verstehen: understating the meanings that people assign to their actions and 
their relationships (Freund 1968), through to addressing the everyday character of 
social meaning in the workplace (Garfinkel 1967, Heritage 1984, Miller 1997). 
Miller (1997) suggests that ethnomethodology is concerned with various 
interpretative procedures to uncover the "everyday" and routine classifications of 
experience and meaning. He refers to four aspects of such analysis in the 
construction of the social world. The first concerns the descriptive practices found in 
statements through which behaviour is understood. The second involves the implicit 
assumptions and values that underpin behaviour and communication. The third 
refers to the reflexivity of the social context that frames or assigns distinct roles and 
relationships. Finally, there is concern to understand change and the instability of 
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meanmg. Understanding the social construction of the social world therefore 
involves engaging with these interpretative processes. 
In the processes of data analysis and theoretical development I have wanted to 
ensure that the data itself provides the basis of analysis, interpretation and theory; as 
opposed to getting the data to fit theory. Throughout the research, from the 
development of questions, selection of participants and the collection of field data, I 
have been appreciative of emergent findings and the relationship between data and 
my own interpretations and inclinations. The techniques of grounded theory (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967) have therefore been a methodological influence upon the research 
particularly during the development of the study and the processes of coding, re-
coding, comparison and the development of 'types'. As a methodological approach 
it aims to remedy the problems of grand theory by promoting theory 'discovery', 
particularly through the close analysis of empirical data. As such it has been 
popularly associated with developments in ethnography and symbolic interactionism 
and can be identified as a major contribution to qualitative research methods 
(Charmaz 2000). As an underlying methodology it is concerned with moving from 
data to theory, and as a method or means of research it is associated with openness 
to the variety and detail of the social world. Its practical components are associated 
with theoretical sampling, constant comparison of data, the development of 
empirically based codes and themes, and then the development of theory from the 
data (Glaser and Strauss 1967). The methods of grounded theory have therefore been 
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central to the processes of data collection and analysis, specifically the grounding of 
analysis and interpretation in themes and codes that have emerged from the data. 
However, this study is also concerned to understand the relationship between social 
meaning and discourses. Silverman (1997) has argued that the ethnographic 
exploration of the social world and the interpretative analysis of meaning and action 
should be enhanced with an appreciation of the role of language, communication and 
social discourses. However, this raises serious epistemological dilemmas, 
specifically, how to reconcile the realism of grounded theory and ethnography 
whereby data provides the basis of social theory, with constructivism where meaning 
and theory is subjective, interpretative and discursive. Hammersley (1989, 1992) 
believes this dilemma resides in the dual commitment to realism and relati vism 
typical of ethnography and qualitative research. From this perspective, grounded 
theory can be seen as operating on the assumption that empirical data represents 
something real about the social world and this data can be used to developed realist 
social theory. Alternatively, Charmaz (2000) suggests that the application of 
grounded theory requires the recognition that the social world is characterised by 
multiple realities, where knowledge is mutually created and the interpretation of 
meaning is central. Despite the different epistemological perspectives of realism and 
constructivism, Costain Schou and Hewison (1996) suggest that grounded theory is 
implicitly amenable to accommodate these variations because it is rooted in the 
sociological study of meaning and interpretation, such as symbolic interactionism, 
where recognising the processes of social construction is the core methodological 
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and theoretical concern. It is therefore important to appreciate that the use of 
grounded theory with consideration of social discourses means that theoretical 
developments are not just reflective of the data, but they emerge through the 
interpretation of the researcher as well as the researched. Data analysis is therefore 
characterised by a 'flip-flop' between data and interpretation (Bailyn 1977) and 
theories can be characterised as 'generated' rather than 'discovered'. In 
consequence, data analysis not only provides theory from the data, but also theory of 
the data. 
For this research, grounded theory has therefore provided the basis of data collection 
and analysis, where specific concern has been given to the emergent themes and 
properties of the data from which interpretation and theoretical development has 
occurred. It is appreciated that these processes are interpretative and the resultant 
analysis is not in any sense realist. Nevertheless, through the use of grounded theory 
as a method of data analysis, especially constant comparison and thematic coding, it 
has been possible to identify the interpretative processes underpinning the social 
meaning of error and how these constructions influence social action and control. 
Moreover, by generating and reflecting upon an account of these social processes, 
the data can be indicative of the cultures and discourses that shape social 
interpretation and meaning. In this way the methods of grounded theory, can 
underpin the discursive analysis of text and talk, through the grounding of themes 
within the data, therefore enabling the identification and interpretation of discourses 
and generation of theory (Silverman 2001). 
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Fairclough (1993, 1995) discusses the analysis of discourse along thee lines. The 
first is at the textual level and is concerned with the content of communication in 
terms of delivery and grammar: the 'what's' and the 'how's'. The second dimension 
is the level of discursive practice and is concerned to link the textual features to 
social practices: how patterns of language and communication interact and coalesce 
within specific historical and contextual situations and how local discourses are 
shaped by wider social structures and visa versa. The third dimension is that of the 
social practice and is concerned with the social organisation of situations, 
institutions and social structures in which discourse occurs. It is the latter of these 
approaches that has had an influence upon this research. Through the identification 
of 'grounded' or empirically-based themes this study has been concerned to explore 
how text and talk construct particular social worlds that buttress specific forms of 
social action and control (Prior 1997). 
Together these different methodological and analytical perspectives have been 
influential in the development of this qualitative research. Each has been used to 
inform the decisions I have taken in terms of conducting the research and also in the 
processes of analysis. 
215 
Data management: computer software 
One of the major decisions taken in this study was the use of computer software to 
assist in the management and analysis of qualitative data. Through discussion \\ith 
peers, supervisors and reading the literature, it appeared that there is considerable 
debate about the merits of such technology. Implicitly this seems to centre on the 
appropriateness and ability of computer packages to meaningfully analyse 
qualitative data. Although it is the case that computer packages can indeed 
contribute to theory building, issue must be taken with the view that this technology 
in some diminishes the quality of analysis. An analogy can be drawn with the 
traditional tools of coding and thematic development. Instead of using highlighter 
pens and record cards to cut and order interview data into codes and then themes, the 
basic function of a computer package is merely to replicate this function; in other 
words, the selection, coding, grouping and ordering of data is "managed" through a 
computer package. Underlying both techniques is the person who selects, interprets 
and generates -ideas from the data. Nevertheless several "myths" still seem to 
surround the use of computer software (Bong 2002). 
For this research several trial and demonstration packages were tried out b e f o r ~ ~
deciding on which package to use, including N*UDIST, Ethnograph and Atlas fi. 
From this selection I found that Atlas ti was extremely easy to use. My primary use 
of this software was the storage and coding of the various sources of qualitative data 
that I had gathered through the fieldwork. This included observation, interview 
documentary notes, interview transcripts and electronic hospital documents. The 
software enabled me to store these on a computer in such a way that enabled easy 
retrieval and accessJ,- electronic coding and cross-referencing. The use of the 
computer software in no way diminished my active role as the researcher, as I was 
still required to read and re-read the data, make selections and analyse the codes and 
themes from the data. 
Codes, themes and types 
Once the data had been transferred from physical items, e.g. documents, notes and 
interview transcripts, into the computer package I then set about coding or tagging 
(Baptiste 2001). With reference to the above discussion of grounded theory, the 
processes of analysis were primarily concerned with scrutinising the data for 
emergent, common and uncommon sections of data. During this process I identified 
information that resonated with the theoretical and empirical agenda of the study, 
and other emergent findings. In line with grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967), 
this evolved into the development of grounded codes that were reflective of the data 
and also of relevance to the research. It was during this process that extracts from the 
data were tagged and labelled with codes that referred to their theoretical and 
empirical relevance. This process took a considerable amount of time and involved 
extensive reviewing and revision; eventually over one hundred codes were identified 
covering over 1000 pieces of data and quotes (see appendix one). In order to 
empirically and theoretically justify each code a brief descriptive account was 
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produced to identify the basis of interpretation and selection, the boundaries of the 
code and the relationship with other codes. In line with grounded theory, each code 
was constantly fe-appraised in the light of new data and the codes were compared 
for internal consistencies and external boundaries. In consequence, it was common 
for each code to pass through a series of phases. An example of code development 
can be shown with the initial code "Management" which was used to refer to 
instances where participants talked about hospital management in general, this code 
was then re-coded along several lines to capture the depth of detail with which 
respondents talked about hospital management, including "management -
expertise", "management - roles", "management - control". 
Once all of the observational, interview and documentary sources of data had been 
coded and re-coded in this way the computer package was used to cross-reference 
and compare between codes. For example, the programme enables the researcher to 
sort codes on the basis of AND, NOT, WITH, WITHIN and OR. It was therefore 
possible for me to search for relationships between codes, for example, there were 
several different sub-codes for "reporting" (in terms of incident reporting) which 
were cross referenced with codes such as "directorate variations" (talk of 
peculiarities and variation in hospital directorates) and "risk management" 
(reference to the hospital system). Through the processes of coding, re-coding and 
cross-referencing the data was categorised or themed with reference to the data and 
how they related to the broader theoretical demands of the study. 
The anal ysis of data is often described as a tree where the smaller branches come 
together to form a bigger branch until eventually the branches make a trunk, this can 
be seen w i t h , s . u ~ _ - c o d e s , , codes, family codes, and themes. In this way empirical data 
provides the basis for theoretical development (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Through 
this process attention was given to the theoretical justification for each stage of 
classification and like the initial definition for each code, similar descriptions were 
developed for each theme and concept. By linking these codes together the 
conceptual framework of the analysis emerged and the thesis took shape. The 
analysed data was grouped into three themes that reflected those developed from thL' 
literature and policy, under the general headings of "interpretation of error", 
"incident reporting" and "management practices". 
Typology construction 
One f e ~ t u r e e of the analysis that requires greater attention is the development of 
"types" from the d a t a ~ ~ this can be seen in chapter four. Types have a long history in 
sociology (Weber 1992) and Kluge (2000) suggests that they are used to understand 
complex social realities. Types can be used to highlight internal features or describe 
the relationship between social phenomena. When developing the typology in this 
research attention was given to the theoretical debates surrounding typology 
construction. This consists of several stages, first specify the analytical basis of the 
types, e.g. groups, behaviours, or attitudes; second, group together the relevant 
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empirical findings or codes; third specify their attributes, boundaries and 
relationship to minimise overlap and confusion; fourth, characterise the distinction 
between _ ~ y p e s s but also their meaningful relationship and combination (Bailey 199.+. 
Kluge 2000, Strauss 1987). 
In this study it was found that one level of medical interpretation could be analysed 
in terms of what the doctors regarded as error causality. I was therefore interested to 
identify internal consistencies and clear boundaries between these different 
interpretations and constructions of medical error. The resultant typology consists of 
types that refer to the cause of error in terms of the specific aspects of medical work. 
Taken together the relationship between the types can be seen in terms of the health 
care process and the organisation of the hospital. This typology was developed to 
clarify the way in which doctors interpreted the technical basis of errors in terms of 
expert medical knowledge. 
Data, discourses and theory 
Throughout the processes of analysis, coding and typology construction, I was 
concerned to relate the talk of participants and texts of documentation to wider 
social knowledge, practice, cultures or discourses. As indicated above, text and talk 
are treated as narrati ves that represent particular constructions of the social world 
(Miller and Glassner 1997, Prior 1997) and in doing so serve to promote particular 
realities that include routines or preferences for social control and power. 
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In line wi th Fai rclough' s (1995) third aspect of discourse analysis I was concerneJ 
to link the social meaning of medical error to social and organisational arrangements 
for err.or control, whilst simultaneously reflecting on the influence of other forms of 
social knowledge. It is important to acknowledge that the transition from 'grounded' 
codes and themes to the theoretical appreciation of discourses requires an explicit 
'interpretative leap': while the analysis is based on empirical findings I am also 
aware that I have imposed my own theoretical assumptions upon the data to develop 
an account of discourses and a theoretical contribution to the study of medical 
professionalism and managerialism in the NHS. 
Summary: using the data 
The analytical process of this thesis should not be seen as a distinctive phase that 
was isolated from data collection. Nevertheless there were certain stages of the 
process that were conducted after data collection and interview transcription. The 
initial analytical stages were all recorded within my field work journal and mainly 
consisted of reflective accounts of the hospital management processes, while the use 
of computer software greatly assisted the latter phases of analysis, particularly in 
terms of coding and cross-referencing observational, interview and documentary 
data. It is important to emphasise that through these various procedures there has 
been a constant process of reflecting upon the data, and searching out new ideas and 
concepts. While the following three chapters attempt to present the data in a manner 
that enables it to "speak for itself' I am acutely aware that I ha\'e been subjective in 
the selection of quotes, themes and debates. Furthermore, I am aware of the 
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epistemological dilemmas associated with reconciling realist and relativistic forms 
of qualitative analysis. Besides presenting all the data in its entirety there is little 
prospect of avoiding my interpretative influence. This is something that I believe to 
be crucial to this thesis, because this demonstrates that through the research process, 
including the analysis, it is my interpretation and beliefs that have shaped the 
development of the research and the writing of the thesis. 
Writing the thesis 
When thinking about writing this chapter I examined other accounts of the research 
process and one of the most interesting observations was the lack of attention given 
to the "writing-up" process. This is surprising given that it is this writing that 
conveys the doctoral research. Furthermore, it seems to suggest that it is in someway 
detached from the research and the analysis. However, for my research, I have 
continually kept records of activities and decisions, from readings and findings, 
along with drafts and re-drafts of sections, chapters and arguments. The writing 
process therefore occurred throughout the doctoral process, from justifying research 
methods, literature reviews, conference papers and eventually this thesis. I believe 
this has been crucial to the final thesis that you now hold. Firstly, it has prevented 
me from getting out of the habit of writing. Second, it has ensured that I have written 
records of the doctoral process. Third, writing has helped me to develop ideas and 
222 
arguments. And finally, I have been able to get feedback from supervisors about thc' 
direction of the research. 
As well as writing being central to the entire research process, it is also an integral to 
the analysis of data and development of codes, themes, typologies and theories. 
While data analysis used computer software and my own analytical attention, it was 
only through the process of writing-up that these ideas and findings started to take 
on some shape and form. Each of the "data chapters" was written with reference to 
the findings and the relevant literature. Each drafted chapter was then reviewed and 
re-drafted until the analysis appeared thorough. In this way writing the thesis was 
also an integral process of analysis as I was aware that it is the words that appear on 
the page that ultimately conveys the data and interpretation. 
In terms of the final thesis, the writing process commenced with the three "data 
chapters". These were written as stand alone papers including all the relevant 
literature and theoretical background, analysed finding and discussion. These were 
then re-drafted without the literature to maximise the impact of the data and limit 
theoretical distractions. The literature reviews from each of these chapters were then 
used to form the basis of the earlier chapters. This 'methods' chapter was written 
almost at the end of the process after most of the other chapters had attained their 
shape, followed by the introduction and conclusion. It is also worth noting as an 
addendum that revision and editing followed these stages of writing and had a 
substantial impact on sustaining the continuity and argument of the thesis. 
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Conclusion 
The methods chapter has mUltiple purposes. Firstly, to provide an account of the 
research process. Secondly, in giving this account the methods chapter can indicate 
to the reader how the study could be replicated. And thirdly it can be used to identify 
weaknesses with the research design or suggest future opportunities for research. 
Firstly, I have attempted to provide a transparent and honest account of my doctoral 
research process. From the development of the research project, to identifying and 
selecting participants, gathering information, analysing the data and writing the 
thesis, I hope I have adequately described and justified the decisions I have made 
and the actions I have taken. One of my main objectives in writing this account was 
not to excessively review the theoretical debates that surround research methods, 
these have been developed in numerous articles and text books, instead I have 
wanted to demonstrate that I know the essence of these debates but more importantly 
I wanted to show what I have done. 
Secondly, as Parker (2000) suggests the methods section is often seen as necessary 
to give the "impression" that the research is "replicable" and therefore in some way 
more valid and reliable (Silverman 2001). Like Parker I am somewhat sceptical 
about the extent to which qualitative research can be easily replicated and produce 
similar outcomes. I would like to think that if somebody repeated my research 
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process they would gather similar information, but I also recognise that I was central 
to the research process: I subjectively selected the information to be included in field 
notes, I was an active participant in the social interaction of the interview, and I 
interpreted and developed the data into a theoretical context. So replication is not 
necessarily the objective, but I believe transparency is important so I can 
demonstrate how the ideas expressed in this thesis originated and developed. 
Thirdly, by being transparent and honest not just to the reader but also to myself I 
can start to reflect upon the research process. There are many aspects of the research 
process that I do not feel were necessarily the most appropriate or suitable. First is 
the inclusion of only a single case-study. I feel that while the information gathered in 
the hospital was detailed and useful for making generalisations, it was not supported 
by information from another hospital site that could clarify, support or refute this 
data. Since the completion of this study I have commenced another research project 
and this has afforded me the opportunity to further explore this research within 
another hospital. Second, the access and process of selecting respondents was 
initially based around the senior management level of the hospital and I have to 
question whether through these activities I was 'pushed down' a particular route that 
suited the hospital. However, later discussions with the hospital have suggested that 
senior managers were generally unaware of the directorates within which I was 
conducting research. Third, I would have preferred the selection of respondents 
within each directorate to be more thorough. I feel now that if I had gathered more 
detailed information from within one area I would have found it easier to 
225 
substantiate this work. Conversely if I had done this then I would have included 
fewer directorates and the data would have been too narrow to appreciate the 
variations across the hospital. Fourth, in terms of gathering the information I am also 
disappointed that I did not manage to gather more observational data from the 
directorate level. I would have liked to observe clinics, ward rounds and other 
meetings. This data would have given me greater insight into the local level of the 
hospital and enable me to explore the issues that relate to error. However, due to 
practical constraints this was not possible. Despite these concerns I believe that the 
thesis provides a reasoned account of the social construction and control of medical 
errors. 
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6. The Construction of Medical Errors 
Introduction 
While the fallibility of medical work has become increasingly recognised there 
remains little clarity as to the conceptualisation of error. It is clear that there is an 
abundance of terms and concepts, for example, "error", "mistake", "untoward 
incident", "adverse event" or "adverse patient incident". As shown in chapter three 
much of the empirical research employs such terms interchangeably, or more often 
selects the term most appropriate for the audience, especially the use of "adverse 
event" instead of "error" when writing for professional and management groups. 
It was argued through chapters three and four that there is a prevailing, or even 
dominant, approach for the basis of health service research and policy. This zeitgeist 
certainly seems to shy away from the use of the term 'error' and favours some 
derivative of 'adverse event', but of more significance this approach is highly 
influenced by the popular theories of Human Factors and risk management. What 
this produces is a concept of error that is on the one hand individual and rooted in 
cognitive psychology, and on the other hand organisational and rooted in 
management theory. Of crucial epistemological relevance for this research, these 
approaches conceptualise error in realist terms seeking out an objective and 
universal definition or sometimes types. In other words a health service error i:-; said 
to be real with tangible and absolute characteristics, which are brought about by 
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cognitive lapse and poorly designed organisational systems that promote error-prone 
individual behaviour. The application of this approach in policy suggests that errors 
should be 'truthfully' reported and then through investigation the underlying causes 
can be identified. 
Developing the ideas presented previously, this chapter argues that the prevailing 
notion of error fails to recognise that the professionals charged with the duty of 
reporting 'adverse events' are also involved in social processes of recognising, 
interpreting and understanding errors. It was shown that as an alternati ve to the 
prevailing theory and policy, a socio-cultural and discursive epistemological 
approach could highlight how errors acquire their meaning in a more contingent and 
variable fashion, with reference to particular social relationships, social knowledge 
and occupational cultures. Furthermore, by adopting this approach it can be argued 
that the prevailing approach is reflective of particular discourses or 'constellations' 
of assumptions and meanings that inevitably attempt to construct the meaning of 
error in an objective and scientific guise that promotes spooific forms of social 
action. Equally, it can be proposed that other social or occupational groups make 
sense of or construct errors with references to other discourses and this could lead to 
social action that is not necessarily consistent with the expectations of policy. It is 
the contention of this thesis that medical professionals do indeed construct errors in 
a way that is divergent from that found in policy, where the meaning of error reflects 
particular socio-cultural assumptions and beliefs. Not only does this question the 
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realist basis of policy but it also offers a location for organisational power and 
resistance through the construction of error. 
This chapter provides an empirical account of the construction of medical errors. 
Initially, it is shown how managerial groups within the hospital talk about and define 
health service errors. Here it is shown that the prevailing approach found in theory 
and policy is indeed being taken up within hospital management and is informing 
the implementation of the National System. Attention is then given to the way 
doctors give meaning to and construct errors. Initially, it is argued that doctors 
attempt to 'make sense' of errors with reference to the technical features and aspects 
of their work, specifically decision-making, technical performance, equipment and 
the organisational context of medicine. However, in this discussion it is shown how 
a second dimension of interpretation characterises the medical construction of error, 
which draws on other factors that are culturally pertinent to the evaluation of 
medical errors. These secondary factors arise from and are demonstrative of the 
complexity and uncertainty inherent in medical work, \vnich serve to modify the 
initial preoccupation with technical causality and reveal a complex interpretive 
process. Together these levels of interpretation reveal that the medical construction 
of error is complex, contradictory and transient; where the discourses of bio-medical 
knowledge struggle to deal with uncertainty thereby necessitating the recognition 
and interpretation of other socially important factors. 
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Rather than representing a universal or an objective meaning, the construction of 
error is based upon distinct assumptions, priorities and constellations of knowledgL' 
For this research it is those found in psychological and management theory and also 
those found in medical knowledge and practice. Accordingly the social response to 
error is premised on these different discourses and constructions, on the one hand 
promoting greater managerial intervention into medical work and regulation, whilst 
the other reinforces the legitimacy of medical control and regulation. Although not 
recognised by the relevant policy documents, the way in which medical 
professionals recognise, interpret, give meaning and react to an error in their practice 
will influence what they report and is therefore fundamental for the success of any 
kind of risk management system. 
Human Factors in hospital management 
This section describes the way hospital managers involved in clinical risk 
management and incident reporting talked about and 'made sense' of health service 
errors, with particular reference to the utilisation of prevailing theories. It is evident 
that the principles of Human Factors are being communicated to managers through 
policy and various other promotional schemes. Over the last two-years a great deal 
of effort has been made by the NPSA to prepare and educate those working in the 
NHS about the principles of the patient safety agenda. This has included providing 
conferences, road shows and workshops as well as having a presence at other health 
care seminar programmes. Throughout these activities it is clear that there has been 
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considerable effort to encourage the occupational and managerial awareness of 
policy. This has included the promotion of the prevailing conceptualisation of error, 
or "adverse patient incident" as outlined earlier. The- -result is such that those 
responsible for risk management have been almost 'bombarded' with a particular 
epistemological orthodoxy. In consequence, it appears that the assumptions and 
expectations that underpin this perspective are being increasingly adopted within 
management practice. In other words the discourse of 'error management' is shaping 
the way health service managers understand and construct health care errors. 
The managerial understanding of error 
It was certainly evident from the way in which corporate managers within the 
hospital talked about the patient safety agenda that there was great enthusiasm for 
the health policy. This included those working within the management centre, 
closely associated with executive decision-making for the entire hospital and also 
those at the local directorate level with risk management responsibility (see chapter 
five for an account of the hospital structure). Generally there was great "hope" that if 
fully implemented the National System could "make real change in the NBS". 
Mimicking the messages of theory and policy one manager said that: 
"People don't mean to make mistakes, the NHS is full of good people, its 
normally other things that lead to the mistakes ... being rushed off your feet 
and not having time to do things properly" [Participant/!\1anager 1]. 
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Furthermore, it was clear that the concept of error developed in policy was having an 
influence upon the way in which managers and admiai-strators within the hospital's 
'corporate centre' thought and talked about mistakes. For example, there was 
appreciation for the distinction between active and latent errors, the need for more 
thorough "root cause analysis" and the role that poor organisational systems can 
have in failing to protect against errors: 
"And then there's one poor soul at the end of that chain who gets it wrong. 
Traditionally that one person might have been disciplined, sacked, made to 
feel really bad. And actually when you investigate them one of those other 
processes, chains or links, or what ever you want to call them has gone 
wrong, or all of them might of gone wrong, or one or two essential parts of 
the chain have failed." [PlMl] 
"Its like the Swiss-cheese model, thi,ags sometimes slip through when the 
system doesn't work well" [P/M3]. 
The observations within the Clinical Risk Management Committee also highlighted 
the uptake of the prevailing theoretical position. As the fieldwork progressed it was 
clearly noticeable that this Conunittee was becoming increasingly concerned with 
the activities of the NPSA and the need to take the policy seriously in preparation of 
national implementation. [n particular, the idea of 'root cause analysis' was rising up 
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the managerial agenda, being pushed by those directly responsible for risk 
management, demonstrating the absorption of the active/latent distinction. When 
asked about the principles and application of r06t--t;aUse analysis, members of the 
committee demonstrated the growing influence of the prevailing approach on the 
way they thought about error and also how they recognised the need for 
organisational development in line with policy. 
"And you know with OW AM [An Organisation with a Memory] and the 
Patient Safety Agency we're meant to do root cause analysis of each error, 
which is great and so you should and people are trying to do that to analyse 
errors in more detail now, so the person left holding the parcel when the 
music stops isn't the only person that's considered that had some 
responsibility within the process" [PIM6]. 
From theory to practice: implementing the prevailing concept 
As the fieldwork progressed it was observed in several management meetings that 
the hospital was attempting to apply and promote the prevailing concept of health 
service error, particularly through the development of a set of universal definitions 
and in support of changes to the incident reporting system. This included new 
induction and "training-days" for members of staff, and the distribution of a glossary 
of terms and handbook to each hospital directorate. Building on RIDDOR (Health 
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and Safety Executive 1995) and reflecting the language of policy, the hospital's 
documents defined an untoward event as: 
"An untoward incident is an event which gives rise to, or has the potential to 
produce, unexpected or unwanted effects involving the safety of patients, 
users or other persons" (source: Incident Reporting Training Document) 
Furthermore, this training document contained a list of examples to elaborate upon 
this definition providing staff with further guidance about what constitutes an 
adverse event. Along with its descriptions of accidents, violent conduct, general 
dangerous incidents and near misses, specific attention was also given to clinical 
incidents. These were described as: 
"Error or mishap m clinical procedure, incorrect prescription or 
administration of drugs, absconding patients, self-inflicted injuries, incidents 
leading to increased length of ~ a y , , or unplanned readmission, sharps injury" 
(source: Incident Reporting Training Document) 
This demonstrates the implicit influence of prevailing policies and theories on 
managerial ideas about error and the desire of managers to implement policy and 
prepare the hospital for the introduction of new error management procedures. It was 
commonly observed in the management meetings that those responsible for clinical 
risk management were unsure about the best ways to develop these strategies and 
encourage the participation of hospital staff in accordance with policy. It \\'as 
anticipated that the production and dissemination of standardised definitions and 
practical examples would provide staff with-=-the necessary guidance and contribute 
towards their compliance. This not only shows that managers were responding to 
specific recommendations of policy with regards to standardised definitions, but 
they are also attempting to 'educate' or influence the interpretation of other 
occupational groups within the hospital. 
Questioning the meaning of error 
However, it is misleading to suggest that all corporate and risk managers in the 
hospital were unquestioning in their endorsement of Human Factors and policy, It 
appeared that there was a significant difference between corporate managers and 
those risk managers working at the directorate or local level of the hospital. [n 
particular at the local level there was seemingly less exposure to national policy and 
in consequence there was less awareness of its principles or eagerness to make 
change. For example, there seemed to be a degree of uncertainty and scepticism 
about the policy and a suggestion that a "tight" definition of error could potentially 
neglect the subtleties, peculiarities and "realities" of clinical work. One respondent 
summed up this feeling with a general rejection of the definitions found in policy. 
However, others appeared more measured and suggested that the definition of error 
and the development of error management needed to have a degree of practical 
expertise to reOect the realities of delivering health care. 
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"There isn't for me a clear statement or definition that covers all that could 
possibly go on in a c o m p l e ~ ~ ~ g ~ ! 1 i s a t i o n n ... I think whilst we're trying to 
come up with a catch-all definition we wont get the right lessons learnt and 
the right reporting" [P/M3]. 
"Essential to that is clinical knowledge and being able to interpret theory into 
clinical practice, so you have got to have some understanding ... of what it 
actually means." [P/Risk Lead18] 
Despite such reservations it was found that the patient safety policy agenda was 
having an increasing influence on the management of clinical risks throughout the 
layers of the hospital. This was stronger at the 'corporate' level where there was an 
immediate responsibility for the translation and implementation of policy within the 
hospital, but even at the local directorate level it was evident that the 'spirit' of 
policy was increasingly b e i ~ ~ a?sorbed, where many risk managers or clinical 
governance leaders saw Human Factors as a slight variation of their own 'common 
sense' understanding of error. 
Summary: a prevailing concept of error? 
As shown in chapters three and four, the conceptualisation of error advocated in 
policy is founded on particular psychological theories of error. From the interviews 
236 
and observations with hospital managers, it was clear that these ideas are 
increasingly shaping the way in which these actors conceptualise error and arc 
coming to terms with the implementation of policy_ It is difficult to know whether 
there has been any radical change in the way managers think about mistakes, and 
given that proportionally fewer managers work in the hospital it was difficult to 
acquire a substantial perspective, even though they are primarily invested with the 
responsibility for risk management. Nevertheless it is shown in the following 
chapters that the hospital managers with responsibility for quality are indeed being 
influenced by the ideas found in policy and are acting with reference to the 
prevailing conceptualisation of error and the need to introduce the National System. 
Doctors in search of causality and certainty 
The interviews revealed that doctors typically 'made sense' of errors through 
complex interpretative and social processes. These were characterised by distinct 
and often contradictory p h a s e ~ ~ that contributed to the medical construction of error. 
The initial line of reasoning was commonly concerned with searching out certainty 
and 'reason', specifically doctors tried to understand the cause, or in medical 
parlance the aetiology, of an error. It was through ascertaining hOB' and why 
something happened that the medical meaning of error emerged. However, as it will 
be shown later, doctors were rarely content with merely identifying causality and the 
further interpretation of error seemed to question and de-stabilise these i n ~ a l l
concepts of error. 
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Nevertheless, through this initial search for causality doctors appeared to draw on 
their acquired knowledge ~ . J } ~ ! i ; _ _ expertise about the human body, disease and 
medicine. It was this bio-medical discourse that guided the recognition and 
interpretation of errors in medical work, and frequently this was manifest through 
the identification of distinct 'types' of error, or to be more precise 'causes of error'. 
Although this typology (see figure 6.1) resonates with other studies of medical error, 
in particular Bosk (1979) and Neale (1995), it is distinguished by the characteristic 
interpretative struggle for understanding from the perspective of doctors working in 
health care. Although Bosk's work equally draws on the constructed and negotiated 
realm of medical work his focus resides in the teaching dynamic of surgery; and 
Neale's account is presented as 'real' identification of error types and fails to 
recognise any domains of interpretation. 
The first constructed causal type of error identified through this research can be 
termed medical "decision-making" and refers to the way in which doctors gather 
. ~ ~ ~... 
information, come to terms with the patient's complaint and develop care plans; 
hence it is most often associated with diagnosis. The second type is termed 
"technical performance" and is associated with carrying out medical procedures, 
such as administering a test or drug. The third category is concerned with the 
"equipment" used in health care that ideally assists or enables medical decision-
making and performance. The fourth type of causality refers to the "organisational 
systems" that structure the work of doctors and the delivery of health care. These 
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four themes or types predominated in the way doctors attempted to make sense ()j 
errors in their work. 
However, in the search for causality doctors also highlighted the inter-dependence 
between these types. It was evident that decision-making errors could have a 
consequential influence on technical performance, while equipment and 
organisational systems could also influence the way in which doctors went about 
making decisions or treating their patients. These directions of causal influence (see 
figure 6.1) are also reflective of the medical search for causality. 
However, it is misleading to suggest that the medical search for certainty and 
causality led to the construction of unproblematic and stable types of error. It was 
evident that the medical interpretation of error was frequently confused and 
contradictory, where doctors almost 'battled' or 'struggled' with the complexity and 
uncertainty of their work and the mistakes that could arise. It was clear in the way 
doctors talked about error that the initial interpretation became unstable and this led 
to further layers of interpretation. These secondary issues are addressed later; 
initially attention is given to the search for causality and certainty, and the primary 
types of error. 
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Figure 6.1 Typology of initial medical construction of error aetiology 
Arrows of influence 
Decision making Technical Performance 
Equipment 
Organisational systems 
Decision-making errors 
The "decision-making" category is most frequently associated with issues of 
diagnosis and planning patient care. Diagnosis is a fundamental stage in the care 
process; it involves gathering a range of information, from appreciating the patient's 
complaint, understanding the patient's history, making preliminary investigations 
through observation, and utilising a range of sophisticated scientific tests to assess 
the possible -ci1aracter of the patient's ailment or disease. In the first instance the 
doctor must make decisions with regards to what information is required and what 
tests to request. Once this information is gathered the physician must then make 
some kind of assessment of this information, diagnose the disease and recommend a 
form of treatment and suggest a prognosis. This small sketch can show many of the 
points at which doctors see mistakes arising: for example, were the appropriate tests 
are run, is there sufficient information, is the information correct, and then is the 
decision and diagnosis correct? Doctors seemed to strive to evaluate and 
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conceptualise such decisions in objective and scientific terms, frequently relying 
upon (quasi-) statistical assessments that rely on the identification of risks associated 
with the disease or the patient. Based on these assumptions doctors attempted to 
categorise or define an error. 
"We ... do know about the likelihood of many diseases from talking to the 
patient and then further tests obviously make sure" [PlDoctor 14]. 
"There are certain things you look for. .. risks" [PIDS]. 
However, the way in which doctors also talked about such decisions demonstrated a 
tension. It was evident that such assessments and expectations were implicitly 
influenced by judgmental and subjective issues. It was strongly felt that the 
processes of decision-making, although guided by evidence-based practice, scientific 
data and specialised training, are not in themselves necessarily scientific but 
premised .on making "judgement calls" and subjectivity. 
"Diagnosis is just a guess but people don't understand that, you make a guess 
based on the evidence that you can get and that evidence could change" 
[PID 15]. 
"Wrong diagnosis I think is quite difficult because it is not an exact science, 
it is part art, and therefore you might have a feeling or an inclination and run 
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other tests, but when something happens, in retrospect, you realise that 
actually you got absolutely the wrong diagnosis" [P1D12]. 
Furthermore, diagnostic problems did not seem to be equally distributed about the 
medical profession. It was evident from the way different professional specialties 
talked about their decision-making processes that for some groups making decisions 
was much more difficult. This was often related to the character of the patient or 
disease with which they practiced. 
"I think it is a difficult one diagnosis, I don't think it is in surgery so much, I 
think they are much clearer with black and white decision making, but if you 
look in areas, like medicine, where you can come with non-specific heart 
pain and that could be all sorts of things and there are series of tests you 
should go through before making a diagnosis" [P1D12]. 
It was .. l 0 1 1 ~ d d therefore that outwardly doctors attempted to make sense of decision-
making errors in technical and scientific terms drawing from their acquired medical 
knowledge and through understanding how decision-making could cause an error. 
However, it was also the case that this process of interpretation was characterised by 
other dimensions of judgement and subjectivity that were based on the more tacit 
experiences of medical practice. In consequence, the medical understanding of a 
wrong decision or misdiagnosis is not understood along purely objective criteria, for 
example a decision was wrong therefore it is an error, but when a decision seems to 
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be inappropriate or incorrect, doctors evaluate the decisions they ha\e made in the 
light of their experiences, inclinations and how they went about making the decision 
or diagnosis. Moreover, doctors seemed to emphasis the role of "art" over "science" 
thereby implicitly questioning the technical foundations of their acquired knowledge 
and instead emphasising the more contextual and cultural domains of shared 
experience. For example, if the patient's disease is particularly difficult to diagnose, 
rare or unfamiliar, then the doctor is less likely to feel that they made some kind of 
decision-making error: 
"Misdiagnosis, just by the words breaths the fact that somebody must have 
done something wrong, and actually that's not true, because again I can think 
of an incident recently that was a misdiagnosis, but actually it was because it 
was a complicated diagnosis that led people to make what, when it was 
investigated, a reasonable decision, but it was wrong" [PIM3]. 
Two important points therefore arise from appreciating the manner in which doctors 
talked about their decisions and how they cause errors. Firstly, "judgement calls" 
and subjectivity implicitly buttresses expert knowledge, informs medical practice 
and influences decision-making. This reflects Fox's (1975) observations about the 
uncertainties of medical knowledge that requires doctors to practice on "thc cdgc" 
In consequence some decisions may not be seen as 'wrong' because all the 
appropriate procedures were followed or tests carried Ollt, even if the deciSIOn was 
not necessarily thc best OIlC. Secondly the \vay in which this type of crror is gi\cn 
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meaning IS through reflective subjective interpretation. Doctors seek out 
understanding not just in objective terms but through accounting for other relevant 
issues, Sllch as the complexity of the case, expectation, the patient's characteristics 
and the impact of the decision. These are important features of medical 
interpretation that modify technical evaluations of error and will be discussed later. 
Technical performance errors 
The second type of error aetiology is associated with the "technical performance" 
and treatment stages of health care. After a diagnosis, this can be generally regarded 
as the next stage of the medical labour process, where medical practice typically 
centres on trying to make a change in the patient's health, typically through some 
form of medical intervention. It is therefore important to initially appreciate that this 
stage of medical work is highly dependant upon the relative 'success' of decision-
making, gi yen that treating an inappropriate decision can lead to further potential for 
error. 
"} think if the diagnosis goes wrong you are more likely to make a treatment 
error, because you are going to treat the diagnosis you think, now that 
fortuitously can still be the same treatment for a different diagnosis". [P/D 12] 
Despite the diversity of treatments, procedures and practices that characterise the 
different medical specialties, it was again found that wilen doctors attempted to 
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make sense of the relationship between technical performance and error they 
implicitly illustrated the importance of bio-medical knowledge that guided their 
interpretation of causation. This involved asse.ssing whether procedures had been 
carried out according to the skills acquired through training, expected standards, and 
established guidelines, and importantly whether any deviation had resulted in some 
form of negative outcome. It is the application of medical expertise and knowledge 
that initially provides the foundation for understanding how something may have 
gone wrong. Common examples included administering the wrong drug, carrying 
out the wrong procedure or carrying out the correct procedure in an unacceptable 
way. 
"If something goes wrong you can see if this went right or you did that right. 
There are normally established ways of doing certain things ... " [PlOtS]. 
Like with decision-making, when trying to make sense of such technical mistakes, 
doctors simultaneously sought out other issues that could mitigate or question this 
initial technical assessment, commonly with reference to other aspects of the care 
process, such as a wrong diagnosis, poor teamwork or defective equipment. For 
example, a doctor may administer or prescribe an inappropriate pharmaceutical dose 
but explain the causality not with reference to their direct action but in terms of poor 
labelling or the inability to read hand-writing. In other words, doctors strive to make 
sense of their performance within the parameters of technical or "scientific" 
expertise, but also through simultaneously emphasising and de-emphasising other 
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factors that provide this type of error aetiology with its social meaning. Interestingly 
these secondary issues resemble the 'latent' or 'upstream' factors emphasised in 
- .prevailing theory and policy. However, as it is shown shortly there is not always an 
explicit appreciation of this theoretical perspective, rather it represents a form of 
'common sense' for doctors. 
"It's well documented ... drug packaging can look the same ... in a hurry you 
can get things mixed up." [PID12] 
For example, in general surgery issues of technical performance are associated with 
the procedures relevant to a particular surgical operation. An example of how 
technical surgical procedures can lead to error was given with regards to locating 
and removing particular bodily organs without excessively or unnecessarily 
damaging surrounding tissue, veins or nerves. For surgery an important technical 
issue is to get in and out of the body without unnecessarily harming healthy parts of 
the patients. 
The way in which surgeons talked about these issues suggested that professional 
guidance, established techniques and biomedical knowledge informs their practice. 
Beyond the extreme problems of operating on the wrong patient, it was also pointed 
out that surgery by its very nature necessitates damaging or 'cutting' into bodily 
tissue that is otherwise healthy. Although this is normally interpreted as "acceptable" 
and within the parameters of an operation in order to tackle the patient's disease, it 
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was also clear that there are times when damage to the body is unexpected and 
unacceptable. For example, wound infections are often regarded as an expectl:?d 
"complication" of surgery, whilst some types of nerve damage may be identified as 
"recognised complications" or "acceptable risks", but damaging tissue of organs 
outside the "expected norm" is typically interpreted more negatively. It appears that 
if the procedure is carried out appropriately within expected parameters then any 
harm to the body, for example, incision wounds or damage to tissue are balanced 
with the desired objectives of tackling the actual disease and the expectations of 
professional conduct. Here we see a degree of selectivity, where the surgeon can 
balance damage to the body in terms of what is necessary and expected, with the 
demands of treating the illness, i.e. you may have to do some harm to do more good. 
In this way, medical errors are interpreted and evaluated beyond the medico-
scientific knowledge and reflect other issues that are socially contingent and balance 
notions of "good" or "bad" performance. This dilemma may be observed with recent 
media controversies with regards to unnecessary mastectomies to treat breast cancer 
where it has now been suggested that less drastic surgery may have been more 
appropriate. 
When trying to understand technical performance, therefore, surgeons seemed to 
give meaning to an error with reference to the demands of the surgical procedure, for 
some complex procedures it is necessary to potentially damage other organs, and if 
mistakes occur in this work then these are also balanced out. 
"But if it's just little things that happen in theatre, you know, so trivial that it 
doesn't make much difference you just remember to do it differently next 
time, and I think surgeons always learn by experience" [P/DS]. 
Other medical professionals interpret and give meanlOg to their work in similar 
terms. For anaesthetists the technical issues of performance are obviously different, 
typically their concern is to ensure that the patient is healthily anaesthetised. they are 
monitored and supported throughout surgery and the appropriate drugs and 
substances are given to the patient. One anaesthetist highlighted an example of an 
error associated with the effective utilisation of breathing equipment. On the one 
hand, this was seen as a technical performance problem that could lead to patient 
harm, while on the other hand, it was suggested that if the problem is recognised and 
corrected without any damage to the patient it is merely seen as a 'part of the job' 
that could happen to anybody; not really an error. Again the conceptualisation of 
error is balanced with other considerations such as the harm to the patient. 
"Now that as a fault is a very grievous one, if uncorrected it would lead to 
death of the patient within five minutes, but because you corrected it 
instantly you just regard it as one of those things and get on with it" [PID 17]. 
Issues of technical performance are therefore diverse and complex. The way in 
which doctors seemed to talk about technical performance demonstrated a desire to 
understand the objective technical basis of performance, i.e. was a gi ven procedure 
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carried out in accordance with training, guidance and scientific knowledge? 
However, it was also apparent that the consequences of performance were not 
always interpreted in such terms, but they were constructed through balancing issues 
such as complexity, expectation and harm. This complex process may be indicative 
of the desire or impulse to avoid questioning individual skills and competence and to 
protect professional credibility. In response it seems that doctors attempted to re-
interpret events with reference to other factors, such as organisational systems, 
patient complexity and the impact on health. This may be a cultural strategy to shift 
any suggestion of blame or incompetence. Like Arluke's (1977) analysis of 
symbolic rituals in surgical death rounds, the professionals involved in this research 
also give meaning to errors in such a way that highlights the technical scientific 
basis of error, but they simultaneously draw upon other factors to maintain their own 
feeling of competence. Again the relationship between medical knowledge and 
subjecti ve interpretation is crucial to the medical meaning of error. 
Equipment Errors 
The third type of error aetiology concerned the "equipment" employed in medical 
care. Modern medical care is extremely reliant upon technological devices to assist 
in making decision and treating patients. This can include diagnostic tools such as 
X-rays, haematology tests or advanced MRI scans; while treatment can use keyhole 
technologies and machines to monitor the patient's conditions or provide pain relief. 
When doctors talked about errors in their work there was a strong awareness of the 
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role of equipment. Importantly, while these machines perform tasks in their own 
right, they are principally seen as tools to inform, assist and secure medical decision-
making and performance. It is the ability or inability of medical devices- and 
instruments to perform the expected tasks that characterises the medical perception 
and interpretation of equipment related errors. It was, therefore, evident from 
discussing errors with doctors that equipment constituted a major cause of error in 
medical practice. 
"You can never make any pIece of equipment ... completely risk free" 
[PfD26]. 
The medical understanding of equipment errors exhibited several features. One of 
the main concerns was the potential for machines and devices to malfunction and 
result in direct harm to the patient. It was suggested that due to the limited resources 
of the NHS the quality and standard of equipment did not always meet expected 
standards. Specifically, in several of the Clinical Risk Management Committee 
meetings it was observed that certain forms of equipment, such as breathing 
apparatus and anaesthetic devices, were believed to be below the expected standards 
of the respective professional groups and were the focus of debate and resource 
allocation. 
As well as direct harm to patients, it was also pointed out by that machines can go 
wrong and while not necessarily directly harming the patient, they can hinder the 
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work of the professional. For example, one surgeon claimed that absent or 
ineffective equipment in surgery can sometimes have massive consequences, and 
can necessitate the reliance on more traditional practices. This can create its own 
problems as the surgeon may not be as familiar with some of the older surgical 
techniques that may have been superseded by equipment and in consequence there 
may be greater chance of error. 
"What does it actually mean all these little things, we can still do the 
operations if we don't have the right equipment, the operations get done its 
just not so easy to do them and its difficult to put in black and white" 
[PI030]. 
Another issue with equipment concerned the uncertainties that it can promote or 
exacerbate in medical work. For one obstetrician there was a suggestion that a 
particular piece of monitoring equipment did not always provide the level of 
information required during childbirth and as such it was m o r ~ i k e l y y for errors to 
develop. In this way equipment can exacerbate particular uncertainties in medical 
knowledge and lead to an "equipment gap", which could potentially make medical 
care more prone to error. 
"And it's recognised that the way that monitoring is done it is a spectacularly 
poor tool at telling whether a baby is okay or not. It's very good when it's 
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totally normal and it's reasonable when its completely abnormal, but In 
between that you have got very grey areas" [PID19]. 
The use of sophisticated technology is an important feature of modem health care; 
and with such technology new uncertainties, risks and opportunities for error come 
into existence. An equipment error may appear more 'real', so that when a piece of 
machinery malfunctions it is somewhat easier to locate its impact, but the way in 
which doctors interpret such errors also centres on the social interface between the 
equipment and the patient or doctor. It is here that interpretation and judgement 
informs understanding. For example, an X-ray may reveal an image of a patient's 
chest but professional judgement is still required to interpret the image. It appears 
that the contribution of technology to medical practice should be seen in terms of its 
relationship with professional action, not in isolation, and therefore equipment errors 
are also understood through this relationship. Furthermore, in recognising this social 
dimension it can be seen that equipment problems are also used to mitigate problems 
with professional decision-making and technical performao.ce errors as it was 
suggested that these types of error were sometimes caused by "faulty" equipment. 
Organisational and System errors 
The final causal type of error 'causality' identified from the interviews is associated 
with the organisational systems and occupational context within which medicine is 
practiced. It was frequently discussed how there was insufficient time and resources 
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to deal with all the issues and problems experienced in medical work, underpinning 
which seemed to be a concern with the wider organisational and political agenda of 
the NHS, such as waiting times. All the doctors involved in the research expressed 
concern with the organisational arrangements of the NHS and suggested that these 
were major direct and indirect sources of error in health care. However, a selection 
of novel themes emerged from the data beyond the seemingly ubiquitous concerns 
with resources and staffing levels. For example, several doctors highlighted the 
impact that working patterns and hours of work can have on the effective delivery of 
health care: 
"You know results are phoned at 5 o'clock and not dealt with till the next 
day" [PID9]. 
"When they are actually operated on there is a pressure in trying to get the 
number of cases down because of the time available and so one does try to 
do things as quickly as possible, there is a l w a y s - ~ ~ set time that its going to 
take, and I'm not saying that you are going to cut corners but you are 
continually under pressure to try and get your patient done" [P/D30]. 
"But when you have got a lot of pressure and you have got people whizzing 
around a system that can't cope then you are going to get errors at the end or 
the day I think" [PID20]. 
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It was emphasised by many of the doctors that the result of these pressures was not 
an abundance of errors, rather there was just greater potential for decision-making 
and technical performance errors to arise because there would·-be less time to do the 
tasks as thoroughly as required or to the standards that the professional would 
expect. Organisational systems therefore represented an indirect threat to patient 
safety through the negative influence on medical work. In the medical search for 
'causality' the interpretation of decision-making or performance problems could 
prompt the professional to consider the wider contextual influences on their work. 
As it will be discussed shortly this has interesting, yet not explicit, similarities with 
the ideals of Human Factors. 
As well as this indirect cause of error, doctors were also acutely aware that during 
times of crisis, such as in winter, the organisation of the service could also have a 
direct impact upon patient care. There was considerable concern about the necessary 
resources to sufficiently staff the hospital and ensure that the patients were 
appropriately treated in specialised departments. Onoodoctor showed great concern 
about the allocation of patients around the hospital when specialised wards became 
full and patients found themselves on wards that did not necessarily meet their 
health care needs. 
"In the middle of winter and a flu epidemic, we are still going to get patients 
admitted with respiratory disorders sent to wards that are completely 
unsuitable ... every time there is a ward move there is a communication 
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problem or could be, everybody does their best but it can lead to all sorts of 
delays and it can lead to mistakes eventually." [PID20] 
This means that patients are potentially being treated by professionals that are not 
the most suitable or appropriate and this was regarded as exacerbating decision-
making and performance type errors. This problem also illustrates the problems 
associated with organisational linkages and relationships. Organisational 
communication was seen as a major 'victim' of poorly designed and integrated 
systems, in conjunction with excessive pressure. Modern health care is characterised 
by multiple professionals, often working in teams, providing an integrated care 
pathway. Effective communication and co-ordination is therefore crucial for medical 
work but can also be the source for potential errors, particularly since it is felt that 
there are too few staff and insufficient time to work effectively together. 
Doctors were acutely aware of the potential impact of organisational systems on 
their work. This ranged from general " g r i p e ~ ~ -about the resources and staffing 
levels, to specific complaints about how certain systems are organised. These issues 
were major considerations for the medical interpretation of error. Interestingly, the 
way in which doctors talked about these issues resonates with the prevailing theories 
found in Human Factors. From the perspective of policy, it can be suggested that 
doctors are implicitly appreciative of the active and latent dimensions of error in 
their work, and by identifying mitigating and organisational factors doctors are 
themselves practicing a form of 'root causes analysis'. For a minority of doctors it 
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was certainly evident that the 'patient safety' agenda in the NHS was recognised and 
regarded as an important development in quality improvement. As it will be shown 
in chapter seven, several doctors had attempted to- -replicate techniques of policy 
within their work. Furthermore, it appeared that a collection of doctors had read the 
special edition of the British Medical Journal (e.g. Leape and Berwick 2000, Reason 
2000) and were aware of the recent scandals associated with the Toft Report (Toft 
2001) and the Bristol Enquiry (Kennedy 2001). These had served to promote 
medical awareness and potentially encouraged doctors to consider the organisational 
and latent factors pertinent to their work. It appeared therefore that for some doctors 
the recognition of organisational type errors was explicitly influenced by the 
prevailing concept of error found in theory and policy. In particular one consultant 
had a particularly strong interest in Human Factors and was eager to promote the 
policy to their colleagues. 
"I have that issue of the BMJ with the aeroplane on the front, and I have been 
telling my colleagues about it and leRding it out" [P/Doctor 13] 
In addition this doctor was enthusiastic about working with corporate management 
to promote incident reporting and, as it will be shown in chapter seven, he was also 
involved in developing an alternate form of medical reporting to encourage medical 
participation and the uptake of Human Factors within medical practice. The 
influence of policy was particularly significant amongst a number of doctors 
working in the Directorate of Obstetrics. For the obstetricians it appeared that their 
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appreciation of Human Factors was driven by their advances in risk management 
and incident reporting at a professional level. This is discussed more in chapters 
seven and eight, but it is important to note t h a ~ ~ Hllrnan Factors has had an implicit 
influence on this medical speciality. Crucially, however, this has been promoted 
within the profession well in advance of recent managerial developments. 
For Clinical Directors there was typically some awareness that a new policy agenda 
was to be introduced that would alter the basis of risk and error management, 
especially those directors who worked closely with a local risk manager. 
"Yes, indi vidual errors do occur, there is no doubt about that, and research 
has shown and popular television programmes about medical errors have 
shown that it is usually a systems error, and we have seen that with patients 
being injected intrathecally rather than intravenously and that sort of thing" 
[PfD20]. 
"It's like they say isn't it, we will always make these individual mistakes but 
there are other problems in the way the service is run .. .it's the active and 
latent thing." [PID 13] 
"Of course quite often these aren't technical type errors, they are system 
organisational errors" [PID 17]. 
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For the majority of doctors, however, it was not evident that the activellatent 
distinction and the ideas of Human Factors had a direct influence on their 
understanding of organisational factors. COl\:versely, the medical recognition of 
organisational causes seemed to stem from a 'common sense' understanding that 
was not explicitly shaped by prevailing theory. It may also be the case that by 
emphasising the organisational causes of error doctors are exhibiting a rationale or 
strategy to shift the analytical focus from their own practice and issues of 
competence towards that of which they have no responsibility. This resonates with 
the work of Arluke (1976) because doctors may be emphasising the influences of 
organisations to mitigate any lapses in their own performance or to legitimate claims 
for organisational change. 
Summary: initial interpretations and medical knowledge 
The way doctors talked about errors in their work seemed to generate a basic 
typology encompassing decision-making, technical performance, equipment and 
organisational systems as the potential causes of error. On one level these types 
reflect the technical and contextual features of medical work and show that doctors 
are drawing on their medical knowledge to develop scientific, technical or even 
'real' types of error. This is normally associated with the techniques acquired 
through university training, continuous professional development, keeping abreast of 
new developments, and following evidence-based guidelines and protocols. It could 
be argued therefore that doctors initially give meaning to error in relation to the 
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scientific knowledge that underpins their work. In other words, the discourses of 
medical knowledge and practice therefore influence the search for causality and 
certainty and initially shape the medical construction of error. 
However, in this discussion it also appeared that the medical interpretation of error 
implicitly relies upon other issues, such as expectation and complexity. Throughout 
the interviews it was found that doctors frequently struggled to make sense of the 
causality of error. As shown in the above discussion, doctors emphasised the 
judgemental and contingent character of their work implicit of the uncertainty and 
instability of meaning. For example, it was commonly suggested that medicine is 
"more of an art than a science". In consequence, doctors have some difficulty in 
remaining committed to scientific principles of bio-medical knowledge because of 
the uncertainty and complexity through which errors are seen as originating (Fox 
1975). In consequence, the certainty of this interpretative stage becomes de-
stabilised and other important cultural and tacit factors appear to "fit" into the 
"gaps" or holes in medical k n o w l e d g ~ . . In consequence the medical construction of 
error becomes more complex and unstable as other social factors become important 
and infonn the medical interpretation of error, through both challenging the 
assumptions of medical knowledge or offering to reconcile the gaps and 
uncertainties of this acquired expertise. 
The interview data therefore suggests that it is important to go beyond a typology of 
error and instead understand the other interpretative influences that guide the 
medical construction of error. 
Doctors dealing with uncertainty 
In the first instance therefore it appears that doctors attempt to make sense of errors 
through seeking out the causal relationship between the technical qualities of their 
work and error. However, it is also apparent that when doctors talk about mistakes 
they become aware of the conceptual difficulties and uncertainties in their expertise 
and practice (Fox 1975). In consequence, the initial attempt to interpret errors in 
stable and absolute terms becomes problematic as doctors struggle with the 
complexity and uncertainty of their expertise. In this way error becomes a transient 
concept as a second phase of interpretation further characterises the medical 
construction of elTOr. This proceeding process of interpretation engages with the 
more cultural and social asp.ects of medical work, or the emergent norms and values 
that characterise medical practice at the practitioner level (Lupton 1998). 
Specifically, the medical interpretation of error becomes shaped by the perception 
and the interpretation of uncertainty and in consequence the medical meaning of 
error moves beyond the technical to a more socially contingent concept. 
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The inevitability error 
One of the most prevailing themes was the general feeling, amongst medical 
professionals, of all specialities, that mistakes and errors are an inevitable feature of 
human work. 
"You know we are all human, mistakes are made all day, every day, by every 
body" [P/D5]. 
It was widely suggested that errors are common to medicine because of the inherent 
uncertainties in medical practice, the need to make decisions when information was 
not always available, the technical difficulties of performing certain procedures and 
the complexity of the human body and disease. The academic recognition of 
uncertainty (Fox 1975) was explicitly felt by doctors and characterised the culture of 
medicine. 
In some ways it may be presumed that the acceptance of error reflects an 
appreciation of the 'human character' and is reminiscent of Pope's dictum "To err is 
human, to forgive divine" (1711, line 525). However, it may also be the case that 
doctors have been influenced by recent events within the NHS and messages that 
have been extensively propagated through professional journals (Alberti 2001; 
Berwick 200 I; Berwick and Leape 1999; Leape and Berwick 2000). It may therefore 
be the case that this awareness has been thrust to the fore of medical perception 
through wider professional and social recognition. Moreover, it is likely that 
involvement in this research may have made the doctors implicitly aware of the 
human proneness to mistake . .and thoughtful on the subject. 
Nevertheless, it was commonly felt by doctors that the pressures of working within 
the NHS exacerbated the inevitability of human error in general and had a major 
impact upon their work. This reinforces the link between individual and systemic 
errors as proposed in theory and also identified by doctors through their initial 
discussion of error. 
"Well, human error is always going to occur and it depends on how much 
pressure people are under, whether they have got the time to make 
considered judgements, or whether they are having to work so fast that they 
are having to make snap decisions which inevitably some of them go 
wrong." [PID15]. 
It was extremely common for doctors to attempt to mitigate some of their 
responsibility for error with reference to the lack of resources in the NHS, antiquated 
equipment, time pressures and poor organisational arrangements. In this way, there 
was a tendency to 'blame the system' or organisational types of error causation. 
This "inevitability" makes an important contribution to the study of error and 
reflects Rosenthal's (1995, 1999) findings. Specifically, it suggests that medical 
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work cannot always attain some ideal or perfect level of care, but rather medical 
practice constantly involves working with the potential for something to go wrong. 
This has a significant impact on the medical interpretation of error as it indicates that 
mistakes cannot always be interpreted and controlled in absolute terms whilsl 
highlighting the "gaps" in medical knowledge. 
"You know, there is a learning with patients and mistakes are made, and 
things are not perfect and never have been" [P1D9]. 
The issue of perfection has been raised by the influential writer on medical error 
Lucian Leape (1999). He suggests that the medical approach to error can be 
described as the "perfectibility model", where doctors rely upon expert knowledge 
and experience to deliver an ideal level of care, but when this expectation is not 
reached doctors react with considerable blame and shame. However, the manner in 
which doctors talked about errors in this research shows that they are acutely awarL' 
of the possibilities for mistakes in their work. Contrary to Leape, the doctors seemed 
to feel that the pressure of perfection originates less from within the profession, but 
more from outside, within the eyes of the media, public and government. A number 
of doctors felt that recent health policies expressed contradictory messages, on the 
one hand suggesting that mistakes are an inevitable feature of human work, but 
simultaneously suggesting that through implementing new management practices 
some kind of perfection could be attained. Moreover, doctors suggested that their 
patients did not often share this view and actually expected perfection. Again this 
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demonstrates the important relationship between trust, uncertainty and error that 
contextualises the current developments in health policy. 
The social perception of error 
It was certainly evident that one of the most crucial, but often overlooked factors, in 
the processes of interpreting medical errors is whether events are recognised or 
known about. This may seem quite obvious; if an event goes completely undetected 
then it cannot be given any social meaning; whereas when a suspect event is 
detected professionals can start to make evaluations as to its causes and impact, and 
therefore construct its meaning. However, this small point is rarely addressed in 
other research as it is presumed that mistakes are somehow distinct and independent 
of social perception, but for doctors it is clearly one of the first steps in any 
construction process. 
"Another; big area relates to recognition of problems, in other words, if you 
don't recognise that there's a problem you won't act to do anything about it" 
[P14] 
It was clear that there were several sources of knowing about an error and typically 
they are detected by one of three groups. First, the professional directly involved 
with the event, second their peers involved in the care process, and third the patient 
or their family. For each of these sources there can be different signals that attract 
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their attention and each of these signals can hold different social meaning to the 
groups involved. 
Of interest here are those doctors directly involved in the delivery of care. It was 
evident that a range of triggers can signal whether something has potentiall y gone 
wrong. The most prominent was a "dramatic change" in patient health, for example 
unanticipated death, dramatic loss of blood or severe disability which could lead a 
doctor to review and reconsider the tasks they had performed. Others included 
'warning alarms' or concerned peers and patients. These triggers represent the 
primary basis of interpretation, shaping the way doctors come to know about errors 
and from this how they develop meaning. It also reveals the important 
interrelationship between perception and interpretation, for example, 
"unanticipated", "dramatic" and "severe" all refer to the subjective understanding of 
the events that have transpired. 
The medkal construction of error is therefore not just a matter of understanding 
what caused something to go wrong, but it is determined in part by how and by 
whom an event is discovered. This demonstrates the complexity of the medical 
construction of error, for example, a decision-making error may only be identified 
much later in the care processes when more information is available or a procedure 
has followed the wrong diagnosis. The professionals involved therefore have to 
reflect upon how they have come to know about this problem, locate its cause and 
give the event meaning. Consequently, abstract typologies, of the kind developed 
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above and elsewhere cannot always provide a full account of error. For example, in 
technical terms it could be the case that an error occurs because a wrong diagnosis is 
made because- test results were delayed, but the social awareness of this problem is 
unlikely to originate in those responsible for the test result as no problem has yet 
arisen, rather it could be the professional acting on the test results that is left with 
"blood on their hands". Moreover, the doctor involved in the delivery of care may 
not be fully aware of these processes and awareness of the event is potentially 
isolated to their actions and it is here that they construct the meaning of error. 
Moreover, perceptual and interpretative variations were also recognised across 
occupational boundaries, further demonstrating the contingent construction of error. 
One doctor suggested that it was not uncommon for two doctors reviewing case 
histories in the same directorate to perceive, understand, and evaluate errors 
differently: 
"I suppose around the management [of a patient] there might be a 
discrepancy and one clinician may say 'I think that was all right' whilst 
another might say 'I'm not too sure about that'''. [P1D7] 
One ward manager with risk management responsibilities provided an interesting 
example of where the boundaries of expertise and responsibility in surgical theatres 
guided the variable perception of error. In this particular case, it was told that for 
certain forms of instrument sterilisation in theatre it was normal to use a cold-
sterilant, and for the sterilisation technique to be effective, the ward manager stated 
that the equipment must remain in the sterilant for 20 minutes. On one particular 
occasion, however, it was claimed that a surgeon wished to use the instrument after 
just 10 minutes; and for the ward manager this represented a significant error of 
judgement. 
"Now my staff reported that, and I sent that to their clinical director saying 
you really need to investigate this and do something about it, and his 
perception was what a load of dross why are you sending me this" [PIR27]. 
The perception and interpretation of the error therefore varied between these 
different occupational groups. On the one hand this reflected different areas of 
specialist knowledge, yet it also showed that perception reflects wider differentials 
in organisational authority, culture and the division of labour. In this case the 
surgical interpretation seemed to prevail over that of other members of the surgical 
team, despite their own claims to expertise. Errors are not therefore fixed or stable 
but shift according to the social perception and interpretation of an event. 
The manifestation of uncertainty 
As illustrated above complexity and uncertainty in medical knowledge continually 
undermined the medical search for causality and called into question the aetiological 
types of error initially developed by doctors. These "gaps" (Fox 1975) were 
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generally manifest along three lines: complexity, expectation and severity and 
together with perception represented a further stage of interpretation. One significant 
influence of these three factors was the extent to which they appear to Jilter or 
accentuate the social meaning of error. 
In the first instance, this can be seen with regards to the "complexity" of the human 
body in general and patient's disease in particular; how "easy" it was to diagnose or 
treat. For decision-making this may centre on the outward appearance of the 
condition which the physician must interpret. However, if the patient's symptoms 
are vague, non-descript or the disease is extremely uncommon then the 'accuracy' of 
the diagnosis may be undermined. It was suggested that this could often be the case 
for doctors working within acute medicine because of the assortment of patient 
ailments, unlike for example a specialist working within a breast care unit (hence the 
increased tendency towards medical sub-specialisation), Such complexity can also 
be found in the technical performance aspects of medical work, where errors relating 
to treatment are interpreted with reference to the difficulty of conducting a 
procedure. For example, the interpretation of error in cases of high-risk surgery may 
be balanced out by the complexity of the procedure and the condition of the patient. 
"There is always something maybe I could have done that bit better and there 
are some operations that go badly for whatever reason and it is not actually a 
reflection on you as a bad surgeon it is normally a reflection on the difficulty 
of the case or whatever" [PID25]. 
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It was also suggested that the complexity may- be exacerbated by the general health 
status of the patient, for example co-morbidities can complicate diagnosis or 
- .;;.::.,. ....... -:. .... 
treatment. The patients pre-existing health status may, therefore, be taken into 
consideration when trying to make sense of why an outcome was poor and whether 
it was an error. However, it is necessary to consider that this could be a strategy for 
professionals to locate alternate explanations for why certain procedures are not 
successful and mitigate responsibility. 
"Well if you operate on high risk sick people well some of them die. Well 
they might die because you've made some technical cock-up or they might 
die because you've done your best and they were too sick to make it" [PID5]. 
Medical professionals, therefore, make sense of error beyond merely examining the 
technical causes of event, but also with further reference to the complexity of the 
case. In many ways this can act as a filter and provide the basis for doctors to temper 
or legitimate possibly poor performance, or more specifically modify the meaning of 
the event away from error and towards that of a "complication". In essence what 
may be seen as an error is re-constructed as something that is "a part of the job". 
"Sometimes it's difficult to tell the difference between an accepted 
complication of a condition or an intervention, and something that has 
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actually gone wrong. Sometimes it can be difficult to fit into both categories" 
[P/R] 6]. 
Related to the problems of complexity and uncertainty are the "expectations" of the 
doctor. What is expected from a decision or a course of action is fundamental to how 
that decision or action is evaluated and given meaning. Considering the uncertainties 
surrounding patient complexity, it is therefore not surprising to find that doctors also 
have uncertain and variable expectations as to their performance and ~ n v v prognosis; 
yet these expectations have a vital role in the interpretation and social meaning of 
error. 
On the one hand expectation is often demonstrated in medical work through quasi-
scientific calculations of risk or chance that attempt to quantify and control 
uncertainty through the rationale of scientific medical knowledge (Beck 1992, 
Luhmann 1991). This can involve taking into account the patient's history, the 
disease type and complexity of treatment. For example, an anaesthetist may ask 
about breathing problems, weight and previous ailments when establishing the risks 
of a general anaesthetic and therefore informing their expectation. 
"There are risk factors for that procedure [type of surgery] and we can try to 
work it out ... but it's not absolutely right". [PI030] 
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If a doctor expects a certain degree of risk or there is a possibility that a procedure 
may be below expected standards then the meaning given to these events will 
differentiate from an unexpected error. Specifically, the doctors may interpret the 
event not as an error but as a complication. In this way, expected problems can be 
filtered and given an alternate meaning, because the doctor was aware that this could 
happen. 
"Well from a medical point of view it's often this IS a recognised 
complication, it's not an incident" [PlDll]. 
This can be seen in the earlier remarks concerning surgery where it was pointed out 
that all surgery expects some degree of risk and bodily harm, but these are balanced 
with the desired objectives of care. Equally, if a doctor feels that a patient has a poor 
chance of survival or recovery then expectation seems to de-accentuate the need to 
locate and understand errors that may occur. Here again uncertainty with expectation 
can filter the social meaning of error. 
, ~ ~
Expectation can also have a role In triggering the recognition of an error by 
highlighting that something has gone wrong, accentuating the importance of the 
event and necessitating further enquiry or investigation. The impact of this could 
lead a physician to seek out the cause, raise the issue with colleagues or it could 
form the basis of what many doctors referred to as an "individual learning 
experience". Unexpected events also appear to have an impact upon how medical 
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professionals start to come to terms with events and errors, and act as a dri vcr 
towards seeking out causation. It could be the case that an unexpected event could 
be constructed as "a part of the job" after the doctor has sought out greatcr 
understanding. Nevertheless, doctors tended to refer to expectation as an implicit 
influence on the interpretation of an error, both accentuating and filtering error. 
Expectation therefore underpins the social construction of error and this is not 
always born out of the knowledge or discourse of medicine, but from the local 
contingent peculiarities of medical practice. 
Possibly the most prominent, but not necessarily the strongest, influence on the 
medical construction of error involves the interpretation of "patient harm". It was 
common amongst doctors to emphasise the purpose of medical care: normally 
centring on the ethos of improving patient health through the application of their 
expert abilities. However, the interviews also indicated that an unexpected change in 
patient health and the "severity" of this change were two crucial influential factors in 
the medical interpretation of error. 
As mentioned above, an alteration in patient health may alert the physician to the 
possibility of an error, and the interpretation of the severity can necessitate the 
doctor to conceptualise the event as an error. This is particularly the case when the 
harm to the patient is not expected and takes the doctors by surprise. In this way 
severe and unexpected harm to the patient accentuates the interpretation of an event 
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and can lead to the social construction of an error. Here it is the combination of harm 
and expectation that guides the medical meaning of error. 
Conversely, the combination of severity and expectation can also provide the basis 
for filtering the interpretation of error by enabling the doctor to distinguish outcomes 
that are a "part of the job" and recognised as expected consequences of treatment. 
This can be seen with examples of surgery involving harm to the body in order to 
tackle the disease. 
"I think the important thing is the thing that has a direct impact on patient 
care. An important impact not just you used the wrong sized stitch, but 
something that is actually going to influence their outcome" [PIDS]. 
In consequence, expected patient harm was less likely to be regarded as an error. 
Doctors could justify these events more easily, yet unexpected harm appeared to 
demonstrate the limits and "gaps" of their expertise central to the construction of 
error. Generally, an unexpected negative impact on patient health was widely 
considered an alarming and extremely unsettling event. Not only were doctors 
concerned for the patient and their family, but there was also the potential for a 
strong emotional shock for the professional: calling into question competence, 
responsibility and feelings of self-blame. This was not necessarily under extreme 
cases of death or disability, because expected harm could be more easily 
accommodated, but unexpected harm appeared to accentuate the interpretation of 
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error. It seems therefore that where there is only a small expectation of patient harm, 
but harm still occurs, there is greater pressure for the professionals to critically 
evaluate their performance and interpret the events as an error. 
Summary: the transient meaning of error 
The data reveals that although doctors may initially seek out certainty and causality 
in their interpretation of error. other cultural features and issues characterised the 
medical construction of error beyond the influence of medical knowledge. These 
social and cultural aspects of medical practice appear to have developed to 
accommodate the uncertainties and complexity of medical expertise (Fox 1975) and 
lead to an unstable and transient meaning of error. Many of the doctors expressed a 
feeling that a definitive and meaningful definition of error was beyond their reach 
(Bosk 1986). For example, it was quite common for doctors to attempt a single 
technical definition of error but then reject or clarify this initial suggestion as they 
considered other possibilities and interpretations. It was seemingly felt that a single 
meaningful and workable concept of error is unobtainable. 
"Everybody would have different ways of interpreting ... [errors]" [PIR 16] 
These secondary interpretative Issues render the medical construction of error 
extremely imprecise, fleeting, and unstable. The typology of error causation 
developed above rarely provides a full account of error, because the issues of 
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awareness, complexity, expectation and patient harm undermine or question any 
initial attempt at certainty. One of the most important findings is the way in which 
doctors seem to filter potential errors and reconstruct them as "complications" or 
: ' ...... 
alternatively accentuate 'everyday events' and interpret them as errors. It is not 
possible to provide an abstract formula of when this could occur, but seemingly the 
most likely combination of pressures for filtering centred on when there was a high 
expectation that the complexity of the case may lead to a negative outcome; whereas 
events were accentuated when there was little patient complexity and harm was not 
expected. 
It can therefore be suggested that the medical interpretation of error is transient, 
taking on an initial technical form, but then becoming de-stabilised by other 
considerations. It may be the case that the search for certainty or stability is 
reflective of medical discourses associated with expert knowledge, where medical 
practice is characterised by diagnosis and treatment, in much the same way that 
doctors attempt to diagnose errors. However, the de-stabilisation of error may also 
be a conscious effort to complicate the interpretation and meaning of error, and by 
making it transient it becomes more difficult for other occupational groups to fully 
understand or evaluate. The different meaning ascribed to an error has a significant 
impact upon how doctors subsequently act. For example if the meaning of an error 
Was constructed with reference to organisational causation then the doctor may 
attempt to reform organisational systems; if the responsibility of the error was 
located with individual performance then the doctor may question their practice; or 
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if the doctor feels that no error has occurred then no relevant action will transpire. 
Although this may seem obvious, it is not clear within the health policy 
documentation that different social meanings exist and elicit different social 
responses; this is particularly important given that policy requires professionals to 
report all their errors. By ensuring that error is a transient concept, doctors are not 
only making their own interpretative processes difficult, but also those processes 
associated with other occupational groups. 
Discussion: the medical construction of error 
The doctors involved in this study reveal an almost dual process in the interpretation 
of error. The first and most obvious centres on understanding the cause of error 
within the parameters of acquired medical knowledge. Here attention is gi ven to the 
technical aspects of medical work that, through omission or commission, contribute 
to error. The second approach arises from the inconsistencies in the first process, 
where gaps and uncertainties in knowledge necessitate that interpretation centres on 
considering other culturally significant issues. Errors were not seen as "black and 
white", but were given meaning with reference to expectation, severity and 
complexity: shaped by Issues of perception and inevitability. The medical 
construction of error therefore involves the interpretation of a social event \l.,!ith 
reference to both esoteric knowledge (bio-medical expertise) and the tacit norms of 
medical practice. Where "gaps" exist in the former: the latter filters or accentuates 
the meaning of error. 
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Drawing on Lupton's (1999) discussion of risk epistemologies in chapter four, it was 
argued that error could be broadly understood through two approaches: the realist 
and the constructionist. The conceptualisation of error found in policy and manifest 
in management practice certainly resembles a realist approach as errors are defined 
as objective phenomena that can be scientifically and objectively understood and 
controlled. It is also possible to find such a point of view in the initial medical 
interpretation of error where there is a focus on technical causality. Both these 
approaches attempt to capture the "truth" of error, the first from a managerial 
perspective and the second from the medical; each drawing on established 
knowledge. 
The constructionist approach questions these assumptions and specific attention is 
given to the work of Douglas (e.g. 1966) and Foucauldian (e.g. 1980) theories of 
discourse. From this perspective the social meaning of error reflects the socio-
cultural features of medical work and the discursive qualities of knowledge. Here the 
conceptualisation of error found in both policy and medical work are both regarded 
as constructions that are shaped by different occupational cultures and constellations 
of knowledge. From the managerial perspective this knowledge is derived from the 
Human Pactors approach and manifest in policy. For doctors it is both bio-medical 
k n o w l e d g ~ ~ and also the cultural aspects of practice that shape the meaning of error; 
where knowledge is incomplete or too complex other socio-cultural parameters 
i n f l u ~ n c e e p c r c ~ p t i o n n and interpretation. 
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Developing the constructionist approach it is also possible to explore how the 
meaning of error, not only reflects particular discourses and practices, but can also 
provide the basis for legitimacy and control. On the one hand, managerial action is 
seemingly influenced by the theoretical and practical features of 'patient safety' 
health policies. As such, errors are managed through incident reporting and given 
particular activellatent characteristics. On the other hand, doctors make sense of 
errors with reference to different knowledge, assumptions and norms that lead to 
alternate forms of social action and error control. Both approaches attempt to define 
and control the social world of medical errors. Two related consequences may 
emerge from this epistemological divergence. First doctors may interpret and gi ve 
meaning to error in a way that does not conform to the expectations of policy, 
leading to a lack of participation in incident reporting and the preference for 
occupational-based strategies that reflect medical knowledge. Second doctors could 
argue that managers responsible for the National System do not have the knowledge 
to make sense of medical errors because they are not familiar with medical practice 
and expertise; in consequence they do not have the legitimacy to evaluate or make 
changes in medical work. Given the realist epidemiology of the current theoretical 
and policy zeitgeist such important considerations for the implementation of the 
National System are potentially neglected. 
Returning to the works of Hughes (1951) and Freidson (1970) it can be seen that a 
feature of professional work is the claim to expertise and regulation based on the 
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application of expert knowledge. It could be argued therefore that the medical 
construction of error can serve to inhibit other groups from evaluating medical work. 
This can be seen in two ways. The first is to locate the meaning of error in technical 
knowledge where it can be argued that non-medical groups cannot legitimately 
understand medical errors due to a lack of appropriate expertise. The second is to 
emphasise the complexity and uncertainty of medical work and therefore reinforce 
claims for exclusivity by suggesting that other occupational groups are not aware of 
these other important factors. It can be seen that the dual process of medical 
interpretation leads to a construction of error that marginalizes other 
conceptualisations (Foucault 1980). 
In this research error is therefore regarded as a social construction, despite claims to 
scientific and expert knowledge and without completely rejecting ontology (Bhaskar 
and Lawson 1998). The meanings promulgated through policy and embodied in 
management, and those found in medical practice are both reflective of particular 
assumptions and constellations of knowledge. No single definition of error can 
reflect the full meaning for all groups (Bosk 1986). Despite realist claims to 
maintain and reflect the reality of the real (Knorr-Cetina 1981), the meaning of error 
found in policy and medical work are contingent and relativistic reflecting wider 
discourses and social knowledge. What becomes essential therefore is to understand 
how these discourses and meanings promote specific forms of social action and 
control. 
279 
7. The medical reporting of adverse events 
,l'':' 
Introduction 
The collection of health service information in the pursuit of quality improvement 
has a long history (Donabedian 1980). For example Florence Nightingale introduced 
a system for monitoring patient outcomes, with measures for 'dead', 'relieved' and 
'unrelieved' (Rosser 1983) and the Royal Colleges have introduced the Confidential 
Inquiries. Persistent health service failures have prompted the introduction of more 
systematic and meticulous mechanisms for collecting data about health service 
quality and risks (Clements 1995, Dickson 1995, Wilson 1999). This can be seen in 
with the development of clinical risk management, associated with CNST, and the 
forthcoming introduction of a new National System for error management and 
patient safety. As shown in chapter three, a key component of these reporting 
mechanisms is the identification and communication of risks or errors to enable 
learning (Department of Health 2000, Reason 2000, Wilson 1999). As opposed to 
traditional professional approaches to quality improvement, these are more 
managerial in style, reflecting many of the developments in financial governance 
brought about by the internal market reforms of the early 1990s. 
The National System requires the mandatory reporting of all clinical adverse cvents 
and near misses, in order to facilitate learning about the frequency and typc of errors 
and importantly to enable "root causes" analysis. However, it is widely recognised, 
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both in policy and research, that medical professionalism is characterised by ;1 
culture of "silence", "closed collegiality" and "informal" mechanisms to deal with 
such problems (Alberti 2001, DH 2000, 2001, Leape 1999, Kennedy 2001, 
Rosenthal 1995). Furthermore, despite developments in quality improvement, 
medical professionals are generally more reliant upon established collegial systems 
of quality control, associated with 'self-regulation'. In consequence, both theory 
(Reason 1999, 2000) and policy (Department of Health 2000) strongly advocate the 
modification of occupational cultures to acquire occupational compliance in the 
form of incident reporting; this involves creating a "no-blame" or a "low-blame" 
culture. 
However, it is not always clear in policy what is meant by cultural change and how 
it is supposed to be achieved. There is also little appreciation of the various theories 
of organisational and occupational culture and how they could impact upon policy. 
Moreover, there is little appreciation of the character of medical culture, beyond 
reference to collegiality and the fear of blame, or understanding of how culture may 
influence policy implementation. For example, does medical culture promote a 
preference for collegial based systems because they "fit" better with medical work, 
or alternatively does it reject incident reporting to resist hospital management? 
Furthermore, there remains a serious lack of consideration about medical attitudes 
and beliefs towards reporting, while the promotion of a more open and less 
draconian organisational culture raises questions about the underlying theory of 
culture. This chapter seeks to provide an account of how incident reporting is being 
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implemented in accordance with policy and how medical professionals regard 
incident reporting in terms of their work and occupational practices 
The chapter commences with a descriptive account of the current incident reporting 
systems found in the hospital case study. This reveals not only the existence of a 
trust-wide approach in line with policy, but also variations in the hospital at the 
directorate or service level. Here it is shown that specialist occupational groups 
within the hospital have different approaches and experiences of incident reporting, 
associated with factors such as leadership, external pressures, professional regulation 
and cultural norms. The chapter then develops these findings through the 
identification and interpretation of themes that dominate the medical attitude 
towards incident reporting. Here overt practical problems are initially discussed as 
factors or barriers that inhibit reporting, such as lack of time, the design of forms or 
the lack of feedback. These problems are significant because it can be argued that 
the responsibility for remedying these problems rests less with professional attitude 
but more with management practice. It was also found that there are crucial cultural 
features of medicine that further inhibit reporting. For example, a general disregard 
for the purpose of incident reporting, concern with managerial capacity, a general 
revulsion of bureaucracy and management, and the overwhelming fear of blame. 
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Incident reporting in the hospital 
As discussed in chapter five, the organisation of the case-study hospital involves 
both 'traditional' bureaucratic structures alongside professional/occupational forms 
of organisation. In terms of the bureaucratic organisation, the hospital 1S 
characterised by a clear corporate management centre, along with a range of 
specialist service divisions and directorates. Within this structure medical 
professionals hold various positions from the practitioner level providing clinical 
care, to professional and organisational management leads as Clinical Directors, to 
holding positions in the corporate centre interacting with management groups 
including the department of Corporate Affairs. This section outlines the introduction 
and development of incident reporting within these different organisational sites, 
before moving onto to explore the medical attitude to these various forms of 
reporting. 
The hospital-wide reporting system 
As with the majority of hospitals in the NHS the case study has had experience of 
CNST participation as well as developing procedures for clinical risk management 
and incident reporting (Dineen and Walshe 1999a). Furthermore, the hospital has 
taken particular interest in the emerging policy framework and for a short time 
considered applying for participation in the pilot evaluation project co-ordinated by 
the NPSA. Given this background, the hospital has a pre-existing incident reporting 
system that seems to have emerged in response to CNST standards and guidance, yd 
hospital managers also wanted to develop incident reporting in response to current 
policy and because they believe it serves as a useful tool for improving sen'ice 
quality. 
First it is worth looking at the "hospital-wide" system, which refers to the system of 
incident reporting that is managed at the corporate level of the hospital, through the 
department of Corporate Affairs and operationalised throughout the hospital. It was 
reported during the course of the interviews that this system had been in operation 
since the mid-1990s and receives on average 3500 reports per year. At corporate 
level the deputy director of corporate affairs has day-to-day operational 
responsibility for overseeing the system and at the commencement of fieldwork this 
role was supported by two part-time clinical risk management co-ordinators. Due to 
changes in hospital personnel during the course of the study it was found that a 
dedicated data entry clerk and a specialist nurse had replaced these employees. 
While the hospital-wide reporting system is managed from the Corporate A f f a i r ~ ~
department, it also receives guidance and support from several hospital committees. 
During the initial year of the fieldwork it was found that the Clinical Risk 
Management Committee had an overseeing responsibility for incident reporting and 
risk management, identifying and analysing organisational issues and proposing 
changes in policy. However, as the study progressed the hospital reformed its 
committee structure and introduced an Incident Reporting Group, which has direct 
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responsibility for innovating, encouragmg and overseeing the hospital reporting 
system. This new group now has the responsibility to ready the hospital for the 
implementation of the National System. Initially, this has involved re-developing the 
incident reporting form to ease reporting, and also identifying training needs to 
promote reporting and cultural change. 
The hospital-wide system involves the distribution of a standardised hospital form 
(appendix two) to all clinical areas in the hospital. It is then expected that these 
forms will be used to report incidents for all clinical adverse events; filled out 
primarily by the member of staff involved in the incident or the person made aware 
of the event, for example if a patient falls the responsibility would lie with the staff 
member who discovers the patient. These are then returned to Corporate Affairs for 
data entry and analysis. However, within certain directorates it is common for local 
risk managers or people with responsibility for quality improvement to funnel and 
expedite the reporting of forms by acting as a local collection point. These forms are 
then returned to the department of Corporate Affairs for inputting and analysis to 
inform the management processes (see chapter eight). 
Despite the existence of a uniformed hospital-wide approach to incident reporting, it 
was also found that significant variations existed at the local level of the hospital. 
These were further explored in the directorates of Anaesthesia and Theatres, 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Combined Surgery, Acute Medicine, and 
Rehabilitation. Here it was found that not only were there variations in the 
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relationship between the corporate centre and the directorates, but also In the 
character of incident reporting across the local level of the hospital. 
Anaesthetics and Theatres 
This directorate is significant as it represents two different areas of responsibility 
within the Surgical Division. The first area centres on the medical speciality or 
anaesthesia; the second represents a more general responsibility for the management 
and function of surgical theatres, including technicians and nursing staff. In terms of 
incident reporting both aspects of this directorate can use the hospital-wide incident 
reporting system, but it was apparent that clear occupational variations exist. For 
those working in the Theatres area it was normal to use the hospital-wide form and 
return these forms to the directorate's "modern matron" who has responsibility for 
clinical governance and quality improvement. This person then dealt with immediate 
local issues before sending the forms to the corporate centre. 
However, for the medical anaesthetists there was less inclination to use the hospital-
wide form other than for exceptional incidents or circumstances. As an alternati ve 
this professional group was involved in an anonymous incident reporting scheme 
instigated and nationally co-ordinated by the Royal College of Anaesthetists, to 
which there was more willingness to participate. 
2X6 
"It was really something that our College is quite keen on, there's a lot of 
work being done in Australia, by the Australian anaesthetist on critical 
incident reporting" [P1D29] 
"We have an entirely voluntary critical incident system which is coordinated 
through a new clinician for that, which is forms are filled in ... the Royal 
College does have a dataset and spread sheet which she has just been 
introducing, and she has been able to use that." [P1D26] 
Amongst these doctors there was much more enthusiasm for this approach as it was 
seen as professionally-led, with a local peer collecting and analysing anonymous 
data. Furthermore, a significant feature of this scheme was the confidential and 
anonymous character of the reporting system, which seemed to encourage 
professionals to be more open without fear of reprisals. It could be the case that this 
style of incident reporting was unlike the corporate approach as it appears to reflect 
the traditions of self-regulation. 
"As I say confidentiality is another aspect that I think we are all aware of in 
that the information is useful for us as clinicians but if somebody else gets 
hold of it is whether its going to be a big brother thing looking down upon 
you, not that we not responsible with clinical governance etc, we all have to 
be responsible for what we do but as I say the error side of reporting is more 
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what we do in-house and keep it in-house as opposed to referring it outside 
our department." [PID29] 
Furthermore, as can be seen in this last quote, there is also a degree of suspicion 
from doctors working in this area about the use of such information by hospital 
management. This may reflect a fear that with the identification of the reporter, 
hospital management may be able to use the forms to evaluate and criticise medical 
work. It was also found that these doctors also favoured their own system because it 
predated current managerial approaches and was more sophisticated. These 
professionals therefore seemed to abandon, to a certain degree, the hospital-wide 
approach and rely instead upon their own professional incident reporting system. 
"And as I say anaesthesia has independently done this for many years before 
the trust was more interested and risk management is the thing these days but 
we have been doing it for years and years and years." [PID29] 
Combined Surgery 
The Directorate of Combined Surgery (so named because it includes a range of 
surgical areas that are not sub-specialised within the hospital structure, such as 
cardio-thoracic) involved areas of surgery including breast and gastro-intestinal. The 
respondents are commonly envisaged as working within operating theatres and 
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performing surgery, but they also have important roles on wards and in pre- and 
post-operative clinics. They therefore practice in a range of hospital environments in 
which mistake can arise, from decision-making in clinics to technical performance in 
the theatre. 
It was clear that the surgeons were indeed aware of the hospital-wide incident 
reporting system. However, it did seem that there was little understanding of how 
the system worked or who was responsible for reporting. This may be indicative of 
the apparent lack of surgical participation in reporting, and it may further discourage 
participation due to a lack of understanding of the process. 
"I wasn't aware of them until fairly recently to be fair, I knew that if there 
was a major incident that we would have to report it, but I wasn't aware of 
the forms that we now have, so these are the forms that we have (the 3 page 
hospital form), and as I understand it the consultant in charge of the case is 
responsible for filling the incident form and he may need to discuss it with 
other members of the team who were involved and then send it onto the 
appropriate place" [PID25] 
Unlike anaesthetists, these surgeons did not have an explicit alternative system of 
incident reporting, other than commitments to schemes such as the Confidential 
Enquiries and Royal Society audits. As the hospital-wide approach was the only one 
available to surgery it may be the case that this lack of understanding was important 
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in accounting for the low credibility that it appeared to hold amongst surgeons as a 
tool for making organisational change. This point is reinforced by a stated lack of 
regular feedback provided by hospital management about reported incidents and 
organisational change, further discouraging reporting. 
''There is no point in reporting incidents unless something is done about it, 
and that is one of the problems that we perceive in our practices, you know 
you fill in all these forms and waste a lot of time and nothing gets done about 
it in the end." [PID25] 
Another issue emphasised by surgeons was the feeling that incident reporting was 
mainly nursing-led and covered easily definable problems that were amenable to 
change. Conversely surgical work was seen as complex and distinct from other 
health care activities. These professionals therefore seemed to elevate the 
sophistication and complexity of their own field of expertise and suggest that these 
occupational issues were beyond the scope of managerial action. In consequence, it 
was inferred that surgical issues were seen as too complex to report and should 
remain in professional hands. 
'Things on the wards get reported, nursing issues, administration of drugs, or 
potentially giving the wrong drug; they are easy to define. But in the 
operating theatre if we put down all the things that potentially did not go 
r i ~ h t t there would be things such as no equipment and they would sound 
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fairly petty. But we find it difficult to report the other things because it's not 
black and white, it's complicated" [PID30]. 
It was therefore common for some surgeons to be aware of their responsibility to 
report, but also admit that they rarely did report. Frequently, filling out forms was 
reserved for particularly severe cases. There was also a preference for relying on 
established systems of reporting, such as the Confidential Enquiries, and other 
systems of monitoring surgical quality, such a morbidity and mortality conferences. 
Importantly, these were seen as professionally-led and ensured that the complexity 
of surgery could be adequately understood and the issues dealt with without the 
interference of non-experts, who may have another 'agenda' . 
Due to the apparent under-reporting in the Surgical Division and in response to 
recommendations from the Commission for Health Improvement, the Division has 
subsequently introduced a Clinical Governance leader to spearhead quality 
improvement. This person saw theN:. r-ole as collecting incident forms and providing 
initial analysis and coding before they were returned to Corporate Affairs. Through 
discussion with this person it appeared that the majority of forms received emanated 
from non-surgical professions, and there remained a high degree of under-reporting 
with surgeons. 
"My role is to look after the surgical division ... since the CHI [Commission 
for Health Improvement] visit, which came last year, we have found 
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something where we are lacking in order to improve our care. So I've been 
appointed as clinical governance project leader, but what that is all about I 
look after all the policies, keep them up to date, about health and safety, 
incident and any complaints which I follow up." [P1R23] 
Acute Medicine and Rehabilitation 
For the purposes of this chapter the directorates of acute medicine and rehabilitation 
(both within the Division of Medicine) are described together because of their 
organisational commonalities and shared reliance on divisional level support for 
incident reporting. However, there are some important difference between these 
directorates, mainly around the type of health care they deliver and the incidents that 
are commonly reported. For acute medicine, it was suggested that the mix of patients 
is often eclectic with many types of disease; while for rehabilitation it appeared that 
a lot of their work centred on providing care and rehabilitation for elderly patients. 
Staff groups from both of t h e ~ ~ ~ ~ i r e c t o r a t e s s were involved in the hospital-wide 
. ~ : ~ ~ ., 
reporting system, but the medical professionals had also experimented with an 
alternative "in-house" system. 
It was widely acknowledged that within both directorates non-medical groups, 
mainly nurses, filled in the majority of hospital-wide incident forms. Furthermore, in 
the rehabilitation directorate the bulk of these centred on patient falls (quite common 
for elderly services and recognised within the National Service Framework for 
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elderly care). It was also the case that within both directorates there was 
comparatively little reporting by medical professionals and where it did occur the 
forms were channelled to the relevant clinical director within the directorates for 
evaluation, while non-medical forms were returned to a local risk manager. All 
forms were then returned to the corporate centre. The lack of medical reporting in 
these directorates was seen as a major problem recognised by those working at the 
corporate level of the hospital. 
To address the problem of medical "under-reporting" one consultant with a 
particular interest in patient safety and error management developed and introduced 
an alternative reporting form explicitly for the use of doctors working in the Medical 
Division. This was initially taken up in the Rehabilitation directorate, from where it 
originated, but professionals in other directorates, including Acute Medicine, had 
also used it. The main variation between this system and the hospital-wide approach 
was the design of the form and locus of control. Rather than an A4 three page tick 
box form, the alternate medical form was an AS sheet with an empty box in which 
doctors could enter free text to describe the event or incident. It was suggested that 
this was useful because it was small and could fit into the pocket easily, and 
therefore it could be taken on ward rounds and filled out immediately. 
"It was a little thing, that size [AS] and it had four boxes: patient's 10, date, 
description of the event. And I think when its still fresh in people's mind it 
got a good response, I certainly ... within a week I'd filled out ahout 8 or 10 
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incident forms and sent them to him. He collated those, so he has that 
information, and he actually presented it to the clinical risk management 
committee." [PID 1 0]. 
"We asked every physician to carry a chart in his pocket and just record 
every event" [PIDIO]. 
An apparent benefit of this alternate reporting system was the control of information 
within the local medical professional. Forms were sent to a recognised consultant 
who collated and analysed the data, as opposed to the corporate centre. For doctors, 
this appeared to promote reporting because it appears that the information is 
collected and used by a peer who can appreciate the technical issues of medicine 
with legitimacy and sensitivity. Furthermore, it appeared that this system required 
less time and effort on the part of the reporter as this local lead would gather all 
additional information from the patient's notes. This is not to suggest that all doctors 
therefore adopted this aI?J?f<;>ach, it was quite clear from further discussions that some 
doctors remained adamant that they would not fill in either the hospital or this 
alternate form. Nevertheless, it does appear that this attempt at promoting medical 
reporting faired better than the hospital-wide form. 
"There was a certain amount of flowering ... of filling out the forms, and all 
you had to do was put a patient number in and write a brief summary of what 
happened and I would then pull the notes and summarise it and then We drew 
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up a pack for each of the major ones, and then took it through the actions that 
we took and so on." [PID 13] 
The other significant feature of these two directorates was the existence of a risk co-
ordinator. This role was predominantly based in the rehabilitation directorate, but 
had also widened to cover other directorates within the Medical Division, including 
acute medicine. One of the main roles for this specialist nurse was the collection of 
hospital-wide incident forms, prior to them being returned to Corporate Affairs. The 
information from these forms enabled the risk manager to assess the character and 
frequency of incidents and promote local change. However, as mentioned the bulk of 
this work was based upon information gathered from non-medical groups. 
"[They] send it [the incident forms] to me, they don't send it straight away. 
So they come to me, now in the past we used to receive the incident forms 
and then we used to pass it on to health and safety manager, and then all staff 
incidents a f - e ~ r e t a i n e d d by health and safety and all patient incidents is retained 
by corporate affairs just in case litigation one day might arise and we wi II 
have to look for the incident form. In medicine, acute and rehab, we've 
always had the incident forms here, in the past three or four years ago, I 
decide it was just no good to just receive an incident form and send it on, we 
want know how things happen, so we have the data every three months the 
data collection, pick up the falls, where did they fall, which ward, and all 
that. So we have got a lot of details, and how long somebody is in hospital 
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before they fall, and have they fallen at home before they get here, and 
things." [PIR22] 
Although this specialist nurse had enormous potential to develop local risk 
management systems to compliment corporate reporting and therefore in line with 
national policy, it was clear that this actor regarded incident reporting as primarily a 
'nursing-based' form of quality improvement. He was apprehensive about receiving 
and working with 'medical' reports and suggested that when he received such forms 
these were forwarded to the appropriate clinical director. 
"I can't answer the medical staff incident reporting because they don't come 
to me. I get things like self-injury or needle stick that come to me, but I pass 
them on" [P/R22]. 
The implications of the lack of medical reporting on error management are discussed 
in greater detaiJ-...in -the following chapter. However, it is necessary to consider that 
despite the existence of a local risk co-ordinator, the management and control of 
medical errors remained outside the remit of this specialist nurse. 
Obstetrics 
It was reported that there are overt litigation pressures in the area of obstetrics, 
associated with child death or defect. In consequence, it was not surprising to find 
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that this directorate had well developed local arrangements for incident reporting, 
that worked closely with the hospital-wide system but exhibited a comparatively 
advanced local management capacity in line with national professional expectations. 
"Within the profession, it's within the profession, and also to be fair, the 
hospital, the insurance scheme, the CNST, has driven this forward. A lot of 
things that we aim to meet are their standards and the higher the standard the 
lower the insurance." [PID 19] 
It was widely acknowledged by medical professionals working in obstetrics that 
reporting was a necessary aspect of their work given the enormous health and 
financial risks in this area. Accordingly doctors were encouraged to report incidents 
and this was supported by induction, training policies and directorate-wide 
communications, such as team briefings and feedback. 
"We teach about risk management on the doctors' induction, we teach them 
that it's important to recognise when our systems aren't performing properly, 
and it is important for us as a unit to know when that's happening, and that 
we are not trying to apportion blame but recognise when there are failures, 
and there are multiple level failures." [P/D19] 
In consequence. it was evident that medical reporting in this directorate \ .... as well 
established. Respondents from the Department of Corporate Affairs and the Oi yisiull 
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of Family Health claimed that these doctors reported comparatively more incidenh 
that any other. It was claimed that the fear of blame had been adequately addressed 
through training schemes and local leadership initiatives by the Clinical Director 
who actively promoted reporting. 
"We tend to report most things ... we are very open. Some things go to [the 
risk manager] and I look at the medical ones and talk them through" [PID24]. 
Reporting in this directorate was also supported by local risk management 
procedures. Before forms were returned to the corporate centre, they were normally 
collected and analysed by a local risk manager, who filtered out information to be 
addressed in local management and service planning committees. This person acted 
as a local collection point to address any queries, provide feedback and use the 
information within local initiatives thereby demonstrating change. In comparison to 
the other directorates involved in the research, Obstetrics appeared particularly 
advanced in promoting incident reporting and using the information locally to 
promote service improvement. 
"Okay we note that something is not right, somebody is asked to audit that 
straight away and then you see what is going on and then we change our 
practice and then run the cycle again. Now that is now a very well oikd 
system and a very tight system when things go wrong we just go and do 
things very quickly now." [PID24] 
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"We certainly drive ourselves, we are own worst critics. We drive ourselves; 
we want to improve all the time" [PID 19] 
The directorate of obstetrics and gynaecology was therefore comparatively advanced 
in incident reporting. The staff involved in the research all expressed awareness 
about reporting and a commitment to making quality improvements. The acceptance 
and approval of reporting was buttressed by local risk management systems and 
stated service improvements that demonstrated the purpose of reporting. However, 
these local develops were not explicit linked to those at the corporate level. Crucially 
they were driven by professional developments at the national level. [n many ways 
these systems can be seen as derivatives of the Confidential Enquiry into Maternal 
Deaths and further encouraged by the litigious context of maternity services that 
have necessitated advances in risk management and quality improvement. 
Summary: variations in reporting 
Incident reporting III the hospital therefore exhibited some significant variations 
between directorates. Generally there was a high degree of "under-reporting" for 
medical groups, although in some areas medical reporting appeared more common 
place, specifically in obstetrics and anaesthesia where it was found that drivers for 
reporting were external to the hospital, i.e. litigation pressures and endorsement by 
professional associations. In other areas there had been attempts to promote greater 
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medical reporting, in acute medicine and rehabilitation, but this approach had failed 
to make any long-term impact. One of the most interesting roles at the directorate 
level w ~ ~ ,that of a risk manager or co-ordinator who collected reports before 
returning them to the hospital centre. Although the existence of this role is normally 
associated with higher levels of medical reporting, it is worth noting that they are 
more often associated with the collection of forms from non-medical groups and 
there is an expectation that medical forms are diverted to the local lead medical 
professional, normally the clinical director. 
The use of the hospital-wide incident reporting system was below than expected, or 
seen as necessary for service improvement. It was believed by managers that 
medical professionals are disinclined to report errors and mistakes; furthennore this 
is seen as indicative of a closed collegial culture that limits the managerial capacity 
to improve service quality. 
"It's said everywhere, doctors don't fill in forms ... because you don't 
criticise your colleagues, and you don't want to identify things with your 
practice" [P/M3] 
What becomes important therefore is to understand the barriers to medical incident 
reporting in the NHS. The current policy framework is completely dependent on 
incident reporting. and although it is recognised that there is a need to change 
medical culture there is little appreciation of what this culture consists of and how it 
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operates. Presented here are the views of medical professionals with regard to 
incident reporting. These are discussed along four lines, the 'practical barriers' to 
repoa:till& the perceived 'purpose of reporting't the 'medical construction of 
reportable errors' and finally, the wider 'cultural and professional' context of 
reporting. 
Practical barriers to medical reporting 
"If it becomes an onerous task people won't report" [PID 11] 
All medical professionals involved in the research felt that the practical aspects of 
reporting were a problem that discouraged medical participation. In particular it was 
found that the demands of time, excessive paperwork and 'form design' all inhibited 
medical reporting. 
The problem of time and effort 
Finding the time to participate in incident reporting was one of the most commonly 
cited practical barriers by medical professionals. It was general felt that the technical 
and clinical aspects of medical work are so time consuming that there is seldom 
available time for updating patient notes, let alone participating in other systems or 
"paper exercises" generated by a new management system. 
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"Well, I think it is just so time consuming, you've so many other things to 
do, if you'd nothing else to do people would do it without a problem, but 
there's just pressure to be doing something else" [PID 15]. 
"I think the reason why we don't sometimes go through the formal process is 
often time, we have so many things to do in a set number of hours that other 
things take priority and then you lose focus" [PID31]. 
Time constraints had a number of different implications for reporting. One of the 
most fundamental is the time required to reflect upon events in medical work and 
decide upon the chain of events and contributing factors that lead to or failed to 
protect against an adverse event. 
'There's no time to sit down and think what were the problems last \\'cck, 
can I reflect upon them, can I report them. So I think there just isn't any time 
to do it, and we would want to do it instantaneously when you have got all 
the patient's notes there in front of you and the incident forms" [PID15] 
Gi ven this lack of time to reflect, events that transpired in medical practice are not 
necessarily ignored but minor or less severe events are given a lower priority, 
enabling time and effort to be reserved for those events that are of more significance 
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Alongside the lack of time to reflect, it was also argued that there was a general lack 
of time available for the physical processes of filling in the forms. The way in which 
. doctors talked about their workload exhibited a priority towards providing medical 
care and activities related to this. Other tasks while seen as potentially useful were 
given a low priority as it was seen that they did not have a direct impact upon the 
care of their patient. 
Form design and paperwork 
The problems associated with time were exacerbated by a general feeling that such 
schemes involved excessive amounts of paper work that not only took up more time 
but were particular alien to medical work, whilst tending to reflect managerial 
priorities and not those directly concerned with patient care. 
"I think we mostly view incident reporting as a pain in the arse. And it 
doesn't really contribute very much and it just causes lots of paper work and 
I'm not sure how much benefit it has" [PID5] 
This antipathy towards the processes and burden of incident reporting was also 
recognised by corporate management groups who accepted that time pressures were 
a major source of resistance to incident reporting. Managers often suggested that 
something was needed to facilitate reporting and make it easier: 
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"Anything new is often met with resistance by clinical staff because they see 
it as extra work ... which takes them away from looking after their patients" 
[P/Ml] 
It was also widely suggested that the design of the form impeded reporting because 
they required an enormous "investment" of time and effort to complete, gathering 
information from various sources, such as patient notes, witnesses and guidance 
documents, and then "struggling" with three sides of A4. 
"I have seen the forms which are produced by the hospital and I find them 
very cumbersome, which box does this go into? Because there are codes 
attached to all 'of them but its not always possible to put a code on it." 
[PID30] 
As suggested above, the forms are based upon the entry of speci fic codes for 
particular locations with the hospitals and the type of events. From this list 
professionals enter the appropriate codes on the form and these serve to assist data 
entry and computer analysis at the corporate level, however, it was suggested that 
these codes were in themselves often imprecise, difficult to use and did not reflect 
what the professionals ideally would like to enter on the form. 
"Have you seen the list of codes? There are so many and just trying to find 
the one you want lakes time." [P/D25] 
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"I went through the incident codes we used and they were very very 
unhelpful for us, exceptionally unhelpful, and didn't give us the information 
that we wanted in anything like a useable form. [PID19]. 
"Well, I think they are too long, a tick box type of form would be easier" 
[PID21]. 
In consequence, it was generally felt that the forms should be modified to assist in 
incident reporting. This view was particularly expressed within the Directorates of 
Acute Medicine and Rehabilitation where an alternate form had been developed and 
issued to facilitate medical reporting. As mentioned, this differed from the hospital's 
form because of the lack of complexity and ease of use, particular the reliance upon 
open-text to describe and report events. Furthermore, in Obstetrics it was also 
suggested that the hospital form would ideally be re-designed to promote reporting 
and to gather information in more detail and relevance to that directorate. 
"We have to use a standard form, we don't have a choice, we would have 
preferred to design our own, but we didn't have a choice. So we ha\'l' 
adjusted the codes because we were given the opportunity to change our 
coding, but we couldn't change the form so we had to stick with the form, but 
to be honest, although it's not perfect its, not that bad." [PID 19] 
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Despite such concerns the hospital-wide form remains the predominate method or 
data collection. Management groups have identified the perceived problems with 
this form and believe that it should be altered to encourage reporting. This issue was 
first observed in a Clinical Risk Management Committee meeting where the 
representati ve from the Directorate of Rehabilitation discussed his alternate form. 
More recently, the hospital has introduced an Incident Reporting group to promote 
change in the form and develop it in line with national policy. Here the hospital is 
also eager to design a form that promotes medical reporting. 
"We've got to redesign the form, and we've got to train and raise awareness" 
[P/M1] 
However, it is not clear whether managers appreciate the medical perspective in any 
depth. Doctors were openly critical of the practical aspects of reporting because it 
did not easily "fit" within the established working patterns and arrangements of 
medicine, where there are already demands on time. Doctors claim to give greater 
priority to the actual provision of health care services and there is a suggestion that 
the current "fashion" on audit in the NHS and elsewhere (Power 1997) reduces the 
available time for the provision of "real" medical work. Doctors therefore need to 
find time within their days to participate in reporting and it appears that the purpose 
of reporting needs to be strengthened in order to make it a greater priority. However, 
it may also be the case that these practical problems are merely superficial excuses 
for a general lack of willingness to be involved in reporting. 
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Professional alternatives 
Given these concerns it was not surprising to find that doctors were eager to suggest 
alternative methods of identifying errors in their work. The most common 
suggestion was the reliance upon patient notes that should automatically collect 
information about errors as the doctor updates this record. It was argued that all the 
relevant information is entered in the notes and therefore it was an unnecessary 
duplication to re-enter the information in another form; a feeling that was recognised 
by hospital management. 
"If there is a complication is surgery which is serious then the way its done is 
that we would record in the medical notes what the complication has been 
during that surgical procedure of even or the wards." [PID30] 
"The thing about the medic side is it should be recorded in the notes, so if 
something happens or doesn't happen it should be recorded in the notes" 
[PID9]. 
"if an adverse event occurs or whatever you want to call it, then its 
documented in the patient notes and why should they waste their valuable 
time writing it in the notes and then exactly the same on the incitknt 
reporting form" [P/M 11 
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However, the reliance on patient notes was seen as unfeasible and impractical for 
managerial groups as it does not provide a systematic approach. Specifically, the 
purpose of incident reporting is seen as providing a new and more thorough source 
of information that can be integrated with other forms of data, such as patient notes, 
but crucially is seen as independent. The use of patient notes would require 
managers to review and "trawl" through case notes that were often dispersed about 
the hospital with the relevant clinical staff. This preferred alternative was therefore 
seen as not complying with the imperatives of policy. 
Another medical suggestion was the use of the telephone or e-mail system. Here it 
was felt that information could be speedily reported without the problems of 
paperwork and excessive time constraints. It also appears that the use of telephone 
more easily dispatch responsibility for problems without the necessary paperwork 
and effort. 
"Because it's much easier to pick up the phone; you are getting an instant 
response and you are passing it on. A form you're not really passing it on, 
you are not getting any feedback" [PIM3]. 
The introduction of alternate reporting system in the Directorates of Rehabilitation 
and ACllte Medicine could be interpreted as an attempt by doctors to address the 
practical problems associated with hospital-wide system, whilst also retaining a 
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degree of occupational control. However, the use of such techniques presents further 
problems for management groups who suggested that they fail to provide the 
necessary information for the systematic analysis of the data in line with policy. 
The perceived purpose of reporting 
Doctors were also sceptical about the purpose of reporting and how it \Vas managed 
within the hospital. Although the wider ideals of patient safety were supported, 
incident reporting as a technique to secure this aim were not seen as necessarily 
contributing to this agenda and it was widely argued, particularly in directorates 
relati vely inexperienced in clinical risk management, that there was no clear purpose 
for reporting. This view was exacerbated by the lack of feedback and meaningful 
change that doctors saw in the hospital, further reinforcing the view that reporting 
was a "paper exercise". 
A lack of purpose 
It was common for doctors to suggest that the hospital-wide reporting system failed 
to have an explicit purpose that actually related to service improvements. This was a 
major disincentive to reporting because it further exacerbated the practical barriers 
demonstrated by the sentiment that it is a "waste of time" - time that could be better 
allocated elsewhere. 
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"As I say what am I going to get out of it, or what is the patient going to get 
out of it, or what are my colleagues going to get out of it, and if they don't 
see anything valuable or a valuable learning lesson exercise then people 
don't [report]" [PID26] 
However, it is important to note significant variations across the hospital 
directorates. In Obstetrics reporting was given more support and it was frequently 
suggested that reporting had a proven capacity to support change and share lessons. 
The risk manager and medical professionals working in this directorate had 
instigated service improvement based on these reports, and it may be the case that 
developments at the local level furnished reporting with meaningful purpose and 
local control, issues that plagued the hospital-wide system. Similarly, anaesthetists 
also saw an important role for incident reporting, but here the control of reporting 
remained within professional hands, as reports were collected locally by a 
designated doctor and then returned to the Royal College of Anaesthetists. This 
scheme was regarded as having a purpose because it was seen as contributing to 
professional practice through the introduction of guidelines or professional safety 
notices. Again it was the circumnavigation of hospital management that provides 
reporting with its purpose. 
Another view held by doctors was that reporting reflected managerial priorities that 
were seemingly driven by central government assessment criteria or superficial 
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priorities and did not necessarily reflect the real clinical issues that would improve 
patient care or organisational performance. In consequence, doctors did not feel that 
it related to their work and merely represented another "accounting exercise" or 
what Power (1997) would term a "ritual of verification". 
"It struck me that the work of the risk management committee is about the 
guards around emergency exits, the stairs on upper floor buildings, so if there 
were any five year olds climbing around they won't be able to climb up the 
stairs. But we haven't seen to the everyday events that are happening. \\'e 
don't have such a system. So I just think that no I don't see doctors filling 
those in, in cases when they should have done. And at the moment I can't see 
a way to encourage them; they don't see that as their role." [PID 13] 
"If we are asked to fill in a lot more forms I think ... morale will go dowll 
even lower that it tends to be at the moment and there will be a suspicion that 
emphases will be placed perhaps not always on the things that might improve 
matters" [PID20]. 
"So I think some of the things get labelled with 'its just collecting data for 
the sake of it' because somebody in management has to tick boxes to send 
off to the Department of Health" [PID 10]. 
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Equally, doctors believed that reporting all clinical issues, even if it could be done, 
was of little relevance to the hospital-wide system because managers lacked the 
necessary expertise to 'decipher' the medical reports. Doctors therefore seemed to 
question the capacity of management to fully operationalise incident reporting and 
risk management due to different domains of expertise and the conceptualisation of 
error (see chapter six); in consequence it was felt that there was little purpose in 
reporting to the hospital centre. 
"I mean its all relevant to the trust but there are some things that are relevant 
more on a clinical level than on, you know, that are interesting to physicians 
but not necessarily have a major impact upon trust planning or financial 
implications." [PID29] 
Doctors did not outwardly suggest that hospital management did not want to develop 
safer organisational systems, but it seemed that the explicit purpose of the scheme 
was not yet sufficient in convincing doctors that meaningful change would be made. 
This was common to all directorates involved in the research, and seemingly the best 
way to overcome this problem was for local service leaders and risk managers to 
take more responsibility for reporting and provide professionals with greater clarity, 
purpose and visible change. 
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A lack of change and feedback 
Buttressing the doubts expressed about the purpose of reporting was the suggestion 
that there is insufficient feedback or visible service improvement even when forms 
had been returned to the hospital. This was the 'acid-test' for whether the scheme is 
useful in guiding health service change and worthy of medical professional 
participation. As touched upon above, one of the most prominent problems raised in 
the interviews was the ability of management groups to make sense of t l v ~ ~
information contained in reports and understand the most effective ways of bringing 
about change. For doctors the root of this problem appeared to be in the level 01 
expertise required to make meaningful improvements in clinical work; something 
that management groups cannot possess. Although this theme is explored in greater 
depth in chapter eight it contributes towards discouraging reporting. 
"That's the trouble isn't it, you can report these things till you are blue in the 
face, unless there is someone there to analyse and act upon them and then re-
audit them later, there is no point having an incident reporting scheme" 
[PID 17]. 
Rather than making change, it was the view of doctors that reports were sent off to 
the "faceless" organisational centre or "them over there" in corporate affairs, where 
it was merely collated and filed away without any thorough analysis. Rather than 
regarding reporting as important for making meaningful improvements doctors felt 
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that the hospital-wide reporting system (without local interventions) merely served 
managerial and national priorities that were not necessarily concerned with "rea'" 
quality issues. 
"The other thing is, what happens when you fill a form out, well by and large 
nothing, it's filed somewhere" [PIDS] 
"Yes, I think there is the potential problem of a them and us situation where 
the people working hard in the clinical situation and some manager sitting in 
an office somewhere is going to look at the incident form an come down 011 
us in a judgemental way, which causes the wrong attitude." [PfD25] 
This view may be a reflection of the lack of change that has occurred within the 
hospital based on incident reporting; nevertheless, it demonstrates a lack of 
confidence in the ability of hospital management to make service improvements. 
Consequentially, incident reporting is given less priority in the allocation of time and 
effort. 
"So I think one loses heart in, not only the work of recording these things just 
laking time, but also the benefit of the process unless you can see some clear 
benefit to you and your patients and colleagues" [PlDtO] 
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For doctors to participate more fully in incident reporting, particularly the hospital-
wide approach, it seems necessary therefore to show that change can and will be 
made with the data. However, this is clearly a "Catch-22" situation where doctors dl I 
not see any change and therefore do not report, but yet without medical reporting it 
can be argued that change cannot be made. 
"So if a doctor is confronted with mandatory reporting and they are quizzing 
and want to know what difference it will make they might devolve it to 
someone else ... what we would really prefer I think would be to focus on the 
things with maximum impact, and the way that I would see it is that if you 
deliver on the one thing and you have a culture that delivers on those things, 
as a spin off other things will be better" [PID14]. 
Associated with the lack of visible change doctors also emphasised the lack of 
feedback that they received following the submission of an incident form. It 
appeared that this was not only important for doctors to feel that their concerns had 
been listened to, but in addition it suggests that some change may transpire in the 
future and their concerns were being taken seriously. Without feedback doctors 
certainly felt discouraged to report in the future and again it was felt that hospital 
management just filed the forms and failed to give sufficient attention to the needs of 
those who took the time and effort to fill out and return the forms. 
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"if you keep filling in forms and sending them somewhere and nothing ever 
comes back ... its never going to be the top of your pile because you don't gel 
anything from it" [P/M3] 
"If it just goes in an envelope to hospital headquarters and you never hear 
about it again, probably not going to be of great use, you are going to lose 
enthusiasm" [PID25] 
''Trying to get doctors to fill out forms at the best of times isn't very easy. I 
think part of the reason for that is you do it and you don't actually get any 
feedback from it, it goes off somewhere and don't know who has reviewed it, 
you don't necessarily get any feedback" [PID21] 
Many of the doctors who took part in the research were aware of the overt or stated 
purpose of incident reporting to improve patient care through the identification of 
organisational problems. However, the doctors also suggested that the purpose of 
incident reporting, as it operated in the hospital, did not necessarily reflect this 
professed role, and there was seemingly a gap between policy and what was actually 
happening in the hospital. Within the hospital it was certainly clear that doctors were 
sceptical about the purpose of reporting to contribute to change at the hospital-level 
and this was endorsed by the lack of feedback and visible improvements. Underlying 
these problems, however, is an apparent split between the role of the directorates and 
the corporate centre in terms of controlling incident reporting. It seems that 
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professionals working in an area more familiar and experienced in incident reporting 
may share many of the concerns about the corporate centre but they regard reporting 
as beneficial because of the capacity for local control to make change and provide 
feedback; whereas in those areas where there is little local control there is a general 
scepticism about the purpose of reporting. 
The differential construction of error and adverse events 
One of the most important findings from the research was the way in which medical· 
errors are constructed with reference to the socio-cultural qualities of medical work 
and the discursive influence of medical knowledge. In the previous chapter it W ~ I S S
shown that doctors attempt to give meaning to an error in terms of the technical 
features of the event, but also with reference to a range of other significant factors, 
such as severity, complexity and uncertainty that can "accentuate" or "filter" the 
meaning of the event. In this way, an event is not necessarily regarded as an error 
based on technical or realist assumptions but it is constructed through the social 
fabric of medical work. What is developed is the idea that for an event to be reported 
it should not just be constructed as an error, but it needs to be re-constructed as 
something that necessitates reporting. For the purpose of this research. what doctors 
commonly call an "adverse event" reflects the assumption that it should be reported, 
as opposed to an "error" which does not necessarily lead to this action. This 
variation in terminology is indicative of the subtle difference and complexity at the 
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heart of the medical construction of error, and the different audiences to which 
meaning is being conveyed. 
What should be reported? 
Virtually all respondents suggested that in common with the difficulties of defining 
an error, they were also unsure what should be reported and how it should be 
distinguished from other events that occur in the delivery of health care. It was 
widely believed that the policy definitions were not clear and were sometimes 
"alien" to the assumptions and knowledge of medical work, and therefore they were 
regarded as managerial in tone and jargon. 
"Another barrier right at the other end .. .is understanding really what 
constitutes a serious incident" [P/M3]. 
This may be related to what was shown earlier about the perceived lack of purpose 
l6f"u:::- '; 
of incident report: if doctors do not fully understand what the aim of the scheme is or 
how it functions, then it can be expected that there is insufficient clarity about what 
should be reported. Several doctors suggested this problem could be overcome by 
directorates developing their own guidance for reporting, based on important local 
service issues. However, it was also believed that it would be difficult to achievc 
consensus, particularly between different staff groups as to the definition of \vhat 
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should be reported, and this may lead to further confusion about reporting or 
discourage those from reporting who do not necessarily agree with the definition. 
"It depends on whether there will be a narrow group of definitions. You 
could argue that perhaps there should be some key things to report on and 
those are the important things that should be targeted, but then again how do 
you arrive at a definition of what's the most important?" [PID21] 
"If there's a conflict at a lower level as to whether an error is an error, then 
people are unlikely to fill a form in and therefore incident reporting goes 
down" [PIMl] 
The definition of a reportable error and the criteria for reporting are central to any 
attempt to promote reporting. Varying understandings and meanings will inevitably 
lead to different levels of reporting as interpretative and conceptual differences have 
a bearing on action. This reflects the underlying character of social action, which is 
not adequately recognised in policy. The policy documentation (Department of 
Health 2001a) stresses the need for more guidance about the operational definition 
of "adverse event", yet there remains little comprehension that a single policy 
definition may have to compete with a professional based construction, as developed 
in chapter six. 
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Filtering errors 
The way in which medical professionals make sense of what should or should not be 
reported reflects in many ways the processes of interpreting an error, as shown in the 
previous chapter, specifically doctors filter events prior to deciding what to report. 
This is a crucial social process that seemingly undermines the mandatory 
expectations of policy as certain events are seen as "worth" reporting while other are 
rejected. 
"The professions will filter out what is going to be reported and what is not 
going to be reported" [PID26]. 
One doctor described this process, suggesting that many of the decision-making 
features of medicine involve a degree of reflection and cogitation. Through these 
stages doctors seem to question the assumptions surrounding an event, and in doing 
so interpret and filter the significant features: constructing the basis of what should 
be reported. 
"I think culturally one of the things that doctors think, rightly or wrongly, is 
that doctors take things in, play around with it in their minds, and they think 
that they sift out what is important anyway and therefore the 9 out of 10 
things that pass by don't fundamentally change things and they will 
concentrate just on the tenth. Why are you obliged to fill in about ten things 
rather than just pull out the important one" [PID 14] 
320 
Interestingly, it appears that this preference for mental reflection not only represents 
the process by which the meaning of an "error" and a reportable "adverse event" is 
developed, but it is also indicative of a more general rejection of mandatory and 
unquestioning bureaucratic procedures. 
"I think the issue of selectivity is particularly true amongst medics. Its partly 
relates to, I think, shunning bureaucracy and partly relates to the spectrum of 
experience. I think that some things, a lot of things, go well and some things 
don't go so well, and I think that is multi-factorial, but every time something 
doesn't go well then you don't necessarily report it." [PIDS] 
As shown in chapter six, filtering is therefore an important feature of the way in 
which doctors come to make sense of an error and also what should be reported. In 
this way, errors are either re-constructed as an "adverse event" that should be 
reported or they are filtered and_d_ealt with through other forms of action; like errors, 
adverse events have a "transient" meaning. 
Trivial or clinically relevant 
The most common basis by which errors are filtered or re-constructed relates to the 
clinical relevance of the event. It was frequently stated that the managerial 
expectation for reporting includes events that medical professionals consider 
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"trivial" or of little significance for service development. Importantly, doctors 
suggested that reporting should be reserved, not for every single error, but for only 
those events that management groups can understand and can inform organisational 
change. 
"So if you are reporting everything and you want to get the clinicians 
involved it mustn't be trivial reporting just for the sake of numbers" [PID31]. 
"But there's a difference between, you know, just silly incidents and real 
problems" [PID5]. 
An example of this was provided by a surgeon who suggested that the range of 
errors in surgery can be vast, but often these are trivial and would provide little 
useful information to anyone beyond the individual involved. 
"i mean every time you do an operation something happens that you perhaps 
.... ~ ~ ~
wish it hadn't, but usually its: you tie a stitch and break the thread and you 
have to put a couple of extra stitches in, pretty trivial but you know its a silly 
thing and if every time you did something like that somebody filled a form in 
it would be ridiculous" [P/D5]. 
Doctors, therefore, filter events based on the perceived relevance of the event to 
their own work or the hospital. However, this appears to work on a contradictory 
basis. It is widely suggested that the events that should be reported are those that ~ r e e
the most clinically relevant, but as already shown these are the types of errors that 
doctors feel necessitate medical expertise in order to interpret and understand; 
whereas it is the trivial events that doctors seem to suggest managers should deal 
with, yet these are not worth reporting because they will not lead to any meaningful 
change in clinical work. Of importance in this paradoxical situation is the perception 
and meaning attached to severity and complexity in shaping the meaning of a 
reportable "adverse event". 
Severity 
Concern with the severity of harm is an implicit feature of medical culture, 
especially as medicine is driven by a desire to improve health. In other words, 
particular severe events are seen as necessary to report because there is some need to 
share this information with the hospital, possibly for defensive purposes to "cover 
the doctor's back" against future reprisals. Again there is an important caveat, as 
shown previously, medical professionals are also aware that in many of the tasks 
they undertake errors or complications are to varying extents expected. As shown in 
chapter six, the threats and actual damage to patient health are balanced with the 
long-term objectives of medical work. In consequence, severity is not merely a 
matter of deciding whether an error was of a sufficient level that it should be 
reported, but it involves the interpretation of whether any negative impact is above 
and beyond those expected in a given procedure. 
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"I think an incident however severe in theatre, an anaesthetist will only fill it 
in if it has been particularly severe or if it is of particular interest. perhaps a 
scientific or quirky nature" [PID26]. 
Another factor that encourages medical professionals to rep0l1 errors is the 
perceived impact that the information will have on service improvement. I f a doctor 
thinks that some form of change is desired or feasible they are more likely to report 
incidents in the hope that change will be made. This again relates to severity, as 
doctors seemed to suggest that particularly severe and significant errors should be 
reported so that management action can attempt to promote change. llowcycr, this is 
another paradox: on the one hand professionals appeared to base the significance of 
an event on technical clinical grOlmds that relate to patient health care, which they 
suggest is beyond managerial appreciation, but they also prefer to report events that 
managers can remedy. 
('omplexily, uncertainly and non-medical groups 
Underlying the subjective and interpretative basis of medical decision-making and 
reporting is the inherent complexity of medical work and the problem of uncertainty 
111 medical knowledge (Fox 1975). As shown in the previous chapter, this has a 
major impact on how doctors struggle to come to tenns with potential errors, and 
this is similarly an issue for the constructive processes relevant to rcporting A 
predominant concern raised by many doctors was the view that errors are not easily 
definable with universal characteristics, and equally there was no clear basis on 
which to base decisions",about reporting. The complexity of medical work and tht' 
"gaps" in medical knowledge were therefore central features in the construction of a 
reportable adverse event. 
"People will find it difficult to report things because its not black and white: 
for example if I was doing an operation and we know that we need to avoid 
injury, lets say it's a hernia operation so we need to avoid injury to a nerve 
during the time of dissection, we know the nerve is at risk and you try to 
identify it. So when you are doing the dissection and displaying the nerve 
you can have scissors almost cutting the nerve as you are looking for it. Now 
would that warrant an incident report, well no." [PID30]. 
Accordingly, it was further suggested that a problem with mandatory reporting 
relates to the imperfect character of medical work. As in the previous chapter 
medicine is seen as an imperfect "art" and is characterised by uncertainty. In 
consequence reporting every unexpected event is generally regarded as wasteful and 
would not provide information to assist in meaningful service improvement. An 
underlying issue in the medical construction of a reportable adverse event is the 
interpretation of this complexity and its relevance to non-medical groups. 
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''To fill out a bit of paper every time something isn't perfect is just 
ludicrous .... We as individuals I think are never going to be perfect and, you 
know, whatellef" people say about a consultant provided service and things, 
mistakes are made like in any other profession" [PID9]. 
''The majority of patients or over half the patients will have some sort if 
complication which can be treated; that's the norm it's not an adverse event 
necessarily. So I don't believe all surgical complications should be reported 
as an incident" [PID25]. 
Summary 
One of the major findings from this research is the way in which medical errors are 
constructed from the influence of medical knowledge and working practices. In the 
previous chapter these were explored at length, yet the relevance of these findings is 
. ~ - ' : :.. ' .. 
also found in the way in which the meaning of error correlates with particular forms 
of social action. Of importance here is the way in which an error is constructed 
differently from an adverse event, with reference to issues of severity, complexity 
and uncertainty and in the context that a non-medical occupational group will 
appraise any report. 
It is only when an error has been re-constructed that it will promote the social action 
desired by policy, namely reporting. The interpretation process (figure 7.1) involves 
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a range of stages, from the construction of an 'error' and its re-construction as an 
'adverse event', and these are based on important social and cultural filters. 
Figure 7.1. Overview of the social process of error construction and adverse event 
re-construction. 
Recognised Technical! Constructed Reporting Adverse 
event I ~ ~ Social filter --. error --. filters --. event 
types 
Medical culture, professionalism and reporting 
The final substantive theme found in the data relates to the broad social and cultural 
features of medical work that seem to underpin the aversion towards incident 
reportingo_ It was widely and strongly argued by doctors that reporting is simply not 
an accepted feature of their work or culture; it was described as "alien" to their 
practice and not something that they were taught about in training. Even for thosc 
doctors working in areas where reporting was more established, such as Obstetrics, it 
was still apparent that an aversion to report was integrally bound up with medical 
culture. 
"You might say it's the culture and it's not just being defensivc" [PID9]. 
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''The consultants are even more reluctant to report, but that is very much the 
culture thing" [PIO 17] . 
. ,- -:". 
"I think we are perhaps just non-conformist in that sense." [PID 14] 
Although the culture of medical practice and professionalism has been widely 
discussed (Lupton 1998, Nettleton 1995, Rosenthal 1995), it is rarely the case that it 
has been explored in the context of incident reporting, the possible exception being 
the role of blame and collegiality in inhibiting openness (Kennedy 2001, Rosenthal 
1995). Again the concern with blame figures prominently, but this study also found 
a range of other cultural facets of medical professionalism that impact upon incident 
reporting. 
The inevitability of mistake 
"It's not good enough to be average, everybody's expected to be above 
average and you can't be" [PI05] 
"You will stop yourself and say: well, okay there but for the Grace of God, I 
am not going to do it again, I have learnt my lesson: I am not going to fill a 
form in about this" [PID26]. 
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As mentioned in the previous chapter doctors accepted the inevitability of mistakes 
in their work and the subjective character of their practice. Importantly, the cultural 
a c c e p t a n ( ; e ~ . . pf this inevitability has a major impact incident reporting. In the first 
instance it is suggested that those outside medicine do not always share the 
appreciation for the risks and mistakes of medical work. In consequence, doctors are 
fearful that external groups, particularly, managers, the media and the public may 
not be sympathetic, when in fact these problems are merely inevitable features of 
medicine. Secondly, although clinical risk management is seen as having some role 
in improving health care services, it is believed that they will never be able to fully 
eradicate the problem of error. Doctors are therefore more accepting of certain 
degrees of mistake, and give less priority to reporting. Furthermore, given thus 
inevitability, managerial systems are often seen as intrusive and regulatory. 
Fear and professional blame 
Leape (1999) suggests that medicine is driven by the pursuit of perfection and where 
this is not attained there is common professional response to blame those individuals 
that do wrong (Berwick and Leape 1999). This is seen as inhibiting doctors from 
being open about their problems and potentially leading doctors to conceal mistakes 
(Department of Health 2000, Leape 1999, Kennedy 2001, Rosenthal 1995). Fear is 
indeed a major aspect of medical culture that acts as a powerful barrier to reporting. 
However, as shown in chapter six, doctors are clearly aware that mistakes are an 
inevitable feature of their work and it is often suggested that the desire for perfection 
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rests less with medical practitioners and more at a societal level. Furthermore it has 
been found by Rosenthal (1995) that doctors are often supportive of 'problem 
doctors'. It therefore becomes necessary to understand more about the dynamics of 
fear and blame in medical culture. 
It was rare for any doctor involved in the research not to mention the negative 
impact of blame; and it is not surprising to find that doctors frequently offered this to 
justify the professional reluctance to report. It was suggested that blame did not 
simply involve the apportioning of responsibility and penalties. but in the medical 
world its labelling effects could be long lasting amongst professional peers and on 
career prospects. One doctor mentioned the enormous impact that "scandals" can 
have on the family once they reach the media. 
"Reporting on the medical side is perceived as a blame thing" [PID9] 
"And there's a culture of not wanting to fill these things in and wondering 
what sort of blame is going to come your way if you do" [PID5]. 
"Doctors always complain that they won't fill in an incident form because it 
will just blame, look bad on their references and they'll get it in the neck 
from their consultants" [PIM6]. 
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Although great efforts have been made to inform doctors about the non-punitive, 
"no-blame", or "just" culture of incident reporting, it was still felt that these systems 
are a further "stick to beat doctors" and represent a new method for identifying and 
monitoring medical performance and then allocating responsibility or blame. 
"It looks to me like a witch hunt, another witch hunt and lets face it from 
what is said earlier you are going to get errors, individual errors from people 
under pressure, perhaps being asked to do the jobs they are not trained for, 
and you are going to get system errors, and you are going to have that and if 
you start reporting to the DoH and don't outline the reasons, then it is going 
to seem just like another witch hunt against clinical staff on the front line 
who are doing their best" [PID20] 
"Although that culture has changed I still think there are a lot of people who 
would be reluctant if they could get away with it because there would still be 
a fear of retribution and no amount of mandatory will make any difference" 
[P1R27] 
"People have so many things to do that I think it is unrealistic unless you can 
get it into the culture" [PIDIO] 
This culture of blame was also compounded by a fear of litigation. It was often 
suggested that society is much more litigious and medical work is more open to the 
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scrutiny of lawyers and the courts if patients feel they have been treated 
inappropriately. Doctors often discussed the legal implications of incident reporting. 
suggesting that hospital documents would provide the source from which future 
legal claims could be based. In this way, the lessons of Bristol (Kennedy 2001) may 
not have been fully learnt, as it still seems that doctors are wary of being open about 
their mistakes and inadequacy, despite being open about the imperfections of 
medicine. 
" ... it's partly culture, its fear of litigation and litigation is on the increase, 
and its partly the old culture of preferment in terms of jobs and things and 
how consultants and seniors could blot your career" [PIM6]. 
The rejection of bureaucracy 
Another interesting finding amongst doctors was their general revulsion of 
bureaucracy, paper work and managerial rule. This point was discussed earlier in 
terms of the time and effort required for participation in incident reporting, but it 
was also found that there was a more deep-seated loathing of complex and rule-
based organisational structures. This was expressed as a general rejection of 
mandatory and managerial approaches to hospital control, and in particular with a 
rejection of reporting. 
"So I think the culture is never going to be there for a mass of form filling, 
however much you say fill in forms, fill in forms, fill in forms. It will neYer 
happen" [P!D9] 
"I think culturally doctors are the worst people to follow mandatory rule, if 
there is anything mandatory doctors will think of a way for somebody else to 
do it for them" [P!D14]. 
"To fill out a form is not in the medical culture as yet" [P!D30]. 
"We don't like filling out forms" [P!D25]. 
This anti-bureaucratic sentiment within medical culture may be symbolic of the 
competing forms of organisational and occupational control found within the NHS. 
On the one hand, medical professionalism has a long history of occupational control 
based on a strict demarcation between roles and has traditionally been central to the 
social organisation and division of labour in health care (Freidson 1970). As shown 
in chapter two, there has been an increased management responsibility and authority 
in the NHS since the early 1980s and this has been interpreted as 'challenging' 
medical professionalism. It appears that a cultural and occupational response to stich 
changes is the general rejection of managerial and bureaucratic forms of social 
organisation as they impact upon professional forms of social organisation (Freidson 
2000), which in this case centres on incident reporting. This theme is developed in 
333 
chapter eight, but it was evident from the discussions with doctors that incident 
reporting represents a managerial process that does not reflect the way in which 
doctors work, in particular doctors present themselves as more reflective and less 
rule based. 
Professional differences 
Another important finding was the common medical view that incident reporting, 
although run by managers, is actually a "nurse" based scheme. It was often stated 
that reporting is an established feature of the nursing profession, where "form-
filling" and "paper work" are accepted characteristics of this occupation. However, 
these are not found in medicine because doctors worked in a different way to nursc.'i 
and had different expectations and procedures. Furthermore, it was frequently stated 
that incident reporting was more geared towards nursing issues and it did not easily 
translate to reflect medical work. 
"Whereas the nurse will tend to fill in absolutely anything, that sounds a bit 
unfair, but they certainly have a lower threshold, which I'm sure arises out of 
genuine concern for patient care and quality of care, but there is also this 
element of 'I'm filling this in to cover my self and I have passed it on'''. 
[PID26] 
"I am sure nurses will feel obliged to do that, because they are trained to do 
that. You can see the strengths in both systems; while one system under-
reports but avoids bureaucracy, you still fill in an incident form. Investigate 
what happened and don't do it again. Whereas the other one is obvious I) 
very safe but creates a mass of writing and work." [PID26] (on the difference 
between nursing and medicine) 
"And the trust policy is that the triplicate forms are used for patient falls, 
doctors regard those as nurse initiated and about falls in hospital" [PID 13]. 
The way in which doctors often talked about incident reporting was frequently 'off 
hand' and demeaning to the nursing profession. It may be the case that forms of 
reporting are indeed a more longstanding features of nursing, but for doctors it is 
associated with a different form of professionalism and certainty not one associated 
with medicine, which is seen as inherently more complex and based upon both 
expert medical knowledge and acquired experience. 
Summary: cuLture, complexity and self-reguLation 
Underlying all these findings is the medical preference for forms of quality control 
associated with professionalism. The antipathy and even outright disregard for 
incident reporting seems to stem in many ways from an underlying cultural 
predilection for self-regulation couched in the belief that medical work is complex 
and premised on expert knowledge. In consequence, medical professionals claim the 
ability and legitimacy to interpret and control issues of quality, while other 
occupational groups are excluded. Although this theme is explored more thoroughly 
in the following chapter, it obviously has a significant impact on incident reporting 
because by not reporting doctors are maintaining internal occupational control. 
The 'self-regulatory' character of medical professionalism has been well discussed 
in chapter two, where it was shown that it is frequently regarded as a cornerstone of 
professionalism, along with a high degree of autonomy, public service ethic, and the 
possession of expert knowledge (Wilding 1980). Freidson (1970, 2000) argues that 
this regulatory framework is premised upon the acquisition of expert and esoteric 
knowledge by certain occupational groups, and where other groups cannot acquire 
and pass judgement on this knowledge, leading to claims for self-regulation. Its 
impact on incident reporting is found in the general feeling amongst doctors that 
errors relate to the complexity of medical knowledge and work, and as shown in the 
previous chapter, they are clouded by the interpretation of uncertainty. 
Consequently, the new managerial approach to error control is not seen as 
possessing the knowledge and experience necessary to understand medical errors, 
instead it is commonly seen as a politically-inspired initiative to acquire more 
control over the NHS and medical labour. Hospital based incident reporting is 
therefore seen as illegitimate. Even if it draws upon medical assistance. it cannot 
possess sufficient knowledge to meaningfully understand the incident. 
"The consultants are even more reluctant to report, but that is very much the 
culture thing. The consultants have all grown up in a non-rt:porting era, 
reporting is relatively a recent thing as far as we are concerned." [PID 17] 
"They can't understand what we mean ... how can they" [PID30] 
"It's a big brother thing ... " [PID5] 
It was found that new styles of clinical risk management are regarded as monitoring 
medical work through external agencies and this represent a challenge to the time-
honoured and revered regulatory arrangement for medicine. It can certainly be 
understood why medical professionals may feel this way, as incident reporting 
seemingly represents a form of external audit on medical quality, driven by political 
and managerial groups, which has the potential to delve to the very Achilles heel of 
medicine: errors. This not only has the potential to challenge a key aspect of 
professionalism, but for doctors it could represent an affront to medical knowledge 
itself. It was therefore not surprising for doctors to offer a range of other methods in 
which quality issues and errors are being addressed from within the profession. It 
was quite common for surgeons to refer to Morbidity and Mortality Committees, and 
Medical Audit as established collegial systems for addressing errors and providing 
local feedback. The view of some doctors and managers was that despite the calls 
for cultural change in policy, the underlying character of medical professionalism 
will not easily accept reporting as a technique of quality improvement. 
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"B ut I thi nk on the medical side you will never get a culture where all these 
are picked up. That's part of medical culture" [PfD9]. 
Discussion: a culture of reporting in medicine? 
This chapter has described the systems of incident reporting found within the case 
study organisation. Managed and directed from the corporate centre, it was found 
that a hospital-wide incident reporting system has been in place since the mid-1990s, 
and over the course of the fieldwork it was clear that hospital managers were 
concerned with transforming and promoting this system in line with the emerging 
patient safety policy agenda. It was also found that hospital managers and leaders 
believed there was a problem with securing medical participation in this system and 
there was "medical under-reporting". However, the study revealed that medical 
reporting varied across the directorates of the organisation and reflecting 
professional, organisational and cultural differences. It appeared that in some 
locations medical reporting pre-dated the hospital system and emerged as a 
professional response to external pressures, such litigation; whereas in otl1l'r 
directorates more informal systems existed for the recognition of problems. 
Generally there was little inclination for medical participation in the hospital-wide 
system and a preference for systems of local medical control. 
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It appears that there are several issues that inhibit medical reporting. The first centres 
on the practical inability of managers to prove the worth of reporting through either 
feedback or acknowledged change, in addition to the practical problems of form 
design, time constraints and administrative support. These suggest that management 
change rather than professional change may be more fruitful in securing greater 
reporting. The second theme of reporting barriers centres on the attitude and culture 
of medicine. It is argued in policy and theory that cultural change is required to 
promote reporting yet beyond the ubiquitous concern with blame there is little 
detailed evidence of what aspects of medical culture inhibit reporting. As shown 
above there was a crucial conceptual and perceptual problem with understanding 
what constitutes a reportable error in addition to the professional rejection of 
bureaucracy and preference for collegial systems. 
These factors can be seen as barriers to reporting that have emerged from the 
interactional context of medical work whilst also influence by national professional 
expectations and norms. However, it is also possible to-argue that medical culture is 
not just a barrier to reporting but from a 'radical' perspective. (Parker 2000) it can be 
interpreted as resistant to reporting. In particular it appears that managerial attempts 
to encourage reporting fail to acknowledge what doctors consider to be the 
complexities and subtleties of medical work, whilst it represents managerial and 
bureaucratic intervention in medical work. The normative rejection of reporting 
therefore becomes a strategy for limiting the encroachment of managerial techniques 
in medical work, whilst reinforcing the medical norms of control and collegiality. 
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Given these cultural considerations it is not surprising to find that professional 
control was crucial to the promotion of medical reporting: where manageriaVrisk 
management approaches had been successfully introduced there was significant 
professional leadership and control to accommodate these processes and cultural 
barriers. This may suggest that the rejection of reporting may be an attempt to fend 
off increased managerial control in medical work. 
These findings raise serous questions for the success of incident reporting within the 
National System. The policy has recognised the cultural problems of medical 
openness and transparency, and refers to the impact of blame and the need for 
cultural change to promote incident reporting. However, issue must be taken with 
policy in this regard. In the first instance policy lacks a detailed appreciation of 
medical culture, how it is theoretically conceived and how it operates in relation to 
incident reporting: blame is certainly an issue but as this chapter has shown there are 
other facets to consider. Secondly, both theory aIl4.policy advocate cultural change 
but, as discussed in chapter four and shown above, there is no appreciation of the 
theoretical debates surrounding organisational culture and the bearing these could 
have on policy implementation, especially the conflicts of culture between 
managerial and medical groups. 
In policy organisational culture is conceptualised as a structural property of an 
organisation that can have a functional utility in aligning employees to managerial 
340 
goals, and importantly it can be modified through management activity. TIle policy 
seems to suggest that currently doctors do not appreciate or understand what 
reporting can do and therefore it is necessary to provide a"low-blame" environment 
to encourage participation and to acquire the normative compliance of doctors. 
However, other concepts and theories of organisational culture reveal the 
interactional and antagonistic aspects of organisational life. From this perspective it 
could be argued that the desire for cultural change actually represents a form of 
managerial control, ensuring medical compliance to managerial rule. It could also be 
argued that by failing to consider the interactional and radical aspects of culture, 
policy fails to consider that culture cannot easily be controlled or 'tweaked' from a 
top-down structural perspective. 
Developing these alternative perspectives, it is argued here that medical culture, as it 
pertains to reporting, is indeed varied and based within the interactions and 
experiences of medical work at the directorate level of hospital organisation, as well 
as reflective of broader professional concerns. However, it is also possible to argue 
that medical culture is not just presenting barriers to incident reporting, but by 
adopting a more critical perspective it can be suggested that the culture of non-
reporting in medicine is resistant to managerial systems that are trying to encourage 
medical reporting and openness. The medical attitudes and actions with regards to 
reporting therefore reinforce professional legitimacy and exclude non-medical 
groups. 
341 
8. The management and control of medical errors 
Introduction 
The proposed National System aims to enable hospitals and the NHS to learn about 
errors, but more importantly to promote safer and more risk controlled health care 
systems. Incident reports provide a key source of information about the occurrence 
and character of 'adverse events' and 'near misses', and it is through the analysis of 
this data that 'lessons' can be learnt and shared, and the risks of error managed. As 
shown earlier the Human Factors approach has made a significant contribution to 
health policy directing managerial attention towards both the "active" error and also 
the "latent" systemic factors. This "root cause analysis" involves examining the 
underlying factors that enable errors to occur through forms of risk stratification and 
then promoting safer systems (Department of Health 2000, 200 I). 
It is shown in chapter two, that medical professionals have well established formal 
and informal mechanisms for the regulation of their work. Yet alongside these 
'collegial' approaches to quality control alternate 'managerial' approaches have 
developed, such as risk management. In this context the National System requires 
further managerial activity in the control of health service quality. In the first 
instance this is associated with encouraging professionals to be more open and report 
incidents, as discussed in chapter seven. In the second instance and of interest here 
the National System involves the analysis of incident data to inform organisational 
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change. Specifically, the policy introduces new management structures and 
procedures for analysing incident reports and making change. Of theoretical and 
empirical importance, these could represent new bureaucratic and documented forms 
of organisational control that furnish management groups with new structural 
powers in health care. 
This chapter provides an account of the current managerial approach to clinical risk 
and error management in the case-study hospital. In the first section, a descriptive 
overview of the hospital-wide arrangements and procedures for clinical risk/error 
management is given, which is explicitly premised on the implementation of the 
National System. The chapter then gives an account of variations in error 
management found at the directorate level of the hospital. In a similar manner to the 
discussion of incident reporting, it is shown how different directorates within the 
hospital have developed distinct approaches to clinical risk management, ranging 
from those predominantly based on professional regulatory systems, to more 
corporate-style systems that reflect the ideals of policy. Following this descripti ve 
account, the chapter turns to the normative views of doctors working in the case 
study showing the normative basis of such variations and why the hospital-wide 
approach is not widely adopted. In discussion the hospital-wide approach and the 
directorate variations are then discussed in terms of the changing organisational 
control and management of medical errors. Addressing the debates laid out tn 
chapter four, it IS questioned whether the policy does represent a new form of 
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bureaucratic control and to what extent in alters established medical approaches to 
quality improvement. 
The hospital management of clinical risks and errors 
Systems for the management and control of medical errors in the NHS have been 
both explicit and implicit. As shown earlier, changes in professional practice and 
regulation have implicitly promoted new techniques to control clinical performance 
and mistakes, couched within notions of professionalism. Alternatively, over the last 
ten years schemes such as CNST and the pressure of litigation have necessitated 
more explicit and pro-active managerial systems of clinical risk management. 
Although the implementation of the National System involves NHS Trusts meeting a 
collection of new 'requirements', it is also the case that this will inevitably build 
upon current hospital practices. This section shows how the management 'centre' of 
the hospital is attempting introduce policy and introduce new error management 
systems that precede the collection of incident reports. 
Despite the variations in incident reporting across the hospital, there remains a core 
corporate responsibility for the collection and analysis of reports, located within the 
Department of Corporate Affairs. During the course of the fieldwork corporatc 
leaders in the hospital appeared eager to develop existing risk management systems 
in readiness for policy implementation. It has been possible to observc many of these 
changes as committee structures have been modified, new organisational groups 
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have emerged and new methods of analysis utilised. Not only do these changes 
demonstrate the desire to meet the requirements of policy, but also the character in 
which changes are occurring illustrates a desire for greater managerial control of 
errors. 
The corporate collection of incident reports 
As outlined earlier, the Department of Corporate Affairs has overall day-to-day 
responsibility for incident reporting and clinical risk management within the 
hospital. It is to this department that incident reports should be returned \vithin the 
Trust. This system has been operating for over eight years and annually the 
department receives on average 3500 forms. The passage of incident reports from 
the 'form filler' to the 'corporate centre' can involve a range of different 
organisational actors some of which are also involved in the processes of clinical 
risk management. It was suggested the process of completing and returning a form 
can be such that it was common for Corporate Affairs to receive forms, sometimes, 
weeks after the incident had occurred and this limited the capacity for rapid 
corporate action where necessary. 
"It does take time and sometimes we get them weeks or even months after 
[the event] ... It means that we can't really do anything there and then" 
[P/M33]. 
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This is not to say that incidents are not managed or controlled effectively, but it 
could suggest that due to the line management structure of the hospital, with 
information passing from individuals,-through directorates and divisions and then to 
the corporate centre the capacity for central management action can be limited by 
such processes. However, it is worth pointing out the more severe or serious 
untoward incidents are typically reported to Corporate Affairs with considerable 
speed and are 'flagged-up' using other communication systems, such as the 
telephone, e-mail or personal communications. 
The corporate analysis of incident reports 
After receiving the incident forms the Department of Corporate Affairs has 
responsibility for the collation and analysis of this information. At the outset of the 
research, a sub-group of this department had primary responsibility for clinical risk 
management, comprising two part-time and job-sharing risk co-ordinators. Their 
roles included cataloguing individual forms, recording the basic information, such as 
location and incident codes, and if required, liaising with the reporter or other staff 
in order to investigate the incidents in greater depth. This information was then 
stored using a general computer database. 
At this time in the research process, the analysis of incident data was nonnally 
involved manual reading the fonns and the collection of further information from 
professionals within the organisation. It was commonly suggested that this process 
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required the risk co-ordinators to possess a clinical background in order to 
understand what was reported. Without such experience and expertise it was 
believed that the information could not be used "effectively" to understand the 
events or promote organisational change. 
"I think it's essential for clinical risk management to have a clinical 
background not only ... so that you understand different cases scenarios and 
errors and contributing factors to errors, because you have worked in that 
setting and you understand the language and process and that kind of thing is 
essential." [PIMl]. 
The risk co-ordinators and also those with more senior managerial authority in the 
Department of Corporate Affairs, including the Director and Deputy Director 
suggested that they had acquired this expertise through previous nursing roles held 
earlier in their careers. It was believed that this enabled them to appreciate the 
technical details of the J ~ p o r t s s and appropriately analyse the data. However, as we 
shall see later it is not always common for this view to be shared by other 
professionals within the hospital who appeared more sceptical about the level and 
type of expertise found within the mana'gement of the hospitals 
The initial analysis phase generally focussed on identifying the general character of 
the incidents: ascertaining what transpired, whether this was to be expectt:d or 
whether it was uncommon or threatening to the patient. In many ways this process 
was aided by the incident 'reporter' entering a specific 'incident code', this indicated 
what they believed to be the type of adverse event. The role of the risk co-ordinator 
therefore centred on verifying the assessment made by the reporter. 
The second general phase of the analysis process typically involved USIng the 
amassed information from across the different hospital directorates to develop an 
understanding of incident patterns and trends. This "trend analysis" required the risk 
co-ordinator to identify the most common types of incident, where and when they 
occurred and to ascertain whether further action is needed from the corporate level. 
This 'trend' data was seen as important for identifying problematic and reoccurring 
service issues, where adverse events were consistent and where individual action 
may be influenced by accident-prone organisational systems or upstream decision-
making. For example, the observations revealed that a common trend was for 
incidents to occur following a 'shift change' on the wards due to a range of possible 
effects, including fractured communication or disjointed care provision. In this way, 
trend data is used to ,guide further investigations or suggest where organisational 
change might be required. 
As well as providing information about incident type and frequency, the clinical risk 
co-ordinators also used the information to provide a risk stratification of adverse 
events to more thoroughly inform management decision-making. Developed from 
the policy guidelines, this involved estimating the actual or potential frequency of 
the event, to which the trend data was pivotal, but also gauging the severity of harm 
to the patient. This process was initially guided by a 3 by 3 risk matrix (see figure 
8.1) with severity and frequency plotted on the different axis. In this way the 
combination of these two dimensions could provide an initial risk stratification of 
the incident on which further action could be based. This process was also enhanced 
through the use of a 'traffic-light' colour coding system that indicated the level of 
action possibly required within the hospital. For example, a highly severe and highly 
frequent event would lead to a 'code red' risk that should lead to an immediate 
organisational response to control further risk. However, a low frequency and low 
severity incident would be classified as a "green" risk that would lead to minimal 
intervention presuming that immediate action taken by the relevant professional has 
dealt with the incident when it occurred. This information would be reported to the 
Clinical Risk Management Committee where 'red light' incidents could be discussed 
and detailed investigations co-ordinated. 
Figure 8.1 Example of Risk Matrix 
Severity Low Medium High 
Frequency 
Low Grecn Green 
Medium Green Red 
High d I Red Red 
'Trend data' and 'risk stratification' are well-established methods of analysing 
incident forms within the Department of Corporate Affairs. Together they indicate to 
the risk co-ordinators where high risks of error and reoccurring service issues are 
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located around the hospital. Consequently, this information can be used to point out 
where detailed investigations or enquiries are needed to gain a more thorough 
understanding of clinical errors and risks. The representatives from Corporate 
Affairs involved in the research were eager to use this information to inform "root 
cause analysis" and respondents frequently spoke of the need to understand the 
latent factors underlying incidents 
"And you know with OWAM [Organisation with a Memory] and the Patient 
Safety Agency we're meant to do root cause analysis of each error, which is 
great and so you should and people are trying to do that to analyse the errors 
in more detail now, so the person left holding the parcel when the music 
stops isn't the only person that's considered that had some responsibility 
within the process." [P/M6] 
However, it was also suggested that the capacity for the risk co-ordinators to 
thoroughly a_ualyse all reoccurrmg events and high-risk reports was limited by 
excessive workload and as such only the most critical or severe events tended to 
acquire this analytical attention. In consequence, the corporate centre of the hospital 
frequently relied upon local risk managers, line managers and clinical directors at 
the directorate level to provide further investigations about the character and origin 
of errors. Moreover, while this information could have been used in a proactive 
'human factors' fashion, it appeared that more frequently these findings were 
communicated to the Clinical Risk Management Committee which had overall 
350 
responsibility for over-seeing clinical risk management and incident reporting. The 
relationship between the risk co-ordinators and the committee structure of the 
hospital is highly important for the hospital's approach to error/risk management and 
is discussed below. 
Changes in the corporate approach to risk management 
During the course of the fieldwork several significant changes occurred within the 
within the Department of Corporate Affairs and the hospital's clinical risk 
management system. These changes were brought about by a desire to create greater 
vertical management accountability, to streamline the committee structure of the 
hospital and to prepare the hospital for the National System. At the organisational 
level, the committee structure of the hospital was modified including changes to the 
Clinical Risk Management Committee; whilst in the Department of Corporate 
Affairs the two risk co-ordinators terminated their positions for personal reasons, 
leaving t h ~ ~ day-to-day responsibility for clinical risk management temporarily in the 
hands of the Deputy Director of Corporate Affairs. Prior to replacements being 
found for these roles it presented the Deputy Director with an opportunity to assess 
the risk co-ordinating function and how it might be improved to meet the 
requirements of policy. 
The main changes that were introduced during the course of the fieldwork were the 
introduction of two new members of staff to fill the vacant positions, the purchase of 
1St 
a specialist computer package to assist in data collection and analysis, and attempts 
to improve incident reporting. These developments were also mirrored by changes in 
the corporate c.mnmittee structure, which are discussed later. 
"The process as it stands at the moment. .. we have a clerical officer who 
inputs all the incident forms into a system called Datex as of the first of 
April. Before she does them there is a nurse who works a couple of hours a 
week who goes through them grading them for severity and the likelihood of 
them happening again. So what's written on the form gets put in but also 
with a grading. Any incident that is graded as an amber or a red risk ... she 
uses that to help her review whether we have got something that is a potential 
risk, either in the fact it could happen many times or the consequences to that 
individual are serious" [PfM28]. 
The main analytical changes were captured in the hospital's strategy document for 
the Management of Risk. This document explicitly linked the hospital's incident 
reporting and clinical risk management system to the wider changes in national 
policy, demonstrating the Trust's readiness to adopt the National System. 
Accordingly, the document outlines an explicit Risk Management Cycle for the 
hospital, demonstrating a renewed vigour in the Trust's approach to clinical risk 
management (figure 8.2). This shows how the identification of risks, primarily 
through incident reports, but also including complaints data and other similar 
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sources, should lead to analysis that informs particular forms of organisational 
control. 
To improve the analysis of clinical risks the hospital also re-designed its risk 
stratification matrix in line with policy, replacing the three-by-three scoring tool 
with one composed offive categories for frequency and severity (figure 8.3) and 
leading to four categories of corporate response as opposed to the traffic light 
system. Again this information is communicated to the committee level where 
decisions are made about the appropriate investigation, risk calculation and remedial 
or proactive action, ideally reflecting the principles of "root cause analysis". 
Figure 8.2. The Risk Management Cycle 
ANALYSE 
MONITOR CONTROL MONITOR 
PREVENT 
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Figure 8.3. Revised Risk Matrix 
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In line with the risk management cycle, the information acquired through the 
analysis of incident data can guide three forms of corporate action. First, is 
'avoiding' the risk, for example developing new systems, working practices or using 
different equipment ina n attempt to evade r e-occurrence. Secondly, clinical risks 
can be 'prevented' by ceasing particular activities and therefore eliminating the 
chance of further incidents. Finally, risks can be "accepted" and in such cases the 
hospital must try to control their frequency and their impact, both in terms of costs 
and patient harm; this may include providing training to limit their frequency or 
developing safety-nets. 
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Despite the corporate analysis of incident data, two significant queries emerge from 
the study. First, the analysis of data at the 'corporate centre' does not fully reflect the 
expectations of policy in terms of "root causes analysis"; it appears that hospital still 
has some work to do to fully implement the requirements of policy. Second, 
managerial action and inspired change was not particularly evident in the hospital or 
reflected in the views of professionals. These limitations may relate to the problems 
in corporate structure of the hospital, given that the focal point for decision-making 
and action is split between the Committee level and the Department of Corporate 
Affairs. Within these arenas it appears that action can be confused and frequently 
protracted. The strategy document makes clear these arrangements and shows that 
the information collected and analysed should be used to inform hospital-wide 
action through the sub-committees of the Trust's Risk Committee and the Divisional 
Risk Committees across the divisions of the hospital. Furthermore, while the 
corporate centre can take a lead in analysis and decision-making, it is presumed that 
the bulk of any reforms are to be implemented at the local level of the organisation 
with management guidance. 
The changes in the corporate approach to clinical risk management may appear 
small, for example altering the risk stratification tool, but they represent a major 
shift in the way the hospital manages clinical risks and incidents. Specifically. they 
represent the preparation of the hospital for the implementation of the National 
System for Learning from Adverse Events and Near Misses. Furthermore. it \ \ a ~ ~
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clear from talking with those responsible for incident reporting and clinical risk/error 
management that the language of national policy, in particular the human factors 
approach, are increasingly being incorporated within corporate practice. However, it 
appears that the systems described here are predominantly concerned with the 
collection and analysis of incident data with little explicit use of root causes analysis 
or demonstrable organisational change. 
The Committee role 
The Committee structure of the hospital is therefore the main corporate mechanism 
through which clinical risks and medical errors are controlled in terms of promoting 
organisational and occupational change. At the start of the fieldwork the Clinical 
Risk Management Committee, a sub-committee of the more general Risk 
Management Committee had responsibility for assessing information about incidents 
and risks, and recommending corporate action to the parent Risk Management 
Committee. The composition of this committee includes a range of professional 
representati ves from across the hospital as well as key management roles from the 
corporate centre who met monthly on a formal basis to oversee the clinical risk 
management function of the hospital. 
The Clinical Risk Management Committee received various sources of information 
about which it makes some form of analysis and recommendation. One major and 
regular sources of information comes from the Department of Corporate Affairs 
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which provides statistical data about incident trends and these were often presented 
in the meetings by one of the risk co-ordinators, accompanied by a risk analysis in 
terms of frequency and severity. This information enabled the committee to identify 
particular problem areas in the organisation and enabled the committee members to 
discuss emergent and important organisational issues, or recommend the need for 
further investigation to discover the latent factors. These further enquiries were 
normally conducted through a selected member(s) of the committee who would 
work alongside an individual from Corporate Affairs and a representative from the 
particular directorate. The basis of this selection could range from knowledge of the 
area, appropriate expertise, familiarity with the directorate, or simply possessing the 
time or interest to conduct the investigation. Following an enquiry a small written 
and visual report would normally be made at the following committee meeting 
where discussion and decision-making would take place. 
These investigations and the regular trend analysis provided the committee with a 
major source of information to discuss potential and actual threats to patient safety. 
In this way, the corporate management function relies upon both centralised 
information from incident forms to locate potential issues and also more localised 
support from directorates to further investigate any issues. 
In addition, the committee acquired information about risks and errors by inviting 
every department and directorate within the hospital to make an annual presentation 
or review of their established or estimated risks and errors. This would enable the 
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corporate centre to communicate with the local level of the hospital about errors and 
also enable them to make recommendations. 
"The directorates would make their risk reports, they would be reviewed by 
the risk management committee, who would sort of approve them or say wait 
a minute and ask the directorates to answer certain points" [PID2]. 
Through these presentations the committee receives a broad range of information 
about general directorate level risks, or about specific changes. For example, during 
the course of the fieldwork the Directorate of Rehabilitation presented an annual 
overview of reported incidents and trend analysis; the Critical Care Team presented 
an analysis of the risks associated with a particular item of equipment; while the 
Radiology unit presented an analysis of the potential risks associated with changes in 
its staff working practices. For the committee, these presentations provided an 
important insight into specific risks in the hospital and provided an opportunity for 
corporate involvement in local organisational issues. Whilst for the directorates 
across the hospital it was often seen as a way of facilitating change through gaining 
the support of the committee and improving the chances of receiving additional 
resources. 
These monthly committee meetings were therefore typically characterised by the 
individual members listening to presentations and reports, discussing relevant 
information, raising questions and proposing particular strategies. It was seen as 
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important to gather as wide an opmlOn before making any decisions and this 
frequently involved lengthy deliberation within the group. It was suggested that the 
range of experience and expertise within the group enabled decisions to be broad 
and reflective of the hospital's various staff groups; whilst the information and 
decisions could be relayed back to the hospital directorates and departments through 
these committee members. 
"So individual members of the committee take their expertise back with 
them. Together they also contribute to the decisions, which the group makes 
about various things that come before us" [PIDll]. 
However, it is worth pointing out that this group did not have full representation 
from across the entire organisational units of the hospital, but was comprised of 
individuals who had a specific clinical risk management or quality improvement 
role, or those particularly interested in the subject. Professional representation was 
therefore not always complete, and the direction of input and discussion sometimes 
appeared to undulate between the corporate perspective and the views of the most 
vocal professionals. 
Additionally, it was claimed by members of the committee that sometimes its remit 
was too broad and unclear. Consequently, it was pointed out that it could only 
meaningfully give attention to the most serious events or risks that arise in the 
hospital. This means that the function of the risk co-ordinators within Corporate 
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Affairs is crucial to the work of Committee because it is these actors that make the 
initial assessment and stratification of risk, and therefore their decisions typically 
drive the clinical risk management function of the hospital, particular for the nOI1-
major or scandalous incidents that automatically attract wider attention. 
"The clinical risk management committee for it to function it can only 
concentrate on the really serious ones." [PID2] 
Through these discussions the committee would come to a decision about action, 
support or refine local initiatives and then relay these findings to the more general 
Risk Management Committee. This committee has overall responsibility for risk 
within the hospital, including financial, clinical and organisational risks. The main 
linkage between these committees was through the presentation of committee 
minutes and the dual position of the Medical Director and Director of Corporate 
Affairs sitting on each committee. This committee would then assess these clinical 
risks against the other risks in the hospital before promoting any form of 
organisational change, especially those that had resource implications. This 
organisational relationship appeared to create a degree of confusion amongst tl1l' 
members of the Clinical Risk Management Committee as they were often uncertain 
about what 'their' committee actually did and how much impact it had in developing 
safer organisational systems. 
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"So I think we are probably quite good at identifying what are the real risk 
and issues, but is a question of what we'll do with it once we'vc identified, 
and that's where I feels it falls a bit flat." [PIDS] 
"I am not sure that clinical risk management conunittee is clear about what 
its task is ... I am not sure whether any of them would be able to apply a risk 
management tool to it and say they understand the issue about risks to 
reputation, the risks to finance, the risks to operations" [P1D12]. 
In consequence, it was often suggested that the Clinical Risk Management 
Committee was powerless to make change because this responsibility rests 
elsewhere in the hospital, namely with the Risk Management Committee which has 
the economic resources to make change. 
"What it strikes me as, the clinical risk management committee doesn't really 
make any decisions. It can agree things are or are not a major clinical risk, 
but it's not a committee that weighs up the various risks." [PID2]. 
"It's probably a reflection of the NHS: toothless and airy-fairy and nobody 
making decisions or taking responsibility. An awful lot of management 
strikes me as being a device to put the blame on somebody else's doorstep" 
[PIDS]. 
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Changes in the committee structure 
As mentioned above, there were several important changes in the hospital during the 
course of the fieldwork. In terms of the committee structure it was suggested that 
there was a high degree of overlap between the Clinical Risk Management 
Committee and the Clinical Governance committee. This other group was a sub-
committee of the Trust's Executive Board and had responsibility for wider quality 
improvement issues. In consequence, these two committees were merged to provide 
greater clarity and llllkage between the analysis of clinical risks and wider 
governance issues. In addition, an Incident Reporting Steering Group was introduced 
at this time to provide leadership for incident reporting and oversee the day-to-day 
operation of reporting and analysis. Unlike the Clinical Risk Management 
Committee this new Incident Group consisted of key representatives from across the 
hospital, rather than the "enthusiasts", and in consequence has a more defined 
relationship with the local level of the hospital. 
"There will be divisional representatives that are the lead for risk, there wi II 
be representation from the professional groups on top of that, so the 
professional issues and divisional issues. There will be a corporate 
representative from here because a lot of the wider trust information comes 
from here" [P/M28]. 
The remit of this new group appears to be twofold: first, improve the l e \ ' l . ~ l l of 
incident reporting in the hospital, and second, provide guidance for those working in 
362 
the Department of Corporate Affairs and simultaneously support the work of the 
Clinical Risk and Governance Committee. The observations of this group have 
further endorsed the view that the hospital is attempting to develop its systems in 
line with the National System. The major work of this group has thus far been to 
redesign the hospital-wide incident form in order to facilitate and improve 
participation; and the identification of training needs to raise awareness across the 
hospital about the utility of incident reporting. 
Summary: the corporate management of medical errors 
The corporate structure of the hospital has experienced a degree of change during 
the course of the research, and this can be regarded as an attempt to align the 
management function and capacity of the hospital with the emerging policy context. 
In particular, the hospital has tried to improve the management and analysis of 
clinical incident data and how this is utilised to promote safety. This information is 
being analysed both through the manual appraisal of data, but also through the 
introduction of a specialised computer package that is sophisticated in the analysis of 
incident trends. It is this information, and also the detailed reports from individual 
directorates, that provides the basis of corporate analysis and control. 
What is interesting is the way in which the increased managerial activity in this area 
represents a break with established systems of quality improvement. Although risk 
analysis has become more prominent with the introduction of CNST. the current 
approach is explicitly concerned with expanding the collection of clinical incident 
data, applying management techniques that are associated with the human factors 
approach, and ultimately introducing management-led change. In this way the 
corporate centre of the hospital is attempting to establish its duty and responsibility 
to evaluate and control medical errors. Although the previous chapter has discussed 
the issues associated with medical incident reporting, hospital management will still 
be required to investigate the active and latent features of medical performance that 
could or did lead to an adverse event. On the one hand it is clear that the changes in 
the hospital represent a more bureaucratic, formalised, inclusive and documented 
system of error management that draws on a specialised theoretical framework, 
especially when compared to professional regulatory systems. On the other hand, it 
is necessary to appreciate the activities at the directorate level of the hospital to 
ascertain the extent of this managerial influence in the control of medical errors. 
The directorate control of medical errors 
As shown in chapter seven, the hospital-wide incident reporting system is 
accompanied by variation at the directorate level. Similarly, the corporate 
management of clinical risks and errors is also matched by alternate approaches 
found at the local level of the hospital. These reflect established professional 
systems for performance review as well as variations in local management systems. 
The chain of events from filling out an incident form through to it being analysed in 
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the Department of Corporate Affairs, can include a host of line managers, clinical 
directors, risk managers and other divisional actors with responsibility for the quality 
of clinical care. These local actors can have various roles, from merely collecting, 
confirming and authorising reports; to actively investigating and analysing reports to 
infonn local changes. One of the risk co-ordinators at the corporate centre 
highlighted the potential role at the local leveL 
"The process is about the fonn being filled in, maybe a discussion taking 
place, and then it being the line manager's responsibility to investigate. And 
that's okay and that's fine, because they need to be part of it and they need to 
look at their own lessons." [P/M3]. 
The extent of this local management activity vanes considerably and does not 
necessarily reflect the corporate and national approach. In some areas it is indeed the 
case that local risk managers are pursuing styles of trend analysis that mirror the 
systems conducted by Corporate Affairs. It is also the case that other areas across the 
hospital are engaged in other forms of quality improvement associated with 
professional systems of quality controL 
"We can see fairly wide variations in the way some departments and 
directorates operate. The sort of responsibility that the more senior people 
take, how often they tend to be around and that sort of thing" [PID2] 
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"You know I'm sure there are directorates across the Trust just carrying on 
old-style health and safety meetings as opposed to root cause analysis or 
whatever" [P/M4]. 
These variations demonstrate the intersection of more established professional 
approaches with more contemporary managerial developments. For example, 
Medical Audit was frequently discussed as a relatively new style of quality 
improvement in medicine. It is therefore necessary to appreciate the local variations 
and understand how they converge with or diverge from the central hospital 
approach and the national agenda. 
''The directorates have a very distinct area of practice and we all get on with 
our ow'n thing unless you've got people coming to you saying this is 
happening" [PIM4]. 
Anaesthesia 
As shown previously, this directorate is composed of two distinct areas of 
responsibility that overlap in the context of surgery; here attention is given to the 
medical speciality of anaesthesia. It was also shown that in the hospital this medical 
specialty is participating, almost exclusively, in a confidential and anonymous 
incident reporting programme co-ordinated by the Royal College of Anaesthetists as 
an alternative to the hospital system. The collection of these reports provides this 
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medical group with the opportunity not only to participate in the development of 
national professional research and guidance, but also to contribute to local service 
development. 
Although premised on the 'professional-led' reporting system and directed by 
medical representatives with local risk management support, the analysis of incident 
data within the Directorate of Anaesthesia resemble in many ways the hospital's 
corporate approach, with attention given to the severity and frequency of events. 
However, this was co-ordinated by a designated doctor with responsibility for the 
incident reporting system ensuring that medical control over the process: 
"She identifies trends and repeated problems then I bring it to the directorate 
and discuss policy" [PID26]. 
This risk management function is most commonly performed in association with the 
Clinical Director who has overall clinical leadership responsibility and a duty to be 
aware of important clinical developments. Through regular directorate meetings the 
incident trend data is summarised, typically in terms of the frequency of events, 
event types and severity, and this information can be used to identify problems and 
inform potential procedural changes. As a technique of error management, the 
incident data is also used in conjunction with established collegial systems of 
medical quality regulation. 
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"One of the consultants' jobs is to analyse incidents regularly and also for 
anybody else to report to this particular consultant if anything has gone 
wrong. Any incidents that occur are reported and then we have regularly 
morbidity and mortality meetings once a month, looking at a series of 
incidents that have occurred, plus we have regular directorate meetings 
where we can feedback" [PID 17] 
Morbidity and mortality (M and M) meetings represent a longstanding mechanism 
through which professionals within a speciality and directorate can review and 
evaluate particularly important or interesting cases that have arisen in the care 
process. Traditionally these meetings would rely upon case-reviews and discussion 
amongst the relevant professionals but now the additional incident data contributes 
to this process. The character of these meetings is particularly self-regulatory, as 
those involved are professional peers also working in the same medical field or 
involved in the care process. Incident data was used in conjunction with more 
established and 'traditional' mechanisms of quality control and therefore served to 
enhanced rather than supersede this collegial approach. 
"We do have morbidity and mortality meetings ... so it runs in parallel if you 
like with critical incident reporting and it may be that some of these cases are 
identified as being important enough to discuss and identify properties. So 
there is a certain amount of cross over between critical incident reporting and 
M and M." [PID29] 
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"Every SIX months we all sit down, all the consultant surgeons and 
anaesthetists, and we look at our figures and there are ways of plotting 
graphs of performance with some sort of risk stratification" [PID5] 
The use of incident data within anaesthesia represents the blending of the collegial 
or "traditional" (Close 1997) with contemporary managerial and policy-based forms 
of quality control. The adoption of incident reporting and analysis in anaesthesia, 
however, demonstrates less of an adoption of hospital-wide systems, and more of the 
professional leadership in this area of medicine. It was often claimed that as a 
medical speciality, anaesthesia represented a serious threat to patient safety during 
the surgical process and in consequence over the last ten years developments in 
patient safety from within the profession have had a major impact on promoting the 
use of incident data to develop guidance. In other words, anaesthesia has had these 
systems in place long before the current policy context. Furthermore, it is necessary 
to recognise that the control of these systems resides within the profession. Despite 
these developments, however, there is little regular communication of incident data 
to the corporate centre of the hospital, except in particularly severe or critical cases. 
Moreover, the majority of this data is employed in an anonymous and confidential 
fashion. A further observation was that this speciality is particular suited to such 
styles of error management and clinical risk management, because of the 
standardised character of he work which makes it more amenable to specified 
guidance. 
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"Because it is very much a sequential process, a lot of anaesthesia is the 
same, complex but the same, that if you detect faults that are occurring 
regularly you can prevent that from occurring again by reporting them, by 
dealing with them, by working out what is going wrong and coming up with 
solutions for preventing it to reoccur" [PI017]. 
Therefore it may be the case that additional use of this incident data to guide and 
support established professional regulatory mechanisms is not only encouraged 
through a national professional research programme, but also the accessibility of risk 
management to this medical speciality. 
Combined Surgery 
In the prevIous chapter it was suggested that surgeons were less inclined to 
participate in the hospital-wide incident reporting system and, other than the recent 
introduction of a Clinical Governance lead at the Divisional level, there was little 
evidence of local mechanisms for systematically gathering information about 
adverse events and errors in accordance with policy. Despite the apparent absence of 
formal clinical risk management procedures it did appear that certain sections of 
surgery were involved in national and professional systems of performance 
measurement. One surgeon pointed out that external systems exist to monitor and 
assess their work, such as the Confidential Enquiry into Peri-operative Deaths, and 
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these could provide national and speciality specific guidance about surgical 
performance. However, the collection of this infonnation and its analysis remains 
outside the remit of the hospital and it is used in a confidential professional fashion. 
''The Society for 30 years, has voluntarily collected data, they've written to 
somebody in each unit around the country and asked them just to submit 
simple stuff: total number of cases, and how many have lived and died" 
[PIDS] 
"We collect our own data and have an audit clerk employed by our 
directorate, nothing to do with hospital, who puts data in from all the cases 
we do and we've had that externally validated by outside bodies" [PIDS]. 
It appeared that the surgeons relied primarily on the established collegial systems of 
professional quality control to assess potential errors in their practice. Like those in 
anaesthesia, M and M meetings for combined surgery represent important formal 
mechanisms for highlighting and discussing surgical issues. 
"Most of the more important events people get to hear about anyway, so 
most major events will be reported by other means and will usually come out 
to an M and M forum because that's probably how you will get most out of it 
being discussed" [PID29]. 
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"They are and that is something we traditionally use, you know we look at 
patients, we have a duty to look at our morbidity and mortality and you know 
we review interesting cases and we can normally find something in that case 
that should have been done differently and I think the sign of a mature and 
competent clinician is somebody who can hold his hand up and say I think I 
made a mistake and I think if I'd done that differently I might have made a 
difference to that case" [PID25] 
"You know if there's a really important issue it does get discussed in M and 
M meetings and so on. But if its just little things that happen in theatre, you 
know, or so trivial that it doesn't really make much difference, you just 
remember to do it differently next time" [PID5]. 
These M and M meetings represent the most commonly referenced forum in which 
surgeons raised, discussed and analysed potential and actual errors in their practice. 
It was claimed that the main purpose of these meetings-is to review cases and 
identify potential lessons that could lead to improved practice. This can involve 
examining several different types of events, for example mortalities were a major 
interest, but also unexpected developments in surgery, or unique, interesting and 
uncommon cases. Through analysing such events it is suggested that individual 
practice and local service delivery can be improved through the development of 
guidance, trying alternate techniques or identifying training needs. Unlike those 
working in anaesthesia, however, there is a lack of regular incident data to guide or 
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inform these surgical meetings. Alternatively, it was pointed out that these meetings 
tend to draw upon other sources of information, such as case reviews, medical audit 
data or specific investigations, such as the rate of wound infections. 
"Well every month have a mortality and morbidity meeting, in which our 
audit system throws up a list of all patients we have operated in the previous 
month and obviously with anybody who has died we talk about it. Any 
interesting cases we talk about, we quickly run through all the cases ... 
periodically we'll, you know if we think we've got a problem with wound 
infections, then the next time we'll specifically get the audit clerk to pull out 
all the data on wound infections." [PIDS]. 
"What we tend to do is have an annual rolling programme, so for example, 
we look at all deaths in the preceding month on a monthly basis, so we can 
see if anything could have been done differently" [P1D21]. 
"I mean there is no point in looking at all the hernia repairs that went well, 
because they went home and didn't have any further problems and they have 
got rid of their hernia. But the hernia that went badly or had a complication 
you want to look at to see what went wrong in that case and how we can 
learn from it. .. you don't fill out an incident from for that but you do review 
it as a part of clinical review" [PID25]. 
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As with anaesthetists, this forum represents a collegial and professional method of 
quality control, with the onus on doctors being open and honest about any problems 
that have arisen in their practice. Furthermore, the regulatory character of these 
meetings remains particular intra-professional, with surgeons discussing problems in 
a sympathetic environment where there is similar expertise and appreciation of the 
complexity and uncertainty inherent in surgical work. Again there was no direct 
relationship between these meetings and other forms of error management developed 
at the corporate-level of the hospital. 
Alongside these formal approaches to addressing the quality of surgical work, it was 
also pointed out that informal approaches were common. Similar to Rosenthal's 
(1995) findings about the informal norms and mechanisms of dealing with "problem 
doctors", it appeared that surgeons were accustomed to discussing certain issues 
with their colleagues on a one-to-one basis that did not involve any kind of formal 
record and documentation. 
"So there is a sort of formal thing for discussing important clinical issues, but 
if it's a sort of one person issue its not terribly formalised but we discuss it 
on an individual basis" [P1D5]. 
Informal procedures were discussed only briefly in the course of the research, 
possible demonstrating the intimacy of these processes and the collegial features of 
medical culture. It may be the case that certain problematic events in surgical 
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practice, such as re-occurring minor problems or one-off blunders, are dealt with 
through these informal "chats" before they are addressed through more formal 
procedures. It was difficult to gather much informatiQI4_but it did appear that these 
occurred mainly between colleagues who had worked with each other for a long 
period and where a bond of friendship would enable issues to be raised, but it also 
appeared that this must be undertaken in a non-critical manner. It may also be the 
case that there is greater significance of these informal processes in surgery because 
of the apparent lack of established formal procedures akin to clinical risk 
management. 
Rehabilitation and Acute Medicine 
Again the directorates of Rehabilitation and Acute Medicine are discussed here 
together, primarily because these two specialities have similar experiences in risk 
management and share a risk co-ordinator. Generally, it was found that these 
directorates were experienced in the collection and analysis of incident forms, 
particularly for non-medical groups. As shown in chapter seven, the reporting in 
these directorates was unlike that of the anaesthetists or obstetricians because it 
tended to replicate the hospital-wide system. Furthermore, the risk co-ordinator had 
an important role in co-ordinating the reporting and analysis processes across these 
specialities and communicating issues with the corporate centre. 
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"I decided it was just no good to just receive an incident form and sent it on 
, 
we want to know how things happen, so we have the data every three 
months, the data collection, pick up the falls,. where did they fall, which ward 
and all that" [PIR22]. 
It was clear that the form of clinical risk management in these directorates was 
explicitly modelled on the system found at the hospital level and that advocated 
through policy. Specifically, the risk co-ordinator analysed incident data through 
assessing the frequency and severity of events and applied a "risk matrix" to stratify 
risks. The most common example of this process was with the analysis of patient 
'falls' within the directorate of rehabilitation: identifying the time, location, and 
patient characteristics associated with the fall. In this way, the directorate has been 
able to develop risk assessment tools to identify patients at high risk and promote 
technologies to be used in situations associated with higher risks, such as bed alarms 
that inform staff members when a patient leaves their bed. 
"So we have a series of things, I can show you an example. So you can see 
the issues we get out from the incident form. By doing thal. .. you can 
correlate if lots of people are falling early in the hospital and that gives the 
opportunity to trigger something like falls risk assessment. .. when you do 
the data you actually see the differences from ward to ward. how many falls 
there are, the average we are is probably around a month ... And also we look 
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at a mechanism to try and see if anything will trigger us to a potential faller 
who falls quite a lot. We have got this bed alarm."[PIR22] 
Alongside developing local organisational changes, the risk co-ordinator also makes 
regular reports to the corporate centre of the hospital, through annual presentations 
to the Clinical Risk Management Committee and through working closely with 
members of the Department of Corporate Affairs. In this way, it was suggested that 
the lessons learnt at the local level could be shared widely across the hospital, while 
wider changes at the hospital level can be introduced locally. 
On first appearance it appears that the risk co-ordinator for these two directorates is 
indeed attempting to develop a form of clinical risk management that accords with 
the system promoted through policy and being developed at the hospital 
management level. Specifically, local investigations and analysis complements and 
supports the wider hospital system. However, in terms of the breadth of this local 
approach it also appeared, through d_isc;ussion and observation, that its capacity to 
make change is often limited. This problem returns to the issues identified in the 
previous chapter where it was shown that reporting in these directorates was 
predominantly led by non-medical groups, and medical professionals remained 
disinclined to report using the hospital-wide form even to a local representative. In 
consequence, the ability of the risk co-ordinator to analyse and control for medical 
elTors was extremely limited due to a lack of information. Furthermore, this risk co-
ordinator appeared to be clearly apprehensive and disinclined to investigate any 
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incident forms that directly involved medical performance, and normally such forms 
were referred to the appropriate clinical director. 
In consequence, the management of medical errors remained particularly collegial 
and where issues were raised these were dealt with by the relevant clinical director. 
One of the clinical directors from these directorates expressed real concern with the 
ability of the local directorates to make service improvements given the lack of 
medical reporting and under-developed systems, despite attempting to introduce a 
dedicated medical reporting system. 
"I think there is a lot of concern about actually we don't particularly learn 
from our mistakes, even as clinical director I think that is one of the main 
challenges as a director" [PID 15]. 
It was pointed out that while this alternate medical form did indeed gather some 
useful information, its lasting impact was negligible. In consequence, there remains 
a tendency for medical professionals working in these two directorates to rely upon 
established professional systems of quality control, including medical audit, case 
reviews, and directorate meetings. These various approaches all rely upon more 
collegial approaches to medical regulation and tend to develop change within 
individual or directorate practice, but not necessarily organisational systems. In 
many ways these findings reflect the experience of the Directorate of Combined 
Surgery. 
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"I think they work well and they are a very traditional approach to looking at 
things that went wrong. They h ~ v e e a certain random element to them, they 
might just review patients within a month who have died, and I think they are 
potentially the most effective way of using well-established clinical 
approaches to actually make changes" [PID13]. 
"We have tried to do it in our medical firm, we have something that we call a 
significant event audit and every couple of months we will talk about cases 
we have got on the wards. And some of them are the really good things we 
have done, so we are trying to give positive feedback, and others are where 
things have not gone quite right. We keep it all anonymous but we talk 
through what were the issues about why this didn't go as well as it could 
have and try to think about how you can make it better for the future." 
[PlOlS]. 
The existence of a risk co-ordinator working within these two directorates was 
seemingly limited to non-medical realms of service delivery. Primarily, the lack of 
medical participation in incident reporting limited the capacity for the systematic 
management of medical errors, but it is also the case that established professional 
boundaries were also important in preventing non-medical groups analysing medical 
work. The regulation and control of medical errors, like with surgery, therefore 
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relied upon established professional systems of quality control and performance 
review. 
Obstetrics 
In the prevIous chapter it was shown how the Directorate of Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology has a high level of medical participation in the hospital-wide incident 
reporting system. Furthermore, it was shown how local "ownership" and control, in 
the form of a directorate risk management, appeared to overcome many of the fears 
and apprehensions that are commonly associated with reporting. This field of health 
care has a well-established background for monitoring the quality of care, for 
example the Confidential Enquiry into Maternal Deaths and other professional based 
audits. Given these developments, those working in this directorate were accustomed 
to the emerging policy approach to the management of clinical risks and errors. 
At the directorate level, the local risk manager was the main actor responsible for 
collecting incident reports, and in a similar approach to that being developed at the 
corporate level, the reports are analysed for particularly severe or common events. 
This process benefits from greater levels of reporting and through these analytical 
processes the risk manager is able to identify a range of potential and actual threats 
to patient safety, also aided by their familiarity with local working practices. 
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4'SO every month I do a monthly summary of the incident and that can vary 
from the very trivial, a member of staff bangs their head on a shelf, 
something fairly trivial that really has no adverse outcome: to the very 
serious so that it would involve a very serious clinical incident" [P/R 16]. 
Although this person has direct responsibility for risk management within the 
directorate, this role is supported through inter-professional discussion and analysis. 
Much of this work is done in close contact with reporters and involves working with 
a range of relevant organisational actors and important medical representatives. In 
other words, the analysis is co-ordinated by the risk manager but it is carried out in 
co-operation with medical professionals. So while the risk manager conducts 
collection and initial analysis, this information is further analysed and verified 
through wider professional involvement. Specifically, a consultant obstetrician 
within the directorate participates in the analysis of findings and the clinical director 
actively participates in those incidents that centre on medical performance. This not 
only promotes the pulltQse of the system throughout the directorate, but also ensures 
all relevant expertise is gathered and analysis occurs with the necessary technical 
insight and legitimacy. 
"I think if it was a medical problem I would send it to [consultant's name] 
who is a lead consultant" [PIR16]. 
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"And then [the risk manager] and I have a monthly meeting, we keep all the 
incidents on a database, that we have, we update the database monthly on 
what action we have taken, so that we have documented evidence of all the 
actions taken on all reported incidents ... So we keep a database and [the risk 
manager] and I meet monthly to go through everything and then they get sent 
to the Trust risk management group." [P1D19] 
The clinical risk management role within the directorate therefore benefits not from 
just the greater levels of reporting and a dedicated risk manager, but also from 
including other forms of information associated with medical professional 
regulation, specifically Medical Audit. 
"The two ways of actually addressing risk from my perspective at least, is on 
the one hand have a risk management group, on the other arm have 
audit. .. Well the audit system is based on the audit cycle. The ingredients of 
the audit are twofold, there are national audits that we must actually attend 
to, there are also internal Trust audits, which we need to plug into, and there 
are also educational audits, which are more functional really. Okay we note 
that something is not right, somebody is asked to audit that straight away and 
then you see what is going on and then we change our practice and then run 
the cycle again. Now that is a very well oiled system and a very tight system 
when things go wrong we just go and do things very quickly" [PID24]. 
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The information from incident reports and audit therefore provides a rich source of 
information on which to base analysis and instigate service change. This information 
is disseminated and used in several ways. At the directorate level it is used to inform 
the local risk management group and the clinical governance group. This is done 
through monthly reports, co-ordinated by the risk manager, which enable 
professional representatives within the directorate to discuss specific problems and 
suggest service improvements. The information is also shared at the corporate level 
to gain support for services changes. In this way, error data can be used as a lever for 
organisational negotiations and requests for resources or support, primarily through 
the Clinical Risk Management Committee. 
Of all the directorates involved in the research, Obstetrics was by far the most 
proactive in clinical risk and error management. As suggested previously, the 
developments in this speciality can be associated with increased litigation pressures; 
however, whereas other areas may be experienced in some fonn of quality control or 
risk management, it appeared that this area was particularly experienced in what was 
often referred to as "completing the circle". This refers to not only establishing a 
practice of incident reporting and trend analysis, but also making and monitoring 
organisational change, therefore resembling the "risk cycle" developed at the 
corporate level of the hospital. Respondents from this directorate were extremely 
proud of the achievements that have been made in improving service quality, and 
many examples were given where problems identified through incident reporting 
had been managed through the analysis of data and organisational change. 
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Importantly, while this may reflect the ideals of policy, it is firmly based in 
professional practice, enabling it to contribute to established professional systems, 
rather than it running_counter to medical regulatory systems. 
"As I say we have been reporting for many years, I suppose the question you 
might ask is are we actually improving the services, because are the same 
things occurring every time ... have we learnt our lessons. I think certainly 
when you look at the latest report our medical care of wornen seems to have 
improved." [P1D7] 
"If you look at the system they have got in place in maternity, although still 
not perfect, they have actually started to almost cornplete the circle, they 
need to go back and look at a some of the bits in the process, but incidents 
are getting reported and in some areas very highly reported which is good, 
they are making sure they are capturing it in their own system so they can 
track thern, they are sitting down are reviewing the immediate action and 
going back and taking decisions about where individuals need to stop doing 
things and are not allowed to do things until training has been under-taken, 
so doing a lot of the more difficult side of it, and also using them to send me 
information through quickly about possible early warnings. [PIM28] 
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Summary: directorate control of medical errors 
The experiences-of managing and controlling medical errors at the directorate level 
of the hospital are clearly variable. They not only vary between each other but also 
diverge and sometimes converge with the approach being developed at the corporate 
level. There are many factors that influence the local developments in clinical 
risk/error management, such as litigation pressures in the field of obstetrics. It is also 
interesting to find that the role of a risk co-ordinator can have a variable impact on 
both reporting and the management of errors. In anaesthetics, the professional 
responsible for collecting and reviewing reports contributes to established forms of 
collegial quality control; in rehabilitation and acute medicine the risk co-ordinator 
has made attempts to apply more systematic forms of clinical risk management, but 
this has little medical participation; while in obstetrics the risk manager works 
closely with medical professionals and also the corporate centre of the hospital to 
promote clinical risk management. 
Despite the inroads made in certain areas it remains clear that the hospital-wide 
corporate approach to clinical risk management, is largely peripheral to the systems 
in place at the directorate level. Moreover, it is extremely interesting to find that 
even where more managerial styles are being adopted, such as in obstetrics, there 
remains a reliance upon other established professional systems of quality control that 
tend to incorporate this new information within their practices. It is not surprising 
therefore to find during one conversation with a member of corporate staff that they 
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believed that the National System will have to be directed from the directorate level 
, 
possibly with support from the corporate, because there is little hope of getting 
doctors to,)N.prk with a managerial driven scheme. What then are the attitudes of 
doctors about these systems and what impact do they have on the prospects of 
policy. 
Attituq.:s towards the management of errors and clinical risks 
It is not surprising to find a certain degree of uncertainty and apprehension amongst 
medical professionals, as it may appear that their professionalism (specifically 
clinical freedom and self-regulation) are further eroded by these management 
systems that seem to evaluate their work. 
"J: Do you think it is a challenge to clinical freedom? 
P21: I think quite a few things are these days. I think the traditional 
consultant is a disappearing breed." [PID21] 
It has to be pointed out, however, that while doctors may talk of the corporate centre 
of the Trust in a somewhat disparaging manner, this appears to be a rather symbolic 
gesture of difference and even resistance. It was clear that medical and managerial 
groups in the hospital frequently worked productively together in service 
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management, for example in committee meetings. What may be questionable, 
therefore, is the way in which the two different approaches to service improvement 
are reconciled and negotiated within the hospital particularly at the local level. 
"I think everybody in the health service is pro for improving patient care, 
that's not a problem, but 1 think sometimes we don't show as a corporate 
organisation we're serious about it, by dealing with some of the things that 
year after year cause trouble" [PI09]. 
Nevertheless there are a range of beliefs, assumptions and attitudes that underpin 
medical involvement in these divergent approaches to error management. Attention 
therefore turns to these cultural and occupational characteristics that provide the 
context for the control of medical errors. 
Managerial expertise? 
Generally, medical professionals believed that the current approach to clinical risk 
management has indeed something important to contribute to service development. 
Although this view was most commonly found amongst medics aware of the wider 
policy context, it was still evident that hospital management was seen as having a 
useful function; associated with wider service issues often supportive to, but not 
directly related to, medical work. Furthermore, it was acknowledged that while 
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clinical risk management may be more commonly associated with managerialism, it 
is not necessarily dissimilar from medical models of quality improvement. 
"I think it's probably a two way thing, because from a clinicians point of 
view risk management is seen as perhaps a management way of approaching 
the situation and there does need to be input from management, and also the 
clinician. A lot of the aims are the same for both, but it is about how each 
side sees to that." [P1D17] 
Hospital managers were therefore regarded as possessing a legitimate expertise and 
this could indeed be related to issues of service quality. However, it appeared that 
this domain of managerial expertise was seen as distinct from that of medical work 
and concerned with different aspects of health care organisation. This was often 
elaborated along the lines that many of the factors that contribute to the patient's 
journey through the hospital are not purely medical, but related to issues such as 
safety, hospitality and amenities. Doctors seemed to believe that these features of 
hospital organisation were the appropriate and legitimate concern for management 
"A manager on the overhand will see the throughput, the waiting, the 
parking. I am not saying doctors are blind to that, so there may be errors or 
problems with parking or waiting and things like that; but doctors are 
primarily concerned with the medical product because that is what they have 
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an influence on and it's the management that deals with the throughputs. Its 
all patient care its just different dimensions of the same thing" [PID 14]. 
Furthermore, while doctors are indeed supportive of certain areas of management 
activity this support was conditional on clear boundaries with medical expertise. One 
respondent further emphasised the different domains of expertise demonstrating an 
implicit feeling that managerial knowledge is appropriate in a certain corporate 
context, but not in the medical. 
"As a doctor we are trained in biological sciences so we think in terms of 
biological systems, which is maybe different to an engineer who is dealing 
with physics and mathematical formulas, or a manager who is dealing with 
systems ... In a sense a lot of that isn't the biological system that doctors are 
used to, whereas managers are dealing with that all the time and they are 
thinking about throughputs and capacity and things like that. So that 
dimension is very important for someone with that expertise and experience" 
[P1D14] 
Doctors may therefore be happy for increased risk management, but seemingly this 
is only seen as legitimate in specific domains of health service quality where there is 
little medical claim to expertise or willingness to be involved. Accordingly, virtually 
all the doctors involved in the research expressed extreme dismay and scepticism 
about the management appraisal of medical practice. By far the biggest concern was 
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the ability of managers to interpret and analyse the details of medical work. In terms 
of receiving incident forms it was felt that managers would not be able to 
appropriately interpret and understand this information and as shown in chapter 
seven, this had a considerable effect on medical reporting. 
"You can report but without an explanation as to why, its not going to get 
you anywhere is it!" [PID20] 
The data showed that there is widespread medical concern that managerial expertise 
cannot grasp the "reality" of medical work due to the lack of experience, training, 
and medical knowledge. This was frequently related to the role of hospital managers 
being able to analyse medical errors and assess aspects of medical practice and 
competence. The effect of this general feeling was to discourage doctors from 
reporting and therefore undermining attempt at corporate change. 
"If we look at where problems arise I can see that the management could not 
really comment on the doctors medical assessment, the details of the history, 
the details of the examination, couldn't really ... isn't best placed to judge 
that event" [PID 14] 
"I think it has to be a professional thing because if it is a managerial thing I 
think it is going to lack reality." [P1D31] 
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In consequence, the majority of doctors suggested that for incident reports and error 
management to have any 'real' meaning it would be necessary for medical 
professionals to lead the analysis of information and "sympathetically" interpret the 
information. In this way any decisions would be legitimately based upon the 
appropriate expertise. 
"J: And that would mean evaluating skills and ability ... 
P1D31: Yes and managers would have a job to do that... only another 
clinician could probably do that." 
As managers typically do not possess this expertise, doctors fear that their work will 
be evaluated unfairly without the necessary attention to detail or consideration of the 
complexity of medical decision-making. Consequently it can be seen that while 
managerial expertise is indeed endorsed for wider service quality, it is illegitimate in 
terms of the delivery of medical services. Furthermore, the increased penetration of 
managerial expertise into aspects of medical work was regarded as challenging the 
established patterns of medical work and professionalism. 
Nevertheless, an important feature of the medical viewpoint is that the task of 
quality improvement should be shared amongst medical and managerial groups in 
accordance with the distinct realms of expertise. It is widely felt that managers do 
have a major contribution to make in terms of organisational analysis, but this 
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expertise cannot and should not extend to the areas of medical practice. The 
managers in the hospital have recognised this concern and attempted to involve 
experienced clinical staff in the analysis of incident data, while the committee 
structure of the hospital also has professional representation through clinical 
directors and the Medical Director. Seemingly, however, the distance between these 
representati ves, at the centre, and the appropriateness of this clinical expertise, at the 
local, remains questioned by doctors in the hospital. 
Inappropriate management focus 
While doctors are becoming more open to the idea of risk management in general 
and clinical risk management specifically, there also remains a degree of scepticism 
about how the corporate approach is actually making service improvement. It was 
frequently suggested that rather than focussing on the "real things" that make a 
difference to health care, there is a tendency for the hospital to focus on the more 
"trivial" or non-clinical aspects of service delivery. All medical professionals, both 
those involved in the corporate committee structure and also those at the directorate 
level commonly expressed this view. 
"We are getting an analysis ... the trouble with that is that they are in my 
terms related to hotel or nursing matters more than they are to medical 
matters" [PlDll]. 
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Crucially this demonstrates an inherent contradiction in the medical attitude towards 
the hospital's corporate approach to clinical· errors and risks. While doctors may 
question what managers are achieving in terms of service improvement they are also 
critical of the managerial ability and legitimacy to analyse medical practice. So on 
the one hand, doctors prefer managers not to examine medical work and instead 
focus on wider organisational issues, but they are also critical of how this focus on 
organisational issues lacks any reality for medical practice. The management 
function therefore rests in a paradoxical position, in that to make changes that are 
meaningful it requires greater analysis of medical work, while doctors are unwilling 
to endorse such managerial activity. 
Another concern amongst doctors was that managerial action would not necessarily 
be guided by the principles of "no blame" or fairness, but because of a lack of 
expertise, understanding and sympathy there may be a tendency for managers to be 
critical of medical performance. 
"You are having a whole float of people up there who think that because 
management is easy and they it up there, this power base, and then they try to 
throw their weight around without understand the fundamentals." [PID24] 
"I think there is the potential problem of a them and us situation: with the 
people working hard in the clinical situation and some manager sitting in an 
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office somewhere is going to look at the incident form and come down on us 
in a judgmental way" [P/D25]. 
"Policing doesn't work because we can't police enough for it to work, we 
have to make people receptive to sorting their own house out" [PID2]. 
There was certainly a feeling that increased managerialism would lead to greater 
evaluation and constraint on medical practice and these developments in clinical risk 
management represent a new development in the ongoing "saga" between doctors 
and managers in the NHS. 
Professional expertise and leadership 
Given the above misgiving about the capacity of managerial expertise to understand 
medical work and the fear of increased managerial control, it is not surprising to find 
that doctors are extremely vocal in their preference for medical leadership in clinical 
risk and error management. Doctors generally believed that the analysis of medical 
incidents should be operationalised through professional techniques of regulation, 
where there would be the appropriate knowledge and sympathy to interpret the 
complexity of medical work. 
"If you are assessing clinical competence type risk issues then I think it can 
only be reviews by your colleagues with an expertise in it, but if you are 
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assessing other issues like process issues then it doesn't necessarily need 
clinician involvement" [PI03l]. 
"I think classifying them at a corporate level is impossible, I think a doctor 
needs to do it, to sort of itemise what happened at each step and recognise 
what it was that doctors can learn, because the work is extremely complex, 
when you look at how a diagnosis is made and what steps are taken when 
that diagnosis is made." [PID13] 
In consequence, it was often suggested that the responsibility for controlling medical 
errors and risks should be held by a medical professional who is experienced in the 
clinical environment and familiar with medical knowledge. Fears about 
inappropriate managerialism would, therefore, be alleviated, as medical involvement 
would ensure a legitimate basis for organisational quality improvement. 
"I think a risk manager, whoever that would be ... .-ldeaUy it has to be a 
medical" [P/M6]. 
"So if you want quality, you want risk management, you want the guy who 
knows to see the patients" [PID24]. 
It can be seen from the experiences of clinical risk and error management at the 
directorate level of the hospital that medical professionals are certainly more 
395 
inclined to rely upon more 'professional' forms of quality control. Moreover, where 
advances in more contemporary management systems have been made these 
techniques are brought within traditional systems where medical expertise can 
remain in control. However, the doctors involved in the research also made it clear 
that while they are familiar with more professional forms of medical regulation, they 
are somewhat unsure as to their own ability to analyse the wider range of 
contributing factors. 
"I do feel and perhaps I'm talking about myself principally ... that I don't feel 
fully competent in knowing how to assess the issues and priorities." [PIDIO] 
"I think there is a lack of managerial skill in senior doctors and there is a 
tendency to be personal in a way that isn't helpful in resolving problems" 
[PlDt3] 
It is not surprising therefore to find that some doctors, espe..cially those more familiar 
with the hospital management structure, suggested that the different bodies of 
knowledge and expertise found within medicine and management should work side-
by-side and inform each others practice. 
"I think the worry is that managers don't actually understand medicine so 
you do need medical input into the system. So again I think you would want 
to think that there were clinicians actually looking at the data again with the 
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managers to say how do you understand what we are collecting, how can you 
actually assimilate that data and find the fundamental prohlems and not get 
distracted by whether the clinicians have not got things quite right" [PID 151 
In this way it might be possible that organisational change could be more thorough 
and relevant to medical work, without the apprehensions of increased managerial 
control. However, given the apparent fears outlined above it may be questionable 
whether all doctors in the hospital would be open to such an approach. 
Professional control 
The preference for medical expertise and the incorporation of Ill'\\' managerial 
techniques within established professional approaches of quality control represent a 
broader desire for the occupational or collegial control of errors. It was widely 
argued that for meaningful clinical improvements to be made it is necessary to 
utilise medical expertise; specifically the experience and knowledge found at the 
local level of the hospital. Only through actually working within the hospital was it 
felt that incidents could be appreciated in the appropriate context, while service 
improvements could be instigated and implemented by those actually invol ved in the 
care process. 
"I think it's more likely, more likely to be effective if people on the ground 
in an influential position are themselves influenced to take on board the 
messages and to deliver on those. I think that always works better and that's 
something we are very conscious of as a team to advise how we work with 
people to make them realise their problems rather than policing them." 
[PID2] 
It is not surpnsmg, therefore, that across all medical specialities there remallls 
reliance on and preference for professional systems of quality control even where the 
more managerial techniques have been borrowed or adapted, for example, in 
obstetrics. However, this preference may go further than merely wishing to promote 
appropriate service improvement and instead reflects a desire to retain professional 
control. The full implementation of the National System would certainly introduce 
more rigorous managerial assessment of medical work and lead to service changes 
that may be seen as managerial. In consequence it is not surprising to find that 
doctors have a deep-seated desire to retain control over these aspects of their work. 
"In terms of top-down assessment of clinical work I think doctors feel more 
comfortable if there is medical peer review as opposed to organisational 
NHS management assessment." [PID14] 
In this way the reliance on professional systems and the absorption of new 
management approaches within these collegial models could represent a professional 
strategy for maintaining occupational control at the local level of the health service. 
398 
"I suppose part of it is because there were processes already in place in 
directorates which preceded and so if you did have complications then this is 
how we used to do it. We are then being askedto do a different way of doing 
things which perhaps is not seen as clinically relevant and there is reluctance 
to do the same thing twice" [PID21]. 
Important therefore is not only the appropriate expertise to guide analysis but also 
the requirement to protect medical work from external interference. This returns 
back to many of the themes discussed earlier in the thesis, and specifically the ideas 
developed by Freidson (1970). As discussed in chapter two, two popular 
characteristic features of medical professionalism are autonomy and self-regulation, 
and although these terms require greater clarity (Evetts 2002, Waring 2002), it is 
important to appreciate that doctors themselves may be engaged in strategies to 
maintain their established professional practice, and also perhaps in what they see as 
the best interests of the patient (Freidson 200 1). 
Summary 
The doctors involved in the research all expressed some degree of scepticism and 
apprehension about the increased managerial involvement with regards to clinical 
errors. The most prominent amongst these was the suggestion that in order to 
understand errors fully and with meaning it is necessary to possess the expertise of 
the relevant doctor. This perspective obviously reinforces the idea that only those 
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groups with the appropriate expert knowledge and experience can legitimately 
appreciate the complexity of work. In consequence forms of self-regulation are 
reinforced and promoted. This could suggest thatjncreased managerialism in this 
area of health service quality may indeed represent some fundamental threat to their 
professional decision-making (autonomy) and the control their performance 
(regulation), and by challenging the legitimate basis of these new managerial 
systems, the extent of managerial interference is minimised, whilst professional 
systems are reinforced. In this way the values and norms of medicine represent a 
further feature of medical culture that can be interpreted as a strategy for maintain 
the occupational control of quality. 
However, it was also felt that medical knowledge cannot fully appreciate all the 
relevant organisational issues relevant to quality improvement, and implicit is a 
suggestion that corporate management does indeed have a useful role, associated 
with the 'legitimate' domains of expertise. Although doctors may subtly recommend 
such an approach, the findings of the research show that it is more common for 
medical groups to rely upon professional systems and ' i n c ~ r p o r a t e ' ' managerial 
approaches within existing professional practices, rather than working together. 
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Discussion: the management or control of medical errors 
This chapter has provided an account of the various approaches to error management 
found in the case study hospital, specifically in the context of new patient safety 
health policies. At the corporate level it is evident that efforts are being made to 
implement forms of management that analyse the causes of error in line with policy. 
It could be argued that if these systems were fully established and the appropriate 
occupational action was secured then these systems would represent a substantial 
expansion of managerial duties and responsibilities in the area of medical work. 
However, the findings reveal some major obstacles to the implementation of the 
National System. First questions are raised about the management capacity for 
analysing errors and making service improvements without increased incident 
reporting, which as shown previously is limited in certain hospital directorates. 
Second, doctors question the legitimacy of corporate groups to understand medical 
errors without the appropriate experti_se or experience. Third, at the local level of the 
hospital it was found that well-established professional systems of quality control 
and regulation remained the preferred device by which medical professionals 
address errors in their work. Finally, and somewhat paradoxically, it was found that 
while doctors were often supportive of managerial attempts to address \vider 
organisational safety issues, these were seen as trivial features of health care 
compared to 'real' medical issues. The capacity for the National System to make 
meaningful change therefore seems compromised as established professional 
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systems and attitudes towards management legitimacy undermine the developing 
approach. 
It is possible to analyse these findings along two dimensions: the extent to which 
directorates utilise professional or managerial systems. Here "professional" refers ttl 
established systems, such as M and M meetings or Medical Audit, which arc 
primarily based on the principles of collegiality and the legitimacy of medical 
expertise. Alternatively, "managerial" is used to describe developments in patient 
safety associated with national policy and Human Factors. The professional systems 
are more concerned with medical quality issues at the individual dimension 01 
clinical performance; whereas the managerial approaches are more concerned with 
exploring trends and understanding the role of systems. Moreover, it is possible to 
suggest that the professional styles are characterised as methods of education and 
control that attempt to understand specific problems and control for that particular 
event (Harrison and Pollitt 1995); while managerial systems are predominantly 
concerned with making wider occupational and organisational changes in line with 
specific theories of quality assurance. 
It was not surprising to find that all the directorates remained committed to more 
professional systems. However, it was interesting to find local variations in tl1l' 
degree to which managerial systems were incorporated within these professional 
approaches. For example, anaesthetics and obstetricians both used incident data to 
augment established professional systems. In order for this to be possible It is 
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seemingly necessary for these directorates to possess a local risk manager to collect 
and analyse incident reports, and importantly this person should work closely with 
medical professionals or be a medic. Alternatively where there was no risk 
management role or where it was confined to non-medical services there was a 
greater reliance on pure professional systems. It may be the case that rather than 
opening up medical work to contemporary managerial approaches and risk the 
evaluation of medical work, the absorption of some of these managerial practices 
within medical regulation ensures a degree of occupational control. 
On a more theoreticalleve1 it is possible to analyse the implementation of this policy 
in terms of the bureaucratic control of professional labour in terms of quality 
improvement and the management of errors. Unlike previous quality initiatives in 
the NHS, this system represents a break with tradition as hospital management 
explicitly aims to analyse and evaluate aspects of medical work. Relying on 
organisational systems of incident reporting, data analysis and management-led 
change, this also draws on -specialised knowledge about error management that 
resides predominantly in the hands of hospital management. Adapting Harrison's 
(2002) model of the medical labour process, the National System can be seen as a 
form of 'scientific-bureaucratic' control whereby the knowledge to direct 
improvements in medicine are derived from a formalised system external to 
medicine work and based on knowledge external to medical expertise, e.g. human 
factors. In terms of organisational theory, the National System could therefore be 
interpreted as an attempt to promote quality improvement through the cultural and 
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structural control of medical labour, both of which promote new forms ()1 
occupational surveillance. 
However, the chapter has shown that the success of this policy is serioush in 
question and so too are the implications for changes to medical professionalism. T h ~ ~
doctors working in the hospital remain adamant that while there is a role for 
management based quality improvement, its legitimacy and capacity in areas of 
medical work is limited. It is evident that the "external" knowledge of Human 
Factors operationalised in management practice is regarded as illegitimate 111 
addressing the issues pertinent to medical work. Whilst it appears that forms of 
risk/error management within the hospital have either been adapted and brought 
within medical regulatory systems, or they have been virtually excluded or ignored. 
It could also be suggested that by bringing aspects of these new systems WIthin 
medical practice it ensures that medical professionals retain control, whilst 
simultaneously staving off further managerial incursions into medical work. In this 
way, medical professionals are not only ensuring reliance upon their own realms of 
occupational control, but also limiting the penetration of managerial activity in 
medical work. 
9. Conclusion: the social construction and control of 
medical errors 
Introduction 
The prevIOus three chapters have revealed much about the forms of error 
management within the case study hospital and the attitudes of medical professionals 
with regards to these new managerial systems. This work has been developed along 
three lines of enquiry that have attempted to question the assumptions of this policy 
as well as exploring its impact on medical/managerial relations and medical 
professionalism. The first assessed the extent to which the prevailing 
conceptualisation of error found in theory and policy is coterminous with the 
meaning of error developed by doctors, whilst showing how a constructionist notion 
of error reveals important social differences that relate to social power. The second 
theme explored the forms of incident reporting within the hospital and the degree to 
which these systems were being taken up in medical practice; here attention was 
given to the factors that limited medical participation and the different perspectives 
on organisational culture. Finally, the thesis examined the hospital systems that have 
been developed to promote error management and the impact that these have had on 
medical work; in particular the extent to which these have structured and controlled 
medical work. This chapter is concerned with drawing together these findings and 
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developing an account of medical professionalism and managerial ism in the context 
of this new policy. 
It was shown in chapter two that there has been a recognised increase in 
management authority and responsibility in the NHS. Despite claims that this has 
led to a reduction in medical autonomy, there has not been a direct 'assault' on the 
technical aspects of medical autonomy by management groups, i.e. the application 
and evaluation of expert knowledge, as managers have typically been concerned 
with the periphery of medical work, such as the organisation of resources. The 
National System, however, offers to alter this situation be introducing a range of 
'sites' on which organisational power and control is contested. Importantly, this 
policy provides management groups with opportunities to monitor and evaluate 
aspects of medical technical performance, and fundamentally it addressed what 
could be described as the Achilles heel of medicine: its errors. The chapter therefore 
commences with a review of the three main 'questions' that emerged from poli(y, 
guided this research_ and together represent locations in which occupational change 
. ..-, .. , . 
may be occurring. In the light of the empirical data the impact on 
medicaUmanagerial relations is then assessed. 
The questions 
One of the major allns of this research has been to understand the impact of a 
particular policy on the occupational character of medicine with regards to increased 
management authority, responsibility and power. This policy context has devcl\ ) ! ~ l ' d d
in response to the perceived problem of health service errors culminating in till' 
forthcoming introduction of the National System for Learning from Adverse Event 
and Near Misses. Of particular importance for this research have been three 
components of this system, first the conceptualisation of error, second the promotion 
of incident reporting through cultural change, and third new management structures 
to analyse and manage errors. Although this thesis has shown many problems 
associated with this policy, it is worth reviewing these themes as they represent the 
core "questions" with which the research has engaged or the "straw man" to be 
knocked down. 
The prevailing concept of error 
One of the most interesting features of the policy is the explicit preference and 
adoption of psychological and Human Factors theories of error and error 
management. The main contribution has been the development of an active/latent 
dichotomy in the conceptualisation of health service errors. Underlying this concept 
is the idea that errors are "real" events with fixed properties that can be technically 
evaluated and managed. The role of an error management system is therefore to 
gather objective information about active errors and make sense of the latent causes. 
The application of this approach has been the development of specific "types" of 
error associated with the objective and technical aspects of care delivery. 
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It was shown in chapter four, however, that a range of studies have revealed the 
social and cultural context of error (e.g. Bosk 1979); and in an attempt to develop a 
theoretical and phjlosophical framework for understanding error, a r e a l i ~ t t and 
constructivist dichotomy was advanced. From this perspective it was argued that the 
prevailing realist conceptualisation of error, advocated in theory and policy, neglects 
to consider the social and cultural dimensions of subjective perception, interpretation 
and meaning. In particular, drawing from a Foucauldian approach it was argued that 
the notion of error in policy is a construction that serves to define the social 
character of error and promote specific forms of surveillance and control. Taking 
this constructivist approach enabled the research to suggest that if the concept 01 
error advocated in theory and policy is adopted within medical practice then it is 
likely to promote new forms of regulation. In the first instance it could influence the 
way in which doctors interpret and understand errors, and second it could encourage 
doctors to report errors to management groups within the hospital. Conversely, the 
socio-cultural and discursive approach also enabled the research to appreciate 
alternative constructions of error, and explore how medical groups could have 
divergent interpretations of error. The study has therefore been concerned to show 
the medical meaning of error. 
A culture of reporting 
A key feature of error management is the utilisation of incident reporting to gather 
information about errors and provide data on which change can be based. 
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Importantly, the policy encourages cultural modification in order to secure the 
appropriate occupational behaviour, i.e. reporting, which centres on "engineering"' 
beliefs that endorse reporting and encourage openness. 
Questions have been put forward about the theoretical interpretation of 'culture' 
within policy, and it has been argued that there is little explicit recognition of the 
multifaceted and emergent character of medical culture as it relates to incident 
reporting, other than the detrimental influence of "blame" and "fear of retribution". 
The research has therefore aimed to account for the methods of incident reporting in 
the hospital and explore the customs, beliefs, and attitudes of doctors with regards to 
these systems. 
It has also been suggested that the idea of cultural change has the potential to 
represent a new form of organisational control. Like other examinations of cultural 
change (e.g. Parker 2000) it could be argued that in addition to structures of control 
a feature of contemporary organisations are forms of cultural control; winning the 
hearts and minds of employees. It could be argued therefore that the idea of cultural 
change within policy represents an attempt to secure the normative and cultural 
compliance of medical staff. The policy is not clear how this is to be achieved, but it 
is likely to remain committed to promoting the prevailing concept of error and 
encouraging the reporting of incident and acceptance of management-led change. 
Structures of control 
Along with promoting forms of cultural change, the policy also introduces new 
management structures. These are associated with the collection of incident data, the 
analysis of errors and the promotion of organisational change. While forms 01 
cultural control are associated with post-bureaucratic organisations, the policy can 
therefore be interpreted as creating new bureaucratic systems to monitor medical 
work. Importantly, these introduce clear roles and responsibilities for management 
groups to co-ordinate systems of incident reporting, the analysis of incident data in 
line with Human Factors theory and "root cause analysis", and from this information 
instigate health service change. As a mechanism of quality improvement, this 
approach explicitly builds on theories of quality assurance while its application in 
the health service appears to be founded on experiences in clinical risk management, 
whilst being couched within the wider organisational changes associated with 
clinical governance. 
Drawing on theoretical accounts of the medical labour process (Harrison 2002), it 
can be suggested that these bureaucratic systems have drawn on expertise that is 
external to medical practice, and through new hospital structures this knowledge will 
inform occupational and organisational change. For medical work this could include 
identifying tasks and activities that are commonly associated with error and then 
promoting occupational change. This policy could therefore represent new formal 
structures that serve to regulate aspects of medical work on an external and 
4\0 
managerial basis. In this way, a new technical knowledge that is external to 
medicine could provide the basis for new bureaucratic regulatory devices. 
Importantly, these· could undermine the self- or internal regulatory character of 
medicine as they are premised on a divergent expertise that competes with that of 
medicine to understand the cause of medical errors. The research has therefore been 
concerned to understand the extent to which these new systems are being developed 
within the hospital and assess their impact on medical professional work and 
regulation. 
A new frontier for medical/managerial relations? 
These three components of policy can be interpreted as representing new fonns of 
control in the health service, explicitly over medical errors, but implicitly over 
medical work. Previous managerial policies have sought to bring about greater 
efficiency and effectiveness in the service and in doing so it has been suggested that 
they have represented challenges to medical professionalism through structures of 
control (Flynn 1992) or countervailing power (Hunter 1994). However, it could be 
argued that these changes have not directly engaged with the technical aspects of 
medicine, rather they have addressed the organisational and contextual aspects of 
medical work. Alternatively, the National System for Learning from Adverse Event 
and Near Misses could be interpreted as confronting the technical aspects of medical 
expertise as it represents conceptual, cultural and structural forms of organisational 
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control that could empower hospital managers and erode features of medical 
professionalism, associated with autonomy and the regulation of quality. 
As suggested above it could represent a new discursive paradigm \\'ithin health care 
for the conceptualisation of error, which enables new forms of social control; 
structures of control are represented by bureaucratic forms of managerialism to 
analyse errors and promote change, whilst cultural modification strategies a r ~ ~ seen 
as necessary to secure occupational compliance. However, the extent to which this 
prophecy will transpire has not necessarily been born out by this research. 
The findings 
Attention turns, therefore, to the findings gathered in this study. The previous three 
chapters have given an account of the empirical data and provided both descripti ve 
and analytical dissections of the three features of the National System under 
scrutiny. These are summarised here to show how the assumptions underlying 
policy, the practical implementation of policy and the potential challenges to 
medical professionalism are in doubt. 
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The social construction of error: knowledge and pml'cr 
In chapter SIX it was shown how managers within the case-study hospital had 
appeared to talk about errors in a way that reflected the conceptual assumptions of 
theory and policy. However, it was also shown that the manner in which doctors 
talked about errors was distinct from the technical language of Human Factors, but 
instead tended to reflect the technical basis of medical practice. In the first instance, 
doctors talked about error in terms of causality or aetiology and hO\\ certain t y p ~ s s of 
medical work could lead to error. These included the decision-making aspects of 
diagnosis and treatment, the technical performance aspects of care delivery: and the 
contribution of equipment and organisational systems. This does appear to resemble 
the active/latent aspects of Human Factors, but rather than being based upon the 
theoretical assumptions of social psychology the medical 'technical' interpretation 
of error was based upon the esoteric knowledge of medical practice. It is this 
medical knowledge acting as a social discourse (Foucault 1970, Turner 1995) that 
contributes to the medical construction of error. So initially, doctors made sense of 
errors with reference to bio-medical knowledge. 
In addition, when doctors talked about error along these teclmical dimensions it was 
apparent that this knowledge was characterised by compleXIty, gaps and 
uncertainties, reflecting the work of Fox (1975). Many doctors talked of their work 
as an "art" rather than a '·science". In consequence, the medical interpretation of 
error appeared to be shaped by other social and cultural factors associated with the 
transient character of errors. Here it was found that medical perception and 
interpretation were shaped and filtered with reference to issues such as compkxity, 
expectation a n ~ ~ severity. These reflect the tacit assumptions that guide medical 
practice and coalesce within the norms of medical work and together contribute to 
the interpretation of an event and the meaning of an error. 
It is the combination of expert medical knowledge and the socio-cultural features of 
medical practice that provide the basis of the medical construction of error. 
Importantly, this construction is derived from knowledge distinct from the prevailing 
assumptions of Human Factors and so the medical meaning of error develops along 
different parameters from those of managers and policy-makers. Not only does this 
question the realist basis of the prevailing approach but it seriously undermines the 
capacity of policy to adequately manage errors as the medical construction of error 
promotes particular forms of social action, typically associated with professional 
systems, in a similar way that the policy construction promotes action in terms of 
incident reporting. 
Medical culture: divergence and resistance 
In chapter seven, it was shown how the system of incident reporting being developed 
in the case study hospital accords with the expectations of policy, but also how a 
variety of local or directorate approaches were developing concurrently. 
Importantly, it was shown how these variations emerged in response to pressure both 
inside and outside the hospital. On the one hand directorate forms of incident 
reporting had developed in response to guidance from hospital management. 
however, it was also apparent that other pressures, such as litigation, professional 
recommendation and clinical leadership, all contributed to diversity within the 
hospital. 
It was also shown that underlying the variations in medical incident reporting \\'L'rC 
important attitudes and beliefs that have been neglected in policy. Here it was sho\\'11 
that doctors frequently questioned the purpose of incident reporting, they \\'l're 
inhibited by blame, found difficulty with processes of form filling, had a general 
loathing for managerial bureaucracy, and also exhibited a constructive difference 
between what should and should not be reported. These can be interpreted as 
relevant cultural characteristics of medical work that influence incident reporting. In 
policy it is frequently stated that there is a need to change medical culture and this 
often focuses on the problem of blame. This was indeed an important component 
within the broader medical attitude towards reporting, but it was not the only one. 
Rather than theorising organisational culture in a structural-functionalist light, it was 
suggested that by exploring the emergent interactional qualities of medical culture it 
is feasible to appreciate occupational beliefs and values as representing the basis for 
occupational resistance, conflict and control. In this way it is possible to sec the 
cultural traits of medicine, in the context of incident reporting, as not just passi Vl' 
barriers to reporting, but as active forms of resistant to further bureaucratic 
encroach men t. 
In this context, incident reporting was regarded as merely another "paper exercise" 
that was detached from the 'realities' of medical work. Although there was some 
appreciation of the need to recognise the organisational contribution to errors, 
doctors strongly believed that only they could interpret issues of quality given their 
expertise and experiences of working at the "coal face" and providing care. As such 
doctors were not merely critical of the purpose of incident reporting, but in ordl'r to 
limit its encroachment into medical practice, other underlying and emergent cultural 
characteristics were evident. These served to bind medical professionals together, 
within localised directorates and also across the hospital, in rejecting and resisting 
incident reporting; rendering the notion of cultural modification problematic on both 
conceptual and also practical dimensions. 
Error management: professional control 
Given the divergent construction of error and also the cultural resistance to reporting 
it is hardly surprising to find that the emerging corporate approach to error 
management was lacking in potency. It was shown in chapter eight that the hospital 
was developing its systems of clinical risk management in anticipation of the 
National System; however, it was also revealed that a multiplicity of risk 
management and quality improvement schemes existed at the directorate level of thl' 
hospital with varying degrees of integration with the hospital system. Underlying 
these differences was a clear preference for medical control or leadership in the 
interpretation and analysis of errors. Reflecting the perceived illegitimacy of 
managerial expertise to understand medical errors, doctors tended to favour medical 
approaches to quality improvement, particularly those already established within 
medical practice, such as morbidity and mortality conferences and audit meetings. 
Nevertheless it was found that forms of error management had indeed developed 
within certain directorates and reflected the principles of the corporate approach and 
policy. Two key factors appeared to influence these developments, the first was the 
socio-political context of the speciality, for example obstetrics was recognised as a 
high risk and high litigious area of health care and had therefore adopted forms of 
risk management. The second was the introduction of a risk co-ordinator at the 
directorate level who could promote risk management and provide a local lead. 
However, these actors had to work closely with medical leaders within each 
directorate in order to make meaningful change. Furthermore, where forms of risk 
management were being introduced at the directorate level it was found that rather 
than mirroring the desired corporate approach, directorates were more likely to 
"adapt" these systems to concur with the established techniques already in place 
within medical regulation. 
In terms of analysing errors and promoting organisational or occupational change it 
was therefore the case that the hospital-wide approach was superseded by 
developments at the directorate level. In terms of promoting change there was little 
acknowledgement of the hospital's approach, whereas at the directorate level where 
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such systems had been adapted, such as risk stratifications, it did appear that change 
was being made. Importantly, all directorates, with and without an explicit error 
management system, remained reliant upon established professional and collegial 
systems of quality control. In consequence while the implementation of the National 
System may indeed introduce new bureaucratic structures in order to learn from 
errors and promote change, the extent to which these structures are penetrating the 
occupational hierarchies of medicine is bounded within the context of existing 
professional systems. In essence, the systems are not having a direct impact upon 
medical work as yet, and the adaptation of these systems within medical work may 
also represent and attempt to maintain clinical leadership. 
Summary 
From these findings it is possible to draw several conclusions. First, by developing a 
constructionist account of medical error not only are the realist assumptions of 
policy questioned, but it also reveals how medical knowledge and culture underpin 
the medical construction of error in a way that provides the basis for divergent forms 
of social control. Second and following on from these findings, medical participation 
in incident reporting is inhibited by the lack of integration between the medical 
meaning of error and the purpose of incident reporting, whilst the cultural character 
of medical work is in many ways opposed to increased forms of management. 
Finally and bringing all the findings together, the capacity of a hospital-wide 
management system to penetrate medical work is limited by the divergent 
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conceptualisation of error, cultural resistance and also by the preference for localised 
systems of quality control that reflect the established principles of medical 
regulation and collegiality; where the medical interpretation of error is accorded the 
required sympathy and technical understanding. Individually and together these 
three themes contribute a serious critique to policy and question the extent to which 
the implementation of policy will radically alter medical/managerial relations and 
result in some of power transfer. 
A policy in question 
The two main conceptual questions that surround this policy are the realist notion of 
error and the structural-functionalist approach to organisational culture. In chapter 
three it was shown how policy is heavily influenced by the theoretical assumptions 
of human factors and social psychological accounts of error. It was then shown in 
chapter four how epistemologies of risk can be adapted for the study of error. This 
then provided the research with a socio-cultural and discursive base from which to 
empirically explore medical errors. From this perspective the research has not only 
shown the way in which doctors give meaning to errors in their work, but 
importantly it has demonstrated an important epistemological divergence with 
policy. Fundamentally the medical concept of error is not necessarily commensurate 
with that of policy. It is based upon different assumptions and theoretical 
foundations, where medical training and knowledge take precedent over the abstract 
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theory of cognition, where the experience and complexity of medical work have 
more importance that the rational and logical "chain of events" that produce error. 
Policy does not preclude these factors; it simply fails to give them any consideration, 
because it remains committed to a technical social psychological account. This thesis 
therefore questions the realist basis of policy, and as it has been shown, this has a 
serious consequence for medical participation in incident reporting. 
The second questionable aspect of policy is the notion of cultural change. Reason 
(1999) recognises the various theoretically positions surrounding organisational 
culture, but endorses a structural-functionalist perspective (Parker 2000), whereby 
management interventions can manipulate and change occupational cultures. 
However, as shown in chapter four this fails to account for the various ways in 
which culture can be understood or how it operates within organisations. 
Specifically, by conceptualising culture as a structural property 'of an organisation 
health policy fails to consider the interactional basis of culture and how cultures can 
represent the coming together of values and beliefs as expressions of power and 
resistance (Parker 2000). 
It is the contention of this thesis that medical professionals exhibit cultural traits that 
emerge through the interacting influences of shared workplace norms, organisational 
issues and also wider professional standards of behaviour. In this way medical 
professional culture is not something that can be easily manipulated by external 
groups, but is an emergent feature of medical life. Furthermore, from a radical 
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perspective medical culture is not just divergent but can be resistant. Specifically, it 
is resistant to incident reporting and increased managerial activity in medical work. 
By not recognising the contested debates surrounding organisational culture the 
policy fails to have a meaningful basis for promoting increased medical r e p o r t i n ~ ~
and also fails to recognise the normative resistance to the policy. 
The policy therefore rests upon particular assumptions about the organisation l)j 
health services and the character of errors. By drawing on a narrow theoretical 
framework the policy is not open to the possible problems inherent in its 
assumptions, in particular the divergent construction of error that inhibits reporting 
and the cultural resistance to change. By revealing and exploring these assumptions 
this thesis is implicitly questioning the merits of policy and also the thoroughness of 
the theoretical field from which it was spawned. This is not to say that these ideas 
are necessarily "wrong", but they fail to capture the whole picture. 
Medical professionalism and the nlanagement of medical errors 
Attention now turns to the broader theoretical debates that have framed this research. 
In chapter two reference was made to Titmuss's (1963) observation that desired 
changes in the social services may draw upon expertise outside that of the 
professional groups that actually provide the services. furthermore, this external 
knowledge may call into question the relationship between the professions and the 
state. This thesis has directly addressed this issue in the context of health service 
errors and the medical profession. It is politically and socially recognised that 
mistakes in the delivery of health care are a major problem and they must be tackled 
in a manner that supersedes the established forms of quality control. Here policy has 
taken guidance from relatively new fields of management and quality improvement 
to develop a National System. Importantly, the "repository of expertise" guiding this 
policy is external to the knowledge and practices of the medical profession. In 
consequence the policy could be altering the relationship between the medical 
profession and the state as the established form of quality control or regulation in 
health care are joined by new practices that reside outside the realm of medical 
work. 
Medical professionalism and managerialism 
It was shown in chapter two that the medical profession within the NHS can be 
characterised as possessing particular forms of fonnal and informal regulation that 
are overtly concerned with ensuring the competency and quality of medical work 
(although it is also recognised that they also serve other functions in the maintenance 
of professional status and organisational control). Freidson's (1970) study of the 
medical profession showed that professional regulation is premised upon the 
acknowledged expertise of occupational esoteric knowledge that is only acquired 
and controlled by members of the profession. The opportunity for other occupational 
groups to evaluate and assess medical work is therefore regarded as limited and 
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illegitimate. In consequence it has been suggested that professional groups can 
engage In their work with a high degree of autonomy and ( s a l 1 l ~ t i o n e d ) ) self-
regulation. 
It remains necessary, however, to appreciate the bounded, contextual and political 
character of medical work, in particular the contingent relationship with the State 
and the way medical regulation is legitimised by political and social endorsement 
(Freidson 1970, Moran and Woods 1993). Nevertheless, the forms of quality control 
at the practitioner level of medicine have traditionally been associated with a range 
of formal and informal systems that can be seen as predominantly professionally-led. 
It is this important relationship between the profession, the state and the puhlic 
(Salter 2000) within the context of health service errors and declining public trust 
that can be seen as driving changes in medical regulation. As mentioned in chapter 
four it is the special conceptual triangle between uncertainty, risk and en-or that 
contextualise the patient safety agenda in the NHS. This policy can therefore be 
interpreted as an attempt to re-establish the trust at the centre of triangle by bringing 
about greater certainty and control of medical errors and risks. 
It was also pointed out that over the last twenty years there have been several 
organisational changes in the NHS introducing new management roles within the 
health service. These have been interpreted as altering the work of doctors and the 
professional status of medicine (e.g. Cox 1991, Elston 1991, Harrison and Pollitt 
1995), and are associated with the political desire to acquire greater efficiency and 
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accountability in the organisation and delivery of health care. However, it was also 
argued that the extent to which these changes have fundamentally "challenged" 
medical professionalism is open to debate. Managers have indeed acquired ne\\' 
responsibilities for the co-ordination and planning of services, but there has been 
little direct involvement within clinical work. Alongside these developments there 
has been growing concern with not just the efficiency of st?rvices but also 
effectiveness and quality. In consequence, managerial techniques commonly found 
in private enterprise have increasingly been adopted in the NHS, for example forms 
of Total Quality Management and Risk Management. These have promoted new 
forms of management responsibility in health care and have recently culminated in 
clinical governance as a mechanism to align professional responsibility for quality 
with that of wider political and managerial aims. 
Within this managerial context and also with reference to wider social and political 
recognition of health service errors, the National System for Learning lrom Advcrsl' 
Events and Near Misses builds on the capacity of management to develop a more 
rigorous, formalised and bureaucratic system of quality improvement that could 
represent a break with established forms of professional regulation and introduce 
new forms of organisational control. What then are the implications for medical 
professionalism and medical/managerial relations given these findings? Docs thc 
policy represent a challenge to the basis of medical regulation and discretion, and 
introduced new forms of organisational control? 
The discursive, cultural and structural management o/medicallabollr? 
As mentioned above, the National System is comprised of three key features that, 
through its full implementation, could offer to transform medical/managerial 
relations and alter the basis of medical professional regulation. Firstl y, the concept 
of error advocated in policy provides for a construction of error that is fashioned 
from a particular theoretical and discursive context, associated with Human Factors. 
In this way, medical errors could be understood within the context of an expertise 
that is external to medical knowledge and practice, which has itself been found to 
reinforce professional status (Arluke 1977, Bosk 1979, Rosenthal 1995). This 
alternate theory of error and error management therefore has the potential to offer 
non-medical groups a legitimate expertise from which to make service 
improvements. Importantly, this knowledge calls into question medical expertise and 
provides a basis for social power: defining and controlling the social world of 
medical errors. 
Secondly, the success of policy is said to rely on making cultural change within the 
health service to promote incident reporting and occupational acceptance to 
organisational change (Department of Health 2000). It was shown that the rise of 
culture management is associated with the emergence of post-bureaucratic 
organisations that are characterised by flat structures and devolved responsibility or 
'relative autonomy'. In the place of rigid 'rule and role' hierarchies it has been 
suggested that managers should seek the compliance of the workforce through 
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normative and cultural alignment. Such an approach appears appropriate for the 
management of professional work, given that these occupational groups are said to 
possess high levels of autonomy, and therefore cultural control as opposed to rule-
based control may be more successful. By interpreting policy in this way, it can be 
suggested that the promotion of cultural change to secure medical participation in 
incident reporting represents the normative control of medicine. Such cultural 
change could lead to doctors being more open about their practice, providing 
managers with detailed information about their performance, in particular their 
substandard performance, and it could encourage doctors to accept occupational and 
organisational change based upon the theoretical ideals of error management. In 
other words it could represent a substantial challenge to medical autonomy external 
to medical knowledge and driven by managerial action. 
Thirdly, it could also be the case that the introduction or new bureaucratic 
procedures for incident reporting, analysing errors and making service changes 
could also represent new structures of control in IDe health service. Rather thall 
relying on purely post-Fordist notions of cultural change, health policy is also 
introducing more traditional Fordist patterns of control (Harrison 2002). This is 
particular centred on the use of external knowledge, e.g. Human Factors, to guide 
organisational and occupational change. Where incident data is used to evaluate 
medical work through the principles of error management organisational change 
could serve to regulate medical performance and direct occupational change. 
Taken together these components of the National System for Learning from Adverse 
Events and Near Misses could present hospital managers with new organisational 
powers and serve to change the regulatory character of QJ.edicine. However, it has 
been shown that for each of these potential domains of organisational power there 
are considerable reservations. 
A new frontier for medical/managerial relations? 
To what extent, therefore, does the National System for Learning from Adverse 
Events and Near Misses represent a new frontier for medicaVmanagerial relations in 
the NHS? 
Firstly, the data shows that the medical construction of error not only underpins how 
doctors make sense of errors in their work, but it provides a basis for social 
legitimacy and power. Returning to the works of Hughes (1951) and Freidson 
(1970), expert groups can claim legitimacy ~ ~when defining the character of 
occupational labour and its consequences. For medical errors it remains the case that 
esoteric medical knowledge in conjunction with the tacit and cultural features of 
medical practice lead to a complex construction of error. This has several 
consequences. Firstly, it promotes or favours particular forms of social action, 
particularly associated with common experience, expertise, and collegiality. 
Secondly t by referring to expertise and the everyday character of medical work, 
doctors can legitimately "confuse" the meaning of error making external evaluation 
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difficult. Thirdly, these serve to reinforce medical legitimacy and also emphasise the 
illegitimacy of other bodies of knowledge that could attempt to make ~ c n s e e of 
medical errors. In this way, the policy construction of error does not have sufficient 
legitimacy with medical professionals and this key point ensures that all other 
features of the National System are conceptually undermined, including reporting 
and management-led change. 
Second, there is an evident problem with "getting doctors to report". There are 
important variations in medical reporting and these show that there are certain 
potential determinants. For example, reporting appears more prevalent when it 
contributes to existing professional systems, where professional associations have 
instigated it, or where there is local professional control of the reporting processes. It 
appears that there is a widespread rejection of hospital-based incident reporting. This 
raises serious questions about the extent of cultural control. Initially, policy seems 
vague as to what it expects of cultural change and managers appear disinterested in 
actually engaging with professionals on a normative level. It appears therefore that 
incident reporting has been introduced but there has been little dialogue or 
engagement with medical groups. In consequence, doctors seem to have developed, 
or reinforced, a culture that favours internal regulatory systems and actively rejects 
external systems of evaluation. 
Thirdly, while the hospital may have developed new procedures and policies to 
inform the application of error management it appears that important occupational 
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variations have developed at the local level of the hospital and within existin a 
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professional regulatory systems. It was generally the case that doctors remaineJ 
committed to established regulatory systems a§sQ_ciated with internal collegiality, 
because these provide environments where issues of medical error could be 
discussed with like-minded peers who shared the necessary expertise. Furthermore, 
it was found that where variants of the hospital-wide system were being used in 
medical practice, there was a tendency to adapt and adopt the principles of error 
management. In other words, doctors did not subscribe to the managerial approach, 
but attempt to apply aspects of error management within existing professional 
regulatory systems. On the one hand this may demonstrate that doctors are indcl'd 
engaging with the policy agenda, but as Ashworth et al (2002) suggest this could 
represent 'paying lip service' to error management. On the other hand, it ensures that 
doctors retain control of these systems and are limiting the managerial evaluation of 
medical work. 
In consequence, it can be argued t h a t . . J j 1 ~ ~ _patient safety agenda within the NHS, 
specifically the National System, could indeed represent a new frontier for 
manageriaUmedical relations. However, this research has found that important 
discursi ve, cultural and occupational features of medial professionalism serve tu 
reinforce medical legitimacy in this area. The technical aspects of medical autonomy 
are being secured by the, well-documented, approach of presuming the superiority of 
medical knowledge and experience to exclude managerial expertise. In terms of the 
regulation of medical work, it appears that doctors still claim the abi lity to define the 
basis of performance and are excluding non-medical groups from actively 
participating in these forms of quality control; perpetuating the perceived flaws of 
professional regulation (Ashworth et al 20Q21. This is achieved through 'adapting 
and adopting' these new forms of quality improvement within existing professional 
systems. 
What may be of interest, however, is the extent to which this policy agenda develops 
in the future, especially if political pressure for change in the regulation of medicine 
persists. While it has been found that medical control is being retained through 
forms of discursive, cultural and structural power, it could be the case that the 
maintained commitment to policy implementation will prompt doctors to 
increasingly absorb the practices of error management within existing professional 
regulatory systems. Whilst these may appear to reinforce collegiality and 
occupational control, it may also begin to represent 'technologies of the self and 
forms of 'governmentality' (Foucault 1991). Specifically, in attempting to maintain 
occupational control, doctors may be (equ i red to take on the responsibilities for error 
management in the format advocated in policy. Although this may require a radical 
cultural change in medicine, this may be seen as necessary to limit managerial 
interference, but it could actually lead to professional conformity as the 'messages' 
and 'practices' of error management are followed. Like Hoggett's (1996) notion of 
'freedom within boundaries' medical autonomy may be directed and bounded by the 
expectations of policy. 
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Appendix]. List of Codes 
Accountabili ty 
Acti ve errors 
Adverse Event 
Analysis 
Audit 
Autonomy 
Background 
Blame 
Change 
Clinical governance 
Clinical judgment 
College 
Conflict 
CRMC - general 
CRMC - function 
CRMC - conflict 
CRCM - decision-making 
CRMC - communication 
Culture 
Definitions 
Directorate - acute med 
Directorate - Anaesthesia 
Directorate - character 
Directorate - control 
Directorate - Obs 
Directorate - rehab 
Directorate - reporting 
Directorate - Surgery 
Directorate variation 
Di vision of labour 
Error 
Error - avoid 
Error - causes 
Error - complications 
Error - example 
Error - filter 
Error - impact 
Error - impact health 
Error - judge 
EITor - pathway 
Error - patient uncertainty 
Error - perception 
Error - technical 
Error - types 
Infonnation cascade 
Latent errors 
Litigation 
Management 
Management -speak 
Management - control 
Management - devolve 
Management - expertise 
Management - future 
Management - limited 
Management - IK'rL'cption 
Managerial - action 
Media 
Medical - awareness 
Medical - Competence 
Medical - control 
Medical - expertise 
Medical - involvement 
Medical - working 
Medical reporting 
National 
Near miss 
NHS general 
Non-medics on medics 
Organisational links 
Pathway 
Person - clinical director 
Person - clinical manager 111 
management 
Person - management 
Person - medic 
Person - medic in management 
Person - risk manager 
Professional ism 
Regulation 
Reporting 
Reporting - codes 
Reporting - control 
Reporting - facilitator 
Reporti ng - mandatory 
Reporting - not for all 
Reporting - perception 
·B2 
Reporting - problems 
Reporting - responsibility 
Reporting - types 
Reporting barrier 
Resistance 
Resources 
Risk - modelling 
Risk - perverse incentives 
Risk assessment 
Risk management - example 
Risk management 1 
Risks - balancing 
Service change 
Sharing lessons 
Tradition 
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Appendix 2. The Hospital Incident Reporting Form 
Page One. 
HOSPITAL NHS TRUST 
UNTOWARD INCIDENT REPORTING FORM 
PLEASE COMPLETE IN BLOCK LETTERS USING A BLACK PEN. 
Please ensure that you record FACT and NOT OPINION. Reporting should be immediate if duth or serious injury 
has occurred. 
ORIGINATING DEPT/WARD --............... __ .... _____ DIRECTORATE.. .. _ .. ___ . __ ._._._ .. o IyISION ____ ._. __ ._ ...... _ ...... . 
Date of incident 00 0000 Day of week. .................................... . TlIDe of incident 00 00 
~ ~... _1""""dDd. 
Subject In·ratient o O u t · r ~ t i ~ n t t 0 o o EmploYft o 
Visitor I contractor o Fire o V . n d ~ l a m m or tlldt 0 Equipmmt f . i 1 u ~ ~ 0 
Other, please speciiy: ........ _ .... _ ............. _._ ............. _ .... _ ................ _._._ ............. _ .... _ ... _ .. _ .... _ ..... _._. 
Untoward incident o Nearmi!>S 0 
Dangerous occurrence 0 Accident 0 
Place patient sticker here 
if patient involved 
Please state First Aid given to non patients: 
For p ~ t i e n t t reloted Incidenbl 
Responsible Dr. notified of incident: YES 0 NO 0 
s"rious Qinial Untoward Inadent 0 M'JOr Injury 0 
Vwlent incident 0 
Details of ~ r s o n n involved it not ~ t i e n l l (ie. >tafl. visilor) 
SURNAME ... _. __ . ___ .... _ .. 
FORENAME(S) .. _ .. ___ ... _._. 
JOB TITLE _ .. _._. ___ . __ ... __ ...•.. _ .......... _..... GRADE.. __ . __ ._ ... __ ._ .. . 
Date of Birth 0000 DO 
Addre ..... _ .. __ ._ .. _ ....... _ ....... _ .......... _._. __ ...... _ .. _ ....... _._ ... _._ .. _ ........ . 
TIme notified 0000 Tune eumined by Dr. 0000 
~ g n o : s i s s at time of ir":ident .... __ .. _ .... _u .......................................... _ ... _._ P.iillient's Coosultant .. _ ...... _ .. _ .. _ ......... _ ....... _._ ..................... _._ ............. _ .. _ .... _ ... . 
Signature of examining Dr ....... _ ..................................... _ .......... _ ...... _ .... _ ... NAlnf' 01 ~ x . l . m i n i n g g Or. (pLt .. w print) .. ______ . __ . __ ..... _____ ._._._ .• _. __ _ 
Location of incident 
Incident category 
Code ODD 
Code 000 
If other, specify location ......................... _ ....................................... . 
If other. specify ................................................................................ . 
DETAILS OF I ~ C I D E N T T (Give brief factual account/outline of incident. What7 Whe.re7 Staff i n v ~ l v e d 7 7
Equipment Failure? If injury has occurred please describe fully, including whether right or left Side etc.) 
F It db Signature ................................... ··········· ... DateODDOOO orm comp e e y .................................... . 
C . db Signature ........................... _ .......... ········ .. DateDDDDDO ounterslgne y ....................................... . 
limeDDDD 
rART 1 
47405 
Page two 
WITNESS STATEMENTS - to be completed by any person witnessing incidenl 
If there was no witness please write Uno witness" and sign arid date. 
Witness statements to be 4ueumented accurately below. 
Please document FACf and NOT OPINION. If a piece of equipment is involved please quote serial 
number of piece of equipment involved. 
Wltness name: ........................................................................................ Job title: .............. _ ... __ ........................................ . 
Place of work: ............................................................................ _ ....... _ .. Date of incident: ................................................. . 
Witness address if non staff: ................................................................................................................................................. . 
S PRINT NAME: .................................. . SIGNATURE OF WITNES : ..................................................... .. 
DATE: .............................................................................................................................................................. . 
h t y this blank sheet and .tttach edra If more than one witness statement is to be made please p 0 o c o ~ ~
completed witness statements securely to the main Untowud InCident Form. 
rART 2 
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.. us 
rage Three 
OSPITAL NHS TRUST 
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTING FORM 
PLEASE COMPLETE IN BLOCK LETTERS USING A BLACK PEN. 
Incident reported to: Consultant 0 
MESUO 
Relatives informed of incident YESD 
Date of Incident 0 0 00 00 
Line Manager D Health &: Safety D 
Other .. __ ......... _ ........................................... . 
NoD Not applicable D 
Investigation carried out by ............................................................... . 
Designation .......................................................................................... . 
Statement of immediate action taken including outcomes of any investigations carried out (to be cODlplded by Investig.til\& pel'S4ln u 
NDled .bove). If a serious untowud incident hu occurred pleue foUow the f1owch .. t (Appendixl) which Indlates the Itportina 
structure lor both serious cUnica1.n·l Knous non·<linlal untow.ud Inddenu. 
SIGNATURE: ................................................................................................... DATE: ........................ · .......... · .. · .. · .... · .. · .... · .. · 
Statement of Action necessary to prevent future recurrence. it any (ie. changes in policy. further training etc.). This section to be 
completed by Head of Departmentl Senior Nurse Manav-r/Consultant. 
SIGNATURE: ............................... · .. · ........ · .. · .... · .. · .. ····· .. · .. · ............................... DATE: ................................................. ~ ~ . ~ ~ J 
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